Barry E. Sollars v. Commonwealth ( 1996 )


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  •                     COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Baker, Willis and Overton
    Argued at Norfolk, Virginia
    BARRY E. SOLLARS
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.         Record No. 2246-95-1     JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR.
    OCTOBER 1, 1996
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS
    Verbena M. Askew, Judge
    Ruthie Litvin (Kevin M. Diamonstein;
    Diamonstein, Becker & Staley, on brief), for
    appellant.
    Leah A. Darron, Assistant Attorney General
    (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on
    brief), for appellee.
    Barry E. Sollars was convicted in a bench trial of voluntary
    manslaughter, possession of cocaine with intent to distribute,
    and possession of a firearm while in possession of cocaine.   On
    appeal, he contends that the evidence is insufficient to support
    his conviction of voluntary manslaughter.   We disagree and affirm
    the judgment of the trial court.
    On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable
    to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable inferences
    fairly deducible therefrom.   Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 
    216 Va. 349
    , 352, 
    218 S.E.2d 534
    , 537 (1975).   "The judgment of a
    trial court sitting without a jury is entitled to the same weight
    as a jury verdict and will not be set aside unless it appears
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    from the evidence that the judgment is plainly wrong or without
    evidence to support it."    Josephs v. Commonwealth, 
    10 Va. App. 87
    , 99, 
    390 S.E.2d 491
    , 497 (1990) (en banc) (citation omitted).
    On January 21, 1995, Randy Fodrie drove Richard Barkley from
    his home in Mathews County to Newport News in an attempt to buy
    cocaine from Sollars in exchange for a .22 rifle.   They did not
    have enough cash to buy the cocaine, but Barkley estimated the
    value of the rifle to be $70.   Barkley transported the rifle by
    wrapping the barrel in a green shirt and placing it on the
    floorboard of Fodrie's truck pointing towards the passenger door.
    The rifle was not loaded.    En route, Barkley phoned Sollars to
    ask whether he would accept the rifle in exchange for the
    cocaine.   Sollars replied, "No."
    In Newport News, Fodrie and Barkley drove to the apartment
    complex where Sollars lived.    They saw him outside and motioned
    him over to the truck.   Sollars got in the truck and Barkley
    asked him for a "sixteenth" of cocaine which sold for $70.
    Sollars told Fodrie to drive across the street to the McDonald's
    parking lot.   Sollars handed Barkley the cocaine and requested
    payment.   Barkley handed the cocaine to Fodrie and then began
    pushing on Sollars' shoulders saying, "Hey, I got something for
    you, M___ F___."   As Barkley reached down to the floorboard to
    pick up the rifle, Sollars opened the door to the truck and
    jumped out.    Sollars then shot Barkley in the neck.
    Fodrie "hit the gas and took off" because he was afraid
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    Sollars would shoot him.   By the time Fodrie arrived at a nearby
    hospital, Barkley was dead from the gunshot wound.      Fodrie
    disposed of the rifle behind the hospital, where it was later
    recovered by the police still wrapped in the green shirt.
    After his arrest, Sollars admitted shooting Barkley but
    claimed he did so in self-defense.       He acknowledged that the
    gun recovered from his person was the gun used to shoot Barkley.
    The trial court rejected Sollars' claim that he acted in
    self-defense.   It found that Sollars had the opportunity to
    retreat when he opened the truck door.      It also rejected Sollars'
    testimony that his gun just went off.      It specifically found that
    there was no evidence that Barkley had the "imminent intent to
    kill [Sollars]."
    Sollars contends that the evidence fails to sustain his
    conviction of voluntary manslaughter.      Voluntary manslaughter is
    an intentional killing committed in the heat of passion upon
    reasonable provocation.    See Belton v. Commonwealth, 
    200 Va. 5
    ,
    9, 
    104 S.E.2d 1
    , 4 (1958).   Heat of passion may be founded upon
    fear, rage, or a combination of both.       McClung v. Commonwealth,
    
    215 Va. 654
    , 657, 
    212 S.E.2d 290
    , 292 (1975).      Sollars argues
    that the trial court erred in finding that the killing did not
    occur in self-defense.    He contends that he was in fear for his
    own life when he shot Barkley.
    Self-defense is an affirmative defense, which the accused
    must prove by introducing evidence sufficient to raise a
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    reasonable doubt about his guilt.      McGhee v. Commonwealth, 
    219 Va. 560
    , 562, 
    248 S.E.2d 808
    , 810 (1978).     Whether an accused
    proves circumstances sufficient to create a reasonable doubt that
    he acted in self-defense is a question of fact.      Yarborough v.
    Commonwealth, 
    217 Va. 971
    , 979, 
    234 S.E.2d 286
    , 292 (1977).
    Credible evidence supports the trial court's finding that
    the killing of Barkley was voluntary manslaughter and not
    justifiable homicide.   Sollars was involved in a drug deal with
    Barkley and when he had the opportunity to retreat safely, he
    chose instead to shoot Barkley.   The evidence proved that after
    Sollars handed the cocaine to Barkley, he exited the truck while
    Barkley was leaning over to pick up the rifle from the
    floorboard.   He then stood outside the truck and shot Barkley.
    This is consistent with the autopsy report which disclosed that
    the direction of fire was right to left and slightly downward.
    However, it is contradictory to Sollars' testimony that Barkley
    had the rifle pointed at his face in the truck and that his gun
    just went off accidentally after he exited the truck.     The trial
    court was not required to believe the defendant and was entitled
    to infer that he lied to conceal his guilt.      See Black v.
    Commonwealth, 
    222 Va. 838
    , 840, 
    284 S.E.2d 608
    , 609 (1981).
    The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
    Affirmed.
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