Suzanne Hughes v. DSS Arlington County ( 1996 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Baker, Willis and Annunziata
Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
SUZANNE HUGHES
v. Record No. 2345-94-4 MEMORANDUM OPINION *
BY JUDGE JOSEPH E. BAKER
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES FEBRUARY 6, 1996
ARLINGTON COUNTY
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY
William T. Newman, Jr., Judge
Deborah E. Kramer, for appellant.
Mary E. Craig, Assistant County Attorney,
for appellee.
Suzanne Hughes (appellant) appeals from a judgment of the
Circuit Court of Arlington County (trial court) that terminated
her parental rights to her daughter (the child). Appellant
contends that she was denied due process; that the trial court
erred in permitting her to be cross-examined concerning her
experiences with a cult, and in finding that her neglect and
abuse of the child had not and could not be substantially
corrected or eliminated within a reasonable period of time. She
further alleges that the trial court, in arriving at its
conclusion, wrongfully considered evidence that appellant's
"father yelled at her when she was a young girl" and that "the
man who repeatedly raped [her] when she was a young girl and
again in 1993" was still at large.
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
On September 29, 1990, the child, then five months old, was
placed in foster care as the result of an emergency removal. On
October 1, 1990, the county filed an abuse and neglect petition.
It alleged that appellant physically assaulted the child and
could not cope with caring for her. Appellant has been diagnosed
as suffering from myoclonus, a movement disorder, an eating
disorder, a substance abuse problem, borderline personality
disorder, and emotional problems later diagnosed as multiple
personality disorder. Dr. Janieth Wise treated appellant for her
multiple personality disorder and eventually reported to the
county that appellant was capable of parenting the child. The
county retained Dr. M. Kathryne Jacobs, a psychologist with
expertise in early childhood development, to work with appellant
and the child. On February 3, 1992, the child was returned to
appellant. On May 29, 1992, the child was returned to foster
care after further incidents of neglect and abuse. After the
child was removed from appellant's custody, Dr. Jacobs described
the child as suffering from separation anxiety disorder, temper
tantrums, an inability to eat and sleep, and clinical depression.
Following the second removal of the child from appellant,
the Department of Social Services' (DSS) goal was still to return
the child to appellant; however, concern for the child's
well-being caused the DSS to change its goal from the return of
the child to appellant to adoption. 1
1
The child's father, Bruce Stewart, voluntarily surrendered
his parental rights on May 3, 1993.
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In July 1992, at a hearing, Dr. Wise testified that
appellant had told her of appellant's interactions with a satanic
cult. Appellant and Dr. Wise elaborated, describing incidents
appellant witnessed in which cult members killed adults and
babies, times when multiple perpetrators had sex with appellant,
and times when she experienced death threats and the like.
Appellant did not deny these occurrences.
Appellant said that the abuse started when she was seven
years old. Marianne O'Connell, a social worker, testified that
in October 1992, appellant told her that "the night that you
removed [the child], I returned to the cult."
Throughout the latter part of 1992 and into 1993, appellant
was repeatedly in and out of hospitals. Appellant testified that
during a break between hospital stays, during Christmas 1992,
Dwight McMillan, a relative by marriage who had previously abused
her for years as a member of the satanic cult, and other cult
members, abducted and raped her and then dropped her back at the
site where she had been abducted. Appellant believed McMillan to
be hiding from authorities in Canada.
Between March 2, 1993 and June 23, 1993, a judge of the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court for the County of
Arlington (district court), over a four-day period, heard
evidence relating to the termination of appellant's parental
rights, after which the court ordered a continuance of the case
to allow for more time to evaluate appellant's progress and the
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impact of her mental condition on her parenting skills. On
January 31, 1994, after a six-month continuance, appellant's
residual parental rights were terminated by the district court.
Appellant filed notice of appeal to the circuit court where the
child's foster parents filed a motion to be notified of and for
leave to participate in all proceedings. The motion was granted.
At the circuit court trial, Dr. Jacobs testified that
following the termination hearings in district court, the child,
who had been confused and uncertain about where she would live
and who would be her mommy, began to recover from her separation
anxiety disorder. She slept through the night and for the first
time began to take an interest in other children and in the toys
during therapy sessions. Dr. Jacobs described her as "no longer
clinically depressed. She was no longer showing the symptoms of
the reactive attachment disorder." When queried at trial
concerning the child's own desires about her living
circumstances, Dr. Jacobs stated "[The child] has never been
ambivalent about what she wants. . . . She has a momma and a
dadda, that she lives with, the [foster parents], and she has a
person that she calls mommie Suzie that she is attached to." Dr.
Jacobs described the child's bond with her foster parents as "a
primary, primitive, primal attachment of a child to the first
human beings that gave her consistent, appropriate nurturing and
care. They are her psychological parents. . . . They're her
mother and father and that's how she feels toward them."
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The trial court, over appellant's objections permitted the
county to cross-examine appellant about her involvement/
victimization by the satanic cult and about her parents'
knowledge of the cult's abuse of her when she was a little girl
and her parents' failure to contact the police at that time. At
the time of the trial court hearings, appellant lived at her
father's house on the weekends.
A psychological evaluation to assess appellant's prognosis,
as to her ability to parent, was conducted in September and
October 1992, by Dr. Mary L. Froning, an expert in the areas of
psychology, multiple-personality disorders, and child psychology.
The doctor testified at the circuit court that she concluded from
those evaluations that appellant was not able to parent at that
point and recommended that she continue therapy and be
re-evaluated within one year. Dr. Froning stated that a person
with a complicated multiple personality disorder would typically
take five to seven years to recover from the disorder.
On October 18, 1994, the trial court ruled that appellant's
residual parental rights should be terminated. In making this
ruling, the trial judge addressed his concern over the continued
existence of the satanic cult, appellant's inability to help the
police prosecute a member of this cult, appellant's continued
residence in the same family home where she had been verbally and
physically abused as a small child, and lack of family support
that was missing when appellant was an abused child.
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We have examined the record in this case, including the
details of the various foster care plans required by law, and we
find there has been no denial to appellant of due process rights.
Whether evidence is admitted or refused is left largely to
the sound discretion of the trial court. We hold that evidence
of appellant's participation in the cult described was relevant
to these proceedings and that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in permitting appellant to be examined on that
subject.
In this case, the child came into care at an extremely early
age and lived with her mother for a total of nine months out of
her five plus years. Dr. Jacobs testified that during the most
important formative years of her life, the child became attached
to her foster family and established a primal bond. Dr. Jacobs
opined:
It's too late. The critical period is
passed. [The child] is four years old. She
has made her own emotional bond. It would be
an extreme trauma to her to be placed with
someone else for reasons that don't make any
sense to her. She also has a history with
[appellant] which causes her to mistrust
giving herself into the care of [appellant].
So even though our criteria might be met,
you know, [the child's] criteria wouldn't be
met, either biologically or emotionally.
There is substantial evidence to support the trial court's
decision. Appellant asserts that she should be allowed more time
to show that she could be suitable to parent the child.
What is a reasonable period of time depends upon the context
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and circumstances of each case. Virginia Ass'n. of Ins. Agents
v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 574, 579, 47 S.E.2d 401, 404 (1948).
Under the circumstances of this case, the trial court did not err
in refusing to delay its decision. Appellant argues that her
illness has a predicted five-year cure. From this record, the
reality is that there is a three- to five-year treatment plan
with an uncertain outcome.
The primary question always is what is in the best interest
of the child.
[A] court must evaluate and consider many
factors, including the age and physical and
mental condition of the child or children;
the age and physical and mental condition of
the parents; the relationship existing
between each parent and each child; the needs
of the child or children; the role which each
parent has played, and will play in the
future, in the upbringing and care of the
child or children; and such other factors as
are necessary in determining the best
interest of the child or children.
Barkley v. Alexandria Dep't. of Soc. Servs., 2 Va. App. 662, 668,
347 S.E.2d 188, 191 (1986).
Although maintenance of the family structure in all possible
circumstances is important in Virginia, the code recognizes,
however, that there are circumstances in which this is not likely
to occur. "It is clearly not in the best interest of a child to
spend a lengthy period of time waiting to find out when, or even
if, a parent will be capable of resuming his responsibilities."
Kaywood v. Dep't. of Soc. Servs., 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394
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S.E.2d, 492, 495 (1990). 2
The testimony of Dr. Jacobs, the social worker, and the
foster mother makes it clear that the child needs a mother who
can put her interests first and offer her sensible, safe,
consistent, responsible parenting. The child had formed a primal
attachment to the foster family over many years in their care.
Whatever bond remains with her mother is ambivalent and fraught
with mistrust. It is clear in this case that the child regards
her foster parents as her mother and father, and it would likely
do irreparable harm to her to remove her from her home and send
her to an uncertain future with a mother who is still struggling
with serious mental health issues.
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the trial court is
affirmed.
Affirmed.
2
The record discloses that post-trial, appellant continues
to have unresolved problems. She remains in therapy for multiple
disorder and borderline personality disorder. By filing a motion
to reinstate visitation rights pending appeal, appellant opened
the door for a discussion of her present emotional stability.
Appellant has demonstrated serious emotional instability since
the circuit court trial. She was hospitalized following the
trial; she made threats directed at the foster family and the
social workers; and she has expressed to social workers an
obsessive determination to inform the child that she intends to
take her from the foster family.
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