Jose Augustine Delarocha v. Commonwealth ( 1999 )


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  •                       COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Coleman and Lemons
    Argued at Salem, Virginia
    JOSE AUGUSTINE DELAROCHA
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.       Record No. 1537-98-3    CHIEF JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK
    JUNE 1, 1999
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CRAIG COUNTY
    Duncan M. Byrd, Jr., Judge
    Shirley B. Jamison for appellant.
    John H. McLees, Jr., Assistant Attorney
    General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General,
    on brief), for appellee.
    Jose Augustine Delarocha (appellant) was convicted of
    driving under the influence, in violation of Code § 18.2-266.
    Appellant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to
    suppress the evidence because he was not given Miranda warnings
    at the scene.     For the following reasons, we affirm.
    I.
    In reviewing the trial court's denial of the motion to
    suppress, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to
    the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable inferences
    deducible therefrom.      See Giles v. Commonwealth, 
    28 Va. App. 527
    , 532, 
    507 S.E.2d 102
    , 105 (1998).     Although we review the
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010,
    this opinion is not designated for publication.
    trial court's findings of historical fact only for "clear
    error," we review de novo the trial court's application of
    defined legal standards to the facts of the case.     See id.
    An agreed statement of facts by the parties established
    that on September 13, 1997, Trooper Lloyd Craddock (Craddock)
    was dispatched to an automobile accident in the Little Cuba
    Section of Craig County. 1   En route to the accident site,
    Craddock met a deputy who had been present at the accident scene
    and advised Craddock that appellant had been drinking.      When he
    arrived at the scene, Craddock saw appellant's truck "which had
    struck a tree."    At that time,
    [t]he trooper spoke with the driver, who
    advised the trooper that he had wrecked
    about 4:30 to 5:00 p.m., then he advised it
    was 5:00 p.m. Driver Delarocha also advised
    the trooper he had nothing to drink since
    the accident. The Commonwealth's Attorney
    asked the Trooper if when he first arrived
    if [sic] he noticed anything unusual about
    the physical condition of the defendant and
    the Trooper stated no.
    Delarocha then went on to advise the trooper
    that he had drunk 2-1/2 quarts, and that he
    had had his last drink somewhere on this
    road before he wrecked at 5:00 p.m. He also
    advised the trooper that he had no
    handicaps, was not on medication and that he
    had gone through the 9th grade and had his
    GED.
    1
    The record does not contain a transcript of the trial, but
    includes a written statement of facts signed by the trial judge.
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    Craddock had appellant perform several field sobriety tests,
    after which appellant was advised of the preliminary alcosensor
    and the implied consent law and placed under arrest.
    II.
    Appellant contends that the trial court erred by admitting
    his statements in evidence.   He argues that at the time Craddock
    began questioning him at the scene of the accident, he was "in
    custody" for Miranda purposes and any evidence obtained prior to
    his being advised of his rights was inadmissible.   We disagree.
    In Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
     (1966), the United
    States Supreme Court held that an individual must be warned
    before any questioning by police of his right to remain silent
    and his right to an attorney only when that "individual is taken
    into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the
    authorities in any significant way and is subjected to
    questioning."   Id. at 478.   However, the Supreme Court later
    observed that "police officers are not required to administer
    Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question.    Nor is the
    requirement of warnings to be imposed simply because the
    questioning takes place in the station house, or because the
    questioned person is one whom the police suspect.    Miranda
    warnings are required only where there has been such a
    restriction on a person's freedom as to render him 'in
    custody.'"   Oregon v. Mathiason, 
    429 U.S. 492
    , 495 (1977).
    Additionally, Miranda does not affect "general questioning
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    of citizens in the fact-finding process."     Pruett v.
    Commonwealth, 
    232 Va. 266
    , 271, 
    351 S.E.2d 1
    , 4 (1986).     "The
    mere presence of an officer and the mere fact of an
    investigation does not invoke Miranda."     Jordan v. Commonwealth,
    
    216 Va. 768
    , 772, 
    222 S.E.2d 573
    , 577 (1976).
    The present case is controlled by Nash v. Commonwealth, 
    12 Va. App. 550
    , 
    404 S.E.2d 743
     (1991), a factually similar case.
    In that case, the defendant was involved in an automobile
    accident and was later arrested for driving under the influence
    of alcohol.   When the police arrived at the scene of the
    accident, the defendant was found walking approximately one mile
    from his car.   The police brought the defendant back to the
    scene and questioned him concerning the accident.    During the
    investigation, the arresting officer learned how the accident
    occurred.    He smelled alcohol on the defendant and noticed that
    the defendant’s eyes were bloodshot.    The officer asked the
    defendant whether he had been drinking, and the defendant stated
    that he had consumed five or six beers.   After administering
    several field sobriety tests and an alcosensor test, the officer
    placed the defendant under arrest for driving under the
    influence.    The officer then informed the defendant of the
    implied consent law and his Miranda rights.     See id. at 551-52,
    404 S.E. at 743-44.
    The defendant filed a pretrial suppression motion, arguing
    that any statements he made before he was given his Miranda
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    rights were inadmissible.    Affirming the trial court’s refusal
    to suppress the evidence, we held that the defendant was not "in
    custody" for Miranda purposes.     Id. at 553, 404 S.E.2d at 744.
    We reasoned:
    Custodial interrogation means "questioning
    initiated by law enforcement officers after
    a person has been taken into custody or
    otherwise deprived of his freedom of action
    in any significant way." However, persons
    temporarily detained pursuant to routine
    traffic stops are not "in custody" for
    Miranda purposes. In such cases, "the
    officer may ask the detainee a moderate
    number of questions to determine his
    identity and to try to obtain information
    confirming or dispelling the officer’s
    suspicions" that the detainee has committed
    a crime.
    Id. at 552, 404 S.E.2d at 744 (citations omitted) (emphasis
    added).   The record did not suggest that the defendant was
    forced or unwilling to return to the accident scene and answer
    the officer's investigatory questions.    Based on those facts, we
    concluded in Nash that the defendant's statements were properly
    admitted into evidence.     See id. at 553, 404 S.E.2d at 744.
    In the instant case, the facts are essentially identical to
    the facts in Nash.   The statement of facts does not show that
    prior to Craddock arriving on the scene the deputies had taken
    appellant into physical custody or that appellant had remained
    on the scene because he had yielded to their show of authority.
    The record does not suggest that appellant was either forced or
    unwilling to talk to Craddock and, therefore, appellant was not
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    "in custody" for Miranda purposes.     The trooper had a reasonable
    suspicion that appellant had committed a traffic violation as
    his vehicle had struck a tree on the side of the road.    "Thus,
    he was entitled to ask [appellant] a moderate number of
    questions to determine [appellant's] identity and to confirm or
    dispel his suspicions regarding the accident."     Id.
    Nevertheless, appellant argues that he was "in custody" for
    Miranda purposes because Trooper Craddock testified on
    cross-examination that appellant was not free to go.     We find
    this argument without merit.   Whether a suspect is "in custody"
    under Miranda "depends on the objective circumstances of the
    interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either
    the interrogating officers or the person being questioned."
    Harris v. Commonwealth, 
    27 Va. App. 554
    , 564, 
    500 S.E.2d 257
    ,
    262 (1998) (citing Stansbury v. California, 
    511 U.S. 318
    , 323
    (1994)).   "Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary,
    probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis."     Wren v. United
    States, 
    517 U.S. 806
    , 813 (1996).    "[T]he fact that the officer
    does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the
    reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer's
    action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the
    circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action."        Id.
    (citing Scott v. United States, 
    436 U.S. 128
    , 138 (1978)
    (interpreting United States v. Robinson, 
    414 U.S. 218
     (1973))).
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    In the instant case, Craddock's "subjective belief" that
    appellant was not free to leave was not determinative of whether
    appellant was "in custody" for Miranda purposes.    The record
    demonstrates that appellant's statements were made during an
    informal interview that was conducted on the side of the road.
    Craddock never told appellant he was not free to leave, nor did
    he draw a weapon, handcuff appellant or otherwise restrain
    appellant's freedom at the scene to the degree associated with a
    formal arrest.   Although there was a second police officer at
    the scene, the record is silent as to whether that deputy talked
    with appellant or had any interaction with him.    Moreover, the
    investigation took place at a neutral setting, namely, the site
    of the accident.
    A review of all the circumstances establishes that
    appellant was not subjected to a custodial interrogation prior
    to his arrest.   Accordingly, no Miranda warnings were required,
    and the trial court did not err in refusing to suppress the
    evidence.   Appellant's conviction is affirmed.
    Affirmed.
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