Alan Richard Stewart v. Phylla Jean Stewart ( 1999 )


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  •                        COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present:   Judges Bray, Annunziata and Frank
    ALAN RICHARD STEWART
    MEMORANDUM OPINION *
    v.   Record No. 1483-98-2                       PER CURIAM
    MAY 18, 1999
    PHYLLA JEAN STEWART
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY
    William R. Shelton, Judge
    (Carol A. N. Breit; John A. Gibney; Shuford,
    Rubin & Gibney, on brief), for appellant.
    (Thomas W. Blue, on brief), for appellee.
    Alan Richard Stewart (husband) appeals the decision of the
    circuit court granting Phylla Jean Stewart (wife) a divorce and
    deciding other issues.    Husband raises the following issues on
    appeal:    (1) whether the trial court denied him due process; (2)
    whether he received proper notice; (3) whether the trial court
    erred in finding him in default; (4) whether the trial court
    erred by denying him the opportunity to appear, present
    evidence, and defend the case; (5) whether there was proper
    service and return on service; (6) whether there was sufficient
    evidence to support the ground of divorce; (7) whether there was
    sufficient evidence to support the financial award against
    *Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010,
    this opinion is not designated for publication.
    husband; and (8) whether the trial court had jurisdiction to
    grant the relief awarded.    Upon reviewing the record and briefs
    of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit.
    Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial
    court.     See Rule 5A:27.
    The parties were married in Henrico County on April 1,
    1995, and last lived together in Chesterfield County.    Wife
    commenced this action by filing a bill of complaint in
    Chesterfield County on November 30, 1995, alleging that husband
    abandoned her on November 24, 1995.     Husband was personally
    served with the subpoena in chancery and bill of complaint in
    Minnesota on June 24, 1996.   Husband commenced an action in
    Minnesota, serving wife on May 3, 1996.    The Minnesota action
    was dismissed on March 19, 1997.   By letter dated January 31,
    1997, husband's Minnesota counsel contacted the trial judge,
    referenced the pending Virginia divorce action, and stated that
    "[i]t is our belief that our service was completed before the
    service of this matter in the State of Virginia."    Husband filed
    no further pleadings in the Virginia action prior to entry of
    the final decree on October 8, 1997.    On October 8, 1997, wife's
    counsel received a request for discovery from husband's Virginia
    counsel.    Husband filed a motion to vacate, which was granted on
    October 29, 1997, to allow the parties to brief the adequacy of
    notice received by husband.   By order entered January 14, 1998,
    the trial court ruled that husband received adequate notice and
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    that the court had jurisdiction over husband.    The court entered
    the final decree on June 8, 1998.
    Due Process and Sufficiency of Service
    Questions Presented One through Five and Eight arise from a
    single underlying issue concerning the sufficiency of the
    process served upon him so that he received due process and a
    chance to defend himself in the divorce proceedings.     We find
    husband's contentions to be without merit.
    Under Code § 8.01-328.1(A)(9), the Chesterfield County
    circuit court properly exercised personal jurisdiction over
    husband.
    A court may exercise personal jurisdiction
    over a person, who acts directly or by an
    agent, as to a cause of action arising from
    the person's:
    *       *      *      *      *      *        *
    9. Having maintained within this
    Commonwealth a matrimonial domicile at the
    time of separation of the parties upon which
    grounds for divorce or separate maintenance
    is based, or at the time a cause of action
    arose for divorce or separate maintenance or
    at the time of commencement of such suit, if
    the other party to the matrimonial
    relationship resides herein.
    Jurisdiction in subdivision 9 of this
    subsection is valid only upon proof of
    service of process pursuant to § 8.01-296 on
    the nonresident party by a person authorized
    under the provisions of § 8.01-320.
    Id.   Wife established that husband was served with process in
    accordance with the provisions of Code §§ 8.01-296 and 8.01-320.
    "When the court can exercise jurisdiction over the nonresident
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    pursuant to § 8.01-328.1, such service shall have the same
    effect as personal service on the nonresident within Virginia."
    Code § 8.01-320.   Upon service of process, husband was required
    to file a responsive pleading in the Virginia action or suffer
    the consequences of default.
    The person so served shall be in default
    upon his failure to file a pleading in
    response to original process within
    twenty-one days after such service. If no
    responsive pleading is filed within the time
    allowed by law, the case may proceed without
    service of any additional pleadings,
    including the notice of the taking of
    depositions.
    Id.
    Both Emrich v. Emrich, 
    9 Va. App. 288
    , 
    387 S.E.2d 274
    (1989), and Mackey v. Mackey, 
    203 Va. 526
    , 
    125 S.E.2d 194
    (1962), cited by husband as authority for his contention that
    the trial court abused its discretion, are factually
    distinguishable.   In Emrich, the wife failed to file a timely
    response to the bill of complaint because the parties resumed
    cohabitation and the husband fraudulently induced her not to
    answer by indicating he would seek to have the case dismissed.
    We found that the trial court abused its discretion when it
    denied the wife's motion for an extension of time to answer and
    entered a decree of divorce within two months of the filing of
    the bill of complaint, notwithstanding evidence refuting the
    husband's proffered grounds for divorce.   See Emrich, 9 Va. App.
    at 295, 387 S.E.2d at 277.   In Mackey, unlike the case here, the
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    defendant answered the complaint, but then was not provided with
    accurate notice of the taking of the deposition subsequently
    relied upon as the basis for the divorce.   See Mackey, 203 Va.
    at 527-28, 125 S.E.2d at 195-96.   Both cases are inapposite to
    the circumstances here where husband was properly served but
    failed without good cause to respond to the ongoing action.
    Trial courts may properly refuse an
    extension where the delay is due to
    negligence or carelessness on the part of a
    party. Inadvertence or failure to exercise
    due diligence under the circumstances in
    responding to legal process does not
    constitute a reasonable or legal excuse for
    failure to comply with filing requirements.
    Emrich, 9 Va. App. at 293, 387 S.E.2d at 276 (citation omitted).
    Husband filed no response to the June 1996 service of
    process.   He was aware of the ongoing Virginia proceeding, as
    demonstrated by the January 1997 letter from his Minnesota
    counsel to the Virginia trial judge.   Even after the dismissal
    of the Minnesota litigation in March 1997, husband filed no
    response in the Virginia action.   The final decree of divorce
    was entered almost two years after the filing of wife's bill of
    complaint, more than one year after the service of process on
    husband, and more than six months after the dismissal of the
    Minnesota proceeding.   Wife complied with the statutory
    requirements and obtained personal jurisdiction over husband.
    Husband received notice and an opportunity to be heard, which is
    the essence of due process.   "An elementary and fundamental
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    requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be
    accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the
    circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of
    the action and afford them an opportunity to present their
    objections."     Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 
    339 U.S. 306
    , 314-15 (1950).    When husband elected not to respond to
    the ongoing action, he was in default.     Wife was not required to
    provide him with further notice.     See Code § 8.01-320.
    Sufficient Evidence of the Ground of Divorce
    Evidence of the ground for the divorce was presented by
    deposition.    On appeal, husband challenges the sufficiency of
    this evidence.    "'The rule is firmly established in Virginia
    that a divorce decree based solely on depositions is not as
    conclusive on appellate review as one based upon evidence heard
    ore tenus, but such a decree is presumed correct and will not be
    overturned if supported by substantial, competent and credible
    evidence.'"     Collier v. Collier, 
    2 Va. App. 125
    , 127, 
    341 S.E.2d 827
    , 828 (1986) (citation omitted).      See also Code § 20-99(1).
    Wife presented her own deposition and the corroborating
    deposition of Mildred Settle to establish her alleged ground of
    desertion.
    "The question of corroboration is one of
    fact, the decision of which in each case
    depends upon the particular facts of that
    particular case. It is not necessary that
    the testimony of the complaining spouse be
    corroborated on every element or essential
    charge stated as a ground for divorce. The
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    corroborative testimony need not be
    sufficient, standing alone, to prove the
    alleged ground for divorce. Any other rule
    would deprive the testimony of the
    complaining spouse of any practical effect.
    The general rule is that where a particular
    fact or circumstance is vital to
    complainant's case, some evidence of the
    same, in addition to the complainant's own
    testimony, is essential. The main object of
    the provision of the statute requiring
    corroboration is to prevent collusion.
    Where it is apparent that there is no
    collusion, the corroboration needs to be
    only slight."
    Dodge v. Dodge, 
    2 Va. App. 238
    , 245, 
    343 S.E.2d 363
    , 367 (1986)
    (emphasis and citations omitted).
    The trial court found wife's evidence credible.      Wife
    provided sufficient corroboration.      Collusion was not a concern.
    Husband has failed to demonstrate grounds to overturn the decree
    which is presumed to be correct.
    Financial Award
    Husband also contends that the evidence did not support a
    financial award against him.    Because husband received adequate
    notice, his argument to strike the evidence submitted by
    deposition is without merit.    Wife presented evidence to support
    her claim that husband’s actions leading to the dissolution of
    the marriage cost her $43,381.53 and that she incurred $8,006.50
    in attorney’s fees and costs.   We find no error in the trial
    court’s lump sum award to wife pursuant to Code § 20-107.3(D),
    and its award of her attorney’s fees and costs.
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    Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is summarily
    affirmed.
    Affirmed.
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Document Info

Docket Number: 1483982

Filed Date: 5/18/1999

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014