Alfred Gilliam, Jr. v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2014 )


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  •                                              COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Alston, McCullough and Senior Judge Clements
    UNPUBLISHED
    Argued by teleconference
    ALFRED GILLIAM, JR.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
    v.     Record No. 1254-12-1                                   JUDGE ROSSIE D. ALSTON, JR.
    MAY 27, 2014
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    UPON A REHEARING
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK
    Charles E. Poston, Judge
    J. Barry McCracken, Assistant Public Defender (Office of the
    Public Defender, on brief), for appellant.
    Robert H. Anderson, III, Senior Assistant Attorney General
    (Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II, Attorney General, on brief), for
    appellee.
    Alfred Gilliam, Jr. (appellant) appeals his convictions for burglary in violation of Code
    § 18.2-91, possession of burglarious tools in violation of Code § 18.2-94, petit larceny third or
    subsequent offense, in violation of Code §§ 18.2-96 and -104, and damage of property over
    $1,000 in violation of Code § 18.2-137. On appeal, appellant alleges that the trial court “erred in
    admitting hearsay testimony as to the cost of repairs to correct damage to the house, such
    testimony being offered for the truth of the assertion and not being otherwise admissible under
    any recognized exception to the hearsay rule.”
    We issued a memorandum opinion in this case on December 3, 2013, holding that the
    testimony as to the cost of repairs to correct the damage to the house was inadmissible hearsay
    and, therefore, we reversed appellant’s conviction for damage of property over $1,000 in
    
    Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
    violation of Code § 18.2-137. We remanded the matter to the trial court for a new trial on the
    lesser-included offense of misdemeanor property damage, should the Commonwealth be so
    advised. The Commonwealth filed a petition for a rehearing or, in the alternative, for rehearing
    en banc, arguing that the panel erred by limiting a retrial to the lesser-included offense of
    misdemeanor property damage in light of the enactment of Code § 19.2-324.1. The panel
    granted a rehearing and stayed its December 3, 2013 decision.
    I. Background1
    Gene Gillespie was the caretaker of the subject property located at 1742 Willow Drive in
    Norfolk, Virginia in 2012 (“the property”). Gillespie went by the property, owned by Norfolk
    Collegiate School, as part of his regular daily routine. On February 7, 2012, Gillespie visited the
    property and did not notice anything out of the ordinary or missing. There were no repairs being
    done to the house at the time and therefore no tools or workers were on the premises. On
    February 8, 2012, a concerned neighbor called the police to report an apparent burglary at the
    property. Officers Apollo Lopez and Michael Evens responded to the scene and called for
    backup. Officer John Torres, a K-9 unit officer, also responded. When the officers entered the
    property they found appellant standing on top of a toilet in one of the bathrooms. The officers
    then observed a bag of tools and copper and saw that the hot water heater had been removed.
    The officers arrested appellant at that time. After appellant’s arrest, Norfolk detective Kevin
    Barnes arrived at the property and went through the house. Detective Barnes noted that the front
    door had been kicked in, the hot water heater had been removed, and observed two bags filled
    with various tools, copper piping, and some clothing in the house.
    1
    As the parties are fully conversant with the record in this case and because this
    memorandum opinion carries no precedential value, this opinion recites only those facts and
    incidents of the proceedings as are necessary to the parties’ understanding of the disposition of this
    appeal.
    -2-
    A grand jury indicted appellant for burglary in violation of Code § 18.2-91, possession of
    burglarious tools in violation of Code § 18.2-94, grand larceny in violation of Code § 18.2-95,
    petit larceny, third or subsequent offense, in violation of Code §§ 18.2-96 and -104, and damage
    of property over $1,000 in violation of Code § 18.2-137. A bench trial commenced on May 2,
    2012, during which the Commonwealth called Gillespie to testify to the cost of repairs to the
    property. On direct examination, Gillespie testified that the cost of repairs to the property was
    $3,000; however he did not then testify how he knew the cost of those repairs. When questioned
    further on cross-examination, Gillespie testified as follows:
    Q       You didn’t over see it yourself. Someone else did?
    A       The repairs?
    Q       Right.
    A     I get calls of what repairs need to be done, but the
    management company oversees them.
    Q       Okay. So you’re just telling us what you were told about
    the repairs?
    A       I’m telling you what I saw that was broken, and that
    actually meshes with what the management company said needed
    to be repaired.
    At that time, appellant’s counsel objected to the testimony on direct as to the $3,000 cost of
    repairs arguing “[w]hen [Gillespie] said it [on direct], it didn’t sound like hearsay, but when he
    said it now, it is hearsay.” The trial court overruled the objection and found appellant guilty of
    burglary, possession of burglarious tools, petit larceny third or subsequent offense, and damage
    of property over $1,000 on May 21, 2012.2
    Appellant noted his appeal on July 12, 2012. On July 24, 2012, the trial court sentenced
    appellant to five years’ imprisonment for burglary and suspended imposition of a sentence of ten
    2
    The trial court nolle prosequied the grand larceny charge on the Commonwealth’s
    motion.
    -3-
    years for possession of burglary tools, petit larceny third or subsequent offense, and damage to
    property over $1,000.3 On December 3, 2013, the panel issued its memorandum opinion holding
    the evidence of repairs was improperly admitted hearsay and remanding the matter for a retrial
    on the lesser-included offense of misdemeanor property damage. The Commonwealth filed a
    petition for a rehearing, which the panel granted and, accordingly, the panel stayed its December
    3, 2013 decision.
    Having reconsidered our earlier decision, we reaffirm our holding that the trial court
    erred in admitting hearsay testimony as to the cost of repairs. However, we vacate the portion of
    our earlier opinion remanding the matter for retrial only on the lesser-included offense of
    misdemeanor property damage.
    II. Analysis
    On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay testimony as to
    the cost of repairs for damage to the property because Gillespie did not have personal knowledge
    of the cost of repairs and his testimony as to what the management company told him regarding
    the cost was not admissible under any recognized exception to the hearsay rule.
    A. Preservation of Issue for Appeal
    As a preliminary matter, the Commonwealth argues that appellant did not properly
    preserve his hearsay objection on appeal because he did not timely object to Gillespie’s
    testimony as to the cost of repairs. Rule 5A:18 provides: “No ruling of the trial court . . . will be
    considered as a basis for reversal unless an objection was stated with reasonable certainty at the
    time of the ruling, except for good cause shown or to enable the Court of Appeals to attain the
    ends of justice. . . .”
    3
    The sequence of dates noting when the appellant noted his appeal and when the trial
    court entered the sentencing order is stated correctly and is of no significance to the resolution of
    the matters presented.
    -4-
    As a precondition to appellate review, Rule 5A:18 requires a
    contemporaneous objection in the trial court to preserve the issue
    on appeal. Not just any objection will do. It must be both specific
    and timely - so that the trial judge would know the particular point
    being made in time to do something about it.
    Thomas v. Commonwealth, 
    44 Va. App. 741
    , 750, 
    607 S.E.2d 738
    , 742, adopted on reh’g en
    banc, 
    45 Va. App. 811
    , 
    613 S.E.2d 870
     (2005).
    The main purpose of requiring timely, specific objections is to afford the trial court an
    opportunity to rule intelligently on the issues presented, thus avoiding unnecessary appeals and
    reversals. “‘To be timely, an objection must be made when the occasion arises – at the time the
    evidence is offered or the statement made.’” Kovalaske v. Commonwealth, 
    56 Va. App. 224
    ,
    229, 
    692 S.E.2d 641
    , 644 (2010) (quoting Marlowe v. Commonwealth, 
    2 Va. App. 619
    , 621, 
    347 S.E.2d 167
    , 168 (1986)). However, “[i]n some instances it will not be immediately apparent that
    the evidence is inadmissible or is being offered for an improper purpose. In such circumstances,
    an objection is timely if made as soon as the grounds for objection become apparent.” Charles E.
    Friend & Kent Sinclair, The Law of Evidence in Virginia § 2-3[b] (7th ed. 2012). “[I]t has been
    held that – if the objectionable nature of the evidence is not immediately obvious – the objection
    is still considered timely if it is made ‘as soon as the dangerous drift of the examination becomes
    apparent.’” Id. at § 2-2[b] (quoting Weimer v. Commonwealth, 
    5 Va. App. 47
    , 57, 
    360 S.E.2d 381
    , 386 (1987)); see also Bitar v. Rahman, 
    272 Va. 130
    , 140, 
    630 S.E.2d 319
    , 324-25 (2006)).
    In Vasquez v. Mabini, 
    269 Va. 155
    , 158, 
    606 S.E.2d 809
    , 810 (2005), the plaintiff
    brought a wrongful death suit against the defendants for the death of Tamara Mabini, the
    plaintiff’s wife. At trial, the plaintiff presented the testimony of Richard B. Edelman, about the
    expected loss of income and economic value of the loss of the decedent’s services, protection,
    care, and assistance. 
    Id. at 159
    , 
    606 S.E.2d at 811
    . Edelman testified as to the decedent’s lost
    income and benefits based on the assumption that the decedent would have found full-time
    -5-
    employment the day after the accident that killed her at the rate of $8/hour, despite the fact that
    she had been working part-time for $8/hour for the three months preceding the accident and
    seeking full-time work. 
    Id.
    The defendants objected to these and other assumptions by Edelman, and the trial court
    overruled their objections. Following a verdict for the plaintiff, the defendants appealed. On
    appeal, the plaintiff argued that the defendants waived any objection to Edelman’s testimony
    because they did not timely object prior to trial pursuant to the court’s scheduling order. 
    Id. at 161
    , 
    606 S.E.2d at 812
    . The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the defendants’ failure to file
    pre-trial objections to Edelman’s proposed testimony did not constitute a waiver because the
    summary of Edelman’s testimony filed by plaintiff did not contain the specifics of his testimony
    and would not have given the defendants any reason to object. 
    Id.
     The Court further found that
    the plaintiff’s direct examination of Edelman did not reveal his reliance upon the unsupported
    assumptions that underlay his opinion; cross-examination was necessary to bring these matters to
    light. After a brief redirect, the defendants moved to strike Edelman’s testimony. 
    Id. at 162
    , 
    606 S.E.2d at 813
    . The Court held that under the circumstances, the defendants did not waive their
    objection to Edelman’s testimony because at the first opportunity, after the flaws in the expert
    testimony had become apparent on cross-examination, the defendants moved to strike it. 
    Id. at 162-63
    , 
    606 S.E.2d at 813
    .
    Similarly in the case at bar, given the circumstances of Gillespie’s testimony, appellant’s
    objection was timely. On direct examination, Gillespie did not then testify as to how he knew
    the total cost of repairs would be $3,000. At that time, it was not reasonably foreseeable to
    appellant that Gillespie’s testimony might qualify as inadmissible hearsay. It was not clear until
    cross-examination that Gillespie’s testimony as to the cost of repairs was partially based on
    information received from the property management company. Once it became evident that
    -6-
    Gillespie based his testimony on information provided to him by the property management
    company, appellant’s counsel promptly objected. Therefore, based on the circumstances of this
    case and the manner in which the testimony was elicited, we hold that appellant’s objection
    claiming Gillespie’s testimony was hearsay was timely and the issue properly preserved for this
    appeal.
    B. Standard of Review
    “Under familiar principles of appellate review, we examine the evidence in the light most
    favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible
    therefrom.” Crews v. Commonwealth, 
    18 Va. App. 115
    , 117, 
    442 S.E.2d 407
    , 408 (1994).
    “‘The admissibility of evidence is within the broad discretion of the trial court, and a ruling will
    not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion.’” Id. at 118, 
    442 S.E.2d at 409
     (quoting Blain v. Commonwealth, 
    7 Va. App. 10
    , 16, 
    371 S.E.2d 838
    , 842 (1988)).
    C. Admissibility of Gillespie’s Testimony as to Cost of Repairs
    We hold that Gillespie’s testimony as to the cost of repairs to the property constituted
    inadmissible hearsay.
    Hearsay is “‘testimony given by a witness who relates not what he knows personally, but
    what others have told him or what he has heard said by others. ’” Bowman v. Commonwealth,
    
    28 Va. App. 204
    , 209, 
    503 S.E.2d 241
    , 243 (1998) (quoting Cross v. Commonwealth, 
    195 Va. 62
    , 74, 
    77 S.E.2d 447
    , 453 (1953)). “‘Hearsay evidence is testimony in court, or written
    evidence, of a statement made out of court, the statement being offered as an assertion to show
    the truth of matters asserted therein, and thus resting for its value upon the credibility of the
    out-of-court asserter.’” Tatum v. Commonwealth, 
    17 Va. App. 585
    , 588, 
    440 S.E.2d 133
    , 135
    (1994) (quoting Stevenson v. Commonwealth, 
    218 Va. 462
    , 465, 
    237 S.E.2d 779
    , 781 (1977)).
    “Determining whether a statement is offered to prove the truth or falsity of the matter asserted
    -7-
    requires an analysis of the purpose for which the statement is offered into evidence.” Swain v.
    Commonwealth, 
    28 Va. App. 555
    , 559, 
    507 S.E.2d 116
    , 118 (1998).
    A person familiar with property can estimate its value. Walls v. Commonwealth, 
    248 Va. 480
    , 483, 
    450 S.E.2d 363
    , 365 (1994) (“[T]he general rule is that opinion testimony of a
    nonexpert, who is not the owner of the personal property in question, is admissible upon the
    subject of property value, provided the witness possesses sufficient knowledge of the value of
    the property or has had ample opportunity for forming a correct opinion as to value.”); see also
    Burton v. Commonwealth, 
    58 Va. App. 274
    , 282, 
    708 S.E.2d 444
    , 448 (2011). This rule does
    not, however, dispose of the requirement that a person testify based on his personal knowledge
    and not on hearsay information provided by a third party.
    In the present case, while Gillespie had personal knowledge of the damage done to the
    property, he did not have personal knowledge of the cost to repair that damage. Rather, he
    testified that the information as to the cost of the repairs was entirely based upon the amount
    provided to him by the property management company. Further, the record does not indicate
    that Gillespie, as the property’s caretaker, paid for the repairs on behalf of his employer, and on
    that basis acquired personal knowledge of the cost of the repairs. Thus, his observation of the
    damage to the property corroborated the $3,000 figure; however it did not provide an
    independent basis for the cost of repairs. In short, his testimony concerning what the
    management company told him constitutes an out-of-court statement offered for the truth of the
    matter asserted.
    We addressed a similar situation in an unpublished opinion, Brown v. Commonwealth,
    No. 2825-07-1, 
    2009 Va. App. LEXIS 30
     (Va. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2009).4 In Brown, the defendant
    4
    “Although not binding precedent, unpublished opinions can be cited and considered for
    their persuasive value.” Otey v. Commonwealth, 
    61 Va. App. 346
    , 350, 
    735 S.E.2d 255
    , 257
    (2012) (citing Rule 5A:1(f)).
    -8-
    damaged but did not total Ms. Washington’s vehicle. Id. at *2-3. Ms. Washington testified that
    the cost to repair her vehicle was $1,600, based on an estimate from a repair shop. Id. at *4. The
    defendant objected to that testimony as hearsay and later moved to strike the Commonwealth’s
    evidence. Id. Ms. Washington’s testimony was the Commonwealth’s only evidence of damages.
    Id. at *9-10. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to strike and found the defendant
    guilty of felony destruction of property in violation of Code § 18.2-137. Id. at *1.
    On appeal we noted that, while Ms. Washington was competent to testify as to the value
    of the truck, because her vehicle was merely damaged and not totaled, the Commonwealth had
    the burden of proving the fair market cost of repair. Id. at *11 (citing Parker v. Commonwealth,
    
    254 Va. 118
    , 121, 
    489 S.E.2d 482
    , 483 (1997)). However, “Ms. Washington did not offer her
    own opinion as to the fair market cost of repair. She merely repeated the out-of-court estimate
    that an unidentified repair shop reportedly gave to her.” 
    Id.
     Therefore, the Court went on to
    examine “whether the rule allowing lay opinion testimony by a property owner as to the value of
    the owner’s property allows an owner to give secondhand testimony of the amount of a specific
    repair estimate by an out-of-court declarant over the defendant’s hearsay objection.” Id. at *12.
    The issue was at the time the Court decided Brown, and remains, a question of first impression in
    Virginia. Id.
    The Court held that Ms. Washington’s testimony was inadmissible hearsay and reversed
    and remanded the defendant’s conviction due to insufficient evidence of damages. Id. at *17. In
    support of its conclusion, Brown discussed the statutory exception to the hearsay rule for
    affidavits estimating the cost of repairing the damage to motor vehicles, applicable only in civil
    cases. Id. at *12-13 (citing Code § 8.01-416(A)). The Court reasoned that the statutory
    exception would not be necessary if the legislature understood the rule allowing an owner’s
    testimony as to the value of property to mean that an owner could testify as to the estimated cost
    -9-
    of repairs for property based upon estimates provided by third parties. Id. at *14. Further, the
    Court noted that it “would be inconsistent with our traditional maintenance of standards for the
    admission of evidence in criminal cases” to admit hearsay testimony in a criminal case which
    would be inadmissible in a civil case absent compliance with Code § 8.01-416(A). Id.
    We find the Court’s rationale in Brown persuasive. Because Gillespie’s testimony as to
    the cost of repairs to the property was based on inadmissible hearsay, we reverse appellant’s
    conviction for property damage over $1,000, and remand for a new trial, should the
    Commonwealth be so advised. We do not limit the remand to a new trial on the lesser-included
    offense of misdemeanor property damage as provided in our December 3, 2013 decision. Code
    § 19.2-324.1,5 effective July 1, 2013, addresses the prospective disposition of this case, and any
    discussion of Rushing v. Commonwealth, 
    284 Va. 270
    , 
    726 S.E.2d 333
     (2012), is resolved by its
    enactment.
    Appellant assigned error to both the admissibility of the cost of repairs and the
    sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction in his initial petition for appeal. However, a
    judge of this Court denied both assignments of error, and appellant only requested
    reconsideration of assignment of error I, the admissibility issue, by a three-judge panel. Once the
    three-judge panel granted appellant’s appeal, appellant only listed and argued the admissibility
    issue on brief. Thus, the sole issue before this panel was the admissibility of the evidence and
    5
    Code § 19.2-324.1 provides:
    In appeals to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, when a
    challenge to a conviction rests on a claim that the evidence was
    insufficient because the trial court improperly admitted evidence,
    the reviewing court shall consider all evidence admitted at trial to
    determine whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain the
    conviction. If the reviewing court determines that evidence was
    erroneously admitted and that such error was not harmless, the
    case shall be remanded for a new trial if the Commonwealth elects
    to have a new trial.
    - 10 -
    not the sufficiency thereof to support appellant’s conviction. See Rule 5A:20; Buchanan v.
    Buchanan, 
    14 Va. App. 53
    , 56, 
    415 S.E.2d 237
    , 239 (1992). Consequently, Rushing does not
    apply and even if it did, the aspect upon which appellant relies was reversed by Code
    § 19.2-324.1.
    Appellant next claims that it is error to apply Code § 19.2-324.1 retroactively. We note
    that application of Code § 19.2-324.1 in this case does not implicate retroactivity concerns.
    Code § 19.2-324.1 directs appellate courts to remand a case for a new trial if it determines that
    evidence was admitted erroneously and such error was not harmless. Our review and disposition
    of this case occurred after Code § 19.2-324.1 became effective.
    For these reasons, we reverse appellant’s conviction for property damage over $1,000,
    remand for a new trial, should the Commonwealth be so advised, and vacate the portion of our
    December 3, 2013 decision remanding the matter for retrial only on the lesser-included offense
    of misdemeanor property damage.
    Reversed and remanded.
    - 11 -
    VIRGINIA:
    In the Court of Appeals of Virginia on Tuesday         the 7th day of January, 2014.
    UNPUBLISHED
    Alfred Gilliam, Jr.,                                                                                       Appellant,
    against                Record No. 1254-12-1
    Circuit Court Nos. CR12000878-00, CR12000878-01, CR12000878-03
    and CR12000878-04
    Commonwealth of Virginia,                                                                                  Appellee.
    Upon a Petition for Rehearing
    Before Judges Alston, McCullough and Senior Judge Clements
    On December 17, 2013 came the appellee, by the Attorney General of Virginia, and filed a petition
    praying that the Court set aside the judgment rendered herein on December 3, 2013, and grant a rehearing
    thereof.
    On consideration whereof, the petition for rehearing is granted, the mandate entered herein on
    December 3, 2013 is stayed pending the decision of the Court, and the appeal is reinstated on the docket of
    this Court.
    Pursuant to Rule 5A:35(a), the respondent may file an answering brief within 21 days of the date of
    entry of this order.
    A Copy,
    Teste:
    Cynthia L. McCoy, Clerk
    original order signed by a deputy clerk of the
    By:      Court of Appeals of Virginia at the direction
    of the Court
    Deputy Clerk
    COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Alston, McCullough and Senior Judge Clements
    UNPUBLISHED
    Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia
    ALFRED GILLIAM, JR.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
    v.     Record No. 1254-12-1                                      JUDGE ROSSIE D. ALSTON, JR.
    DECEMBER 3, 2013
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK
    Charles E. Poston, Judge
    J. Barry McCracken, Assistant Public Defender (Office of the
    Public Defender, on brief), for appellant.
    Robert H. Anderson, III, Senior Assistant Attorney General
    (Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II, Attorney General, on brief), for
    appellee.
    Alfred Gilliam, Jr. (appellant) appeals his convictions for burglary in violation of Code
    § 18.2-91, possession of burglarious tools in violation of Code § 18.2-94, petit larceny third or
    subsequent offense, in violation of Code §§ 18.2-96 and -104, and damage of property over
    $1,000 in violation of Code § 18.2-137. On appeal, appellant alleges that the trial court “erred in
    admitting hearsay testimony as to the cost of repairs to correct damage to the house, such
    testimony being offered for the truth of the assertion and not being otherwise admissible under
    any recognized exception to the hearsay rule.” We hold that the testimony as to the cost of
    repairs to correct the damage to the house was inadmissible hearsay and therefore, we reverse
    appellant’s conviction for damage of property over $1,000 in violation of Code § 18.2-137 and
    
    Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
    remand to the trial court for a new trial on misdemeanor property damage, should the
    Commonwealth be so advised.
    I. Background1
    Gene Gillespie was the caretaker of the subject property located at 1742 Willow Drive in
    Norfolk, Virginia in 2012 (“the property”). Gillespie went by the property, owned by Norfolk
    Collegiate School, as part of his regular daily routine. On February 7, 2012, Gillespie visited the
    property and did not notice anything out of the ordinary or missing. There were no repairs being
    done to the house at the time and therefore no tools or workers were on the premises. On
    February 8, 2012, a concerned neighbor called the police to report an apparent burglary at the
    property. Officers Apollo Lopez and Michael Evens responded to the scene and called for
    backup. Officer John Torres, a K-9 unit officer also responded. When the officers entered the
    property they found appellant standing on top of a toilet in one of the bathrooms. The officers
    then observed a bag of tools and copper and saw that the hot water heater had been removed.
    The officers arrested appellant at that time. After appellant’s arrest, Norfolk detective Kevin
    Barnes arrived at the property and went through the house. Detective Barnes noted that the front
    door had been kicked in, the hot water heater had been removed, and observed two bags filled
    with various tools, copper piping, and some clothing in the house.
    A grand jury indicted appellant for burglary in violation of Code § 18.2-91, possession of
    burglarious tools in violation of Code § 18.2-94, grand larceny in violation of Code § 18.2-95,
    petit larceny, third or subsequent offense, in violation of Code §§ 18.2-96 and -104, and damage
    of property over $1,000 in violation of Code § 18.2-137. A bench trial commenced on May 2,
    2012, during which the Commonwealth called Gillespie to testify to the cost of repairs to the
    1
    As the parties are fully conversant with the record in this case and because this
    memorandum opinion carries no precedential value, this opinion recites only those facts and
    incidents of the proceedings as are necessary to the parties’ understanding of the disposition of this
    appeal.
    -2-
    property. On direct examination, Gillespie testified that the cost of repairs to the property was
    $3,000; however he did not then testify how he knew the costs of those repairs. When
    questioned further on cross-examination, Gillespie testified as follows:
    Q       You didn’t over see it yourself. Someone else did?
    A       The repairs?
    Q       Right.
    A     I get calls of what repairs need to be done, but the
    management company oversees them.
    Q       Okay. So you’re just telling us what you were told about
    the repairs?
    A       I’m telling you what I saw that was broken, and that
    actually meshes with what the management company said needed
    to be repaired.
    At that time, appellant’s counsel objected to the testimony on direct as to the $3,000 costs of
    repairs arguing “[w]hen [Gillespie] said it [on direct], it didn’t sound like hearsay, but when he
    said it now, it is hearsay.” The trial court overruled the objection and found appellant guilty of
    burglary, possession of burglarious tools, petit larceny third offense, and damage of property
    over $1,000 on May 21, 2012.2
    Appellant noted his appeal on July 12, 2012. On July 24, 2012, the trial court sentenced
    appellant to five years’ imprisonment for burglary and suspended imposition of a sentence for
    ten years for possession of burglary tools, petit larceny third offense, and damage to property
    over $1,000.3 This appeal followed.
    2
    The trial court nolle prosequied the grand larceny charge on the Commonwealth’s
    motion.
    3
    The sequence of dates noting when the appellant noted his appeal and when the trial
    court entered the sentencing order is stated correctly and is of no significance to the resolution of
    the matters presented.
    -3-
    II. Analysis
    On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay testimony as to
    the cost of repairs for damage to the property because Gillespie did not have personal knowledge
    of the cost of repairs and his testimony as to what the management company told him regarding
    the cost was not admissible under any recognized exception to the hearsay rule.
    A. Preservation of Issue for Appeal
    As a preliminary matter, the Commonwealth argues that appellant did not properly
    preserve his hearsay objection on appeal because he did not timely object to Gillespie’s
    testimony as to the cost of repairs. Rule 5A:18 provides: “No ruling of the trial court . . . will be
    considered as a basis for reversal unless an objection was stated with reasonable certainty at the
    time of the ruling, except for good cause shown or to enable the Court of Appeals to attain the
    ends of justice. . . .”
    As a precondition to appellate review, Rule 5A:18 requires a
    contemporaneous objection in the trial court to preserve the issue
    on appeal. Not just any objection will do. It must be both specific
    and timely - so that the trial judge would know the particular point
    being made in time to do something about it.
    Thomas v. Commonwealth, 
    44 Va. App. 741
    , 750, 
    607 S.E.2d 738
    , 742, adopted on reh’g en
    banc, 
    45 Va. App. 811
    , 
    613 S.E.2d 870
     (2005).
    The main purpose of requiring timely, specific objections is to afford the trial court an
    opportunity to rule intelligently on the issues presented, thus avoiding unnecessary appeals and
    reversals. “‘To be timely, an objection must be made when the occasion arises – at the time the
    evidence is offered or the statement made.’” Kovalaske v. Commonwealth, 
    56 Va. App. 224
    ,
    229, 
    692 S.E.2d 641
    , 644 (2010) (quoting Marlowe v. Commonwealth, 
    2 Va. App. 619
    , 621, 
    347 S.E.2d 167
    , 168 (1986)). However, “[i]n some instances it will not be immediately apparent that
    the evidence is inadmissible or is being offered for an improper purpose. In such circumstances,
    -4-
    an objection is timely if made as soon as the grounds for objection become apparent.” Charles E.
    Friend & Kent Sinclair, The Law of Evidence in Virginia § 2-3[b] (7th ed. 2012). “[I]t has been
    held that – if the objectionable nature of the evidence is not immediately obvious – the objection
    is still considered timely if it is made ‘as soon as the dangerous drift of the examination becomes
    apparent.’” Id. at § 2-2[b] (quoting Weimer v. Commonwealth, 
    5 Va. App. 47
    , 57, 
    360 S.E.2d 381
    , 386 (1987)); see also Bitar v. Rahman, 
    272 Va. 130
    , 140, 
    630 S.E.2d 319
    , 324-25 (2006)).
    In Vasquez v. Mabini, 
    269 Va. 155
    , 158, 
    606 S.E.2d 809
    , 810 (2005), the plaintiff
    brought a wrongful death suit against the defendants for the death of Tamara Mabini, the
    plaintiff’s wife. At trial, the plaintiff presented the testimony of Richard B. Edelman, about the
    expected loss of income and economic value of the loss of the decedent’s services, protection,
    care, and assistance. 
    Id. at 159
    , 
    606 S.E.2d at 811
    . Edelman testified as to the decedent’s lost
    income and benefits based on the assumption that the decedent would have found full-time
    employment the day after the accident that killed her at the rate of $8/hour, despite the fact that
    she had been working part-time for $8/hour for the three months preceding the accident and
    seeking full-time work. 
    Id.
    The defendants objected to these and other assumptions by Edelman, and the trial court
    overruled their objections. Following a verdict for the plaintiff, the defendants appealed. On
    appeal, the plaintiff argued that the defendants waived any objection to Edelman’s testimony
    because they did not timely object prior to trial pursuant to the court’s scheduling order. 
    Id. at 161
    , 
    606 S.E.2d at 812
    . The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the defendants’ failure to file
    pre-trial objections to Edelman’s proposed testimony did not constitute a waiver because the
    summary of Edelman’s testimony filed by plaintiff did not contain the specifics of his testimony
    and would not have given the defendants any reason to object. 
    Id.
     The Court further found that
    the plaintiff’s direct examination of Edelman did not reveal his reliance upon the unsupported
    -5-
    assumptions that underlay his opinion; cross-examination was necessary to bring these matters to
    light. After a brief redirect, the defendants moved to strike Edelman’s testimony. 
    Id. at 162
    , 
    606 S.E.2d at 813
    . The Court held that under the circumstances, the defendants did not waive their
    objection to Edelman’s testimony because at the first opportunity, after the flaws in the expert
    testimony had become apparent on cross-examination, the defendants moved to strike it. 
    Id. at 162-63
    , 
    606 S.E.2d at 813
    .
    Similarly in the case at bar, given the circumstances of Gillespie’s testimony, appellant’s
    objection was timely. On direct examination, Gillespie did not then testify as to how he knew
    the total costs of repairs would be $3,000. At that time, it was not reasonably foreseeable to
    appellant that Gillespie’s testimony might qualify as inadmissible hearsay. It was not clear until
    cross-examination that Gillespie’s testimony as to the cost of repairs was partially based on
    information received from the property management company. Once it became evident that
    Gillespie based his testimony on information provided to him by the property management
    company, appellant’s counsel promptly objected. Therefore, based on the circumstances of this
    case and the manner in which the testimony was elicited, we hold that appellant’s objection
    claiming Gillespie’s testimony was hearsay was timely and the issue properly preserved for this
    appeal.
    B. Standard of Review
    “Under familiar principles of appellate review, we examine the evidence in the light most
    favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible
    therefrom.” Crews v. Commonwealth, 
    18 Va. App. 115
    , 117, 
    442 S.E.2d 407
    , 408 (1994).
    “‘The admissibility of evidence is within the broad discretion of the trial court, and a ruling will
    not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion.’” Id. at 118, 
    442 S.E.2d at 409
     (quoting Blain v. Commonwealth, 
    7 Va. App. 10
    , 16, 
    371 S.E.2d 838
    , 842 (1988)).
    -6-
    C. Admissibility of Gillespie’s Testimony as to Cost of Repairs
    We hold that Gillespie’s testimony as to the cost of repairs to the property constituted
    inadmissible hearsay.
    Hearsay is “‘testimony given by a witness who relates not what he knows personally, but
    what others have told him or what he has heard said by others. ’” Bowman v. Commonwealth,
    
    28 Va. App. 204
    , 209, 
    503 S.E.2d 241
    , 243 (1998) (quoting Cross v. Commonwealth, 
    195 Va. 62
    , 74, 
    77 S.E.2d 447
    , 453 (1953)). “‘Hearsay evidence is testimony in court, or written
    evidence, of a statement made out of court, the statement being offered as an assertion to show
    the truth of matters asserted therein, and thus resting for its value upon the credibility of the
    out-of-court asserter.’” Tatum v. Commonwealth, 
    17 Va. App. 585
    , 588, 
    440 S.E.2d 133
    , 135
    (1994) (quoting Stevenson v. Commonwealth, 
    218 Va. 462
    , 465, 
    237 S.E.2d 779
    , 781 (1977)).
    “Determining whether a statement is offered to prove the truth or falsity of the matter asserted
    requires an analysis of the purpose for which the statement is offered into evidence.” Swain v.
    Commonwealth, 
    28 Va. App. 555
    , 559, 
    507 S.E.2d 116
    , 118 (1998).
    A person familiar with property can estimate its value. Walls v. Commonwealth, 
    248 Va. 480
    , 483, 
    450 S.E.2d 363
    , 365 (1994) (“[T]he general rule is that opinion testimony of a
    nonexpert, who is not the owner of the personal property in question, is admissible upon the
    subject of property value, provided the witness possesses sufficient knowledge of the value of
    the property or has had ample opportunity for forming a correct opinion as to value.”); see also
    Burton v. Commonwealth, 
    58 Va. App. 274
    , 282, 
    708 S.E.2d 444
    , 448 (2011). This rule does
    not, however, dispose of the requirement that a person testify based on his personal knowledge
    and not on hearsay information provided by a third party.
    In the present case, while Gillespie had personal knowledge of the damage done to the
    property, he did not have personal knowledge of the cost to repair that damage. Rather, he
    -7-
    testified that the information as to the cost of the repairs was entirely based upon the amount
    provided to him by the property management company. Further, the record does not indicate
    that Gillespie, as the property’s caretaker, paid for the repairs on behalf of his employer, and on
    that basis acquired personal knowledge of the cost of the repairs. Thus, his observation of the
    damage to the property corroborated the $3,000 figure; however it did not provide an
    independent basis for the cost of repairs. In short, his testimony concerning what the
    management company told him constitutes an out-of-court statement offered for the truth of the
    matter asserted.
    We addressed a similar situation in an unpublished opinion, Brown v. Commonwealth,
    No. 2825-07-1, 
    2009 Va. App. LEXIS 30
     (Va. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2009).4 In Brown, the defendant
    damaged but did not total Ms. Washington’s vehicle. Id. at *2-3. Ms. Washington testified that
    the cost to repair her vehicle was $1,600, based on an estimate from a repair shop. Id. at *4. The
    defendant objected to that testimony as hearsay and later moved to strike the Commonwealth’s
    evidence. Id. Ms. Washington’s testimony was the Commonwealth’s only evidence of damages.
    Id. at *9-10. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to strike and found the defendant
    guilty of felony destruction of property in violation of Code § 18.2-137. Id. at *1.
    On appeal we noted that, while Ms. Washington was competent to testify as to the value
    of the truck, because her vehicle was merely damaged and not totaled, the Commonwealth had
    the burden of proving the fair market cost of repair. Id. at *11 (citing Parker v. Commonwealth,
    
    254 Va. 118
    , 121, 
    489 S.E.2d 482
    , 483 (1997)). However, “Ms. Washington did not offer her
    own opinion as to the fair market cost of repair. She merely repeated the out-of-court estimate
    that an unidentified repair shop reportedly gave to her.” 
    Id.
     Therefore, the Court went on to
    4
    “Although not binding precedent, unpublished opinions can be cited and considered for
    their persuasive value.” Otey v. Commonwealth, 
    61 Va. App. 346
    , 350, 
    735 S.E.2d 255
    , 257
    (2012) (citing Rule 5A:1(f)).
    -8-
    examine “whether the rule allowing lay opinion testimony by a property owner as to the value of
    the owner’s property allows an owner to give secondhand testimony of the amount of a specific
    repair estimate by an out-of-court declarant over the defendant’s hearsay objection.” Id. at *12.
    The issue was at the time the Court decided Brown, and remains, a question of first impression in
    Virginia. Id.
    The Court held that Ms. Washington’s testimony was inadmissible hearsay and reversed
    and remanded the defendant’s conviction due to insufficient evidence of damages. Id. at *17. In
    support of its conclusion, Brown discussed the statutory exception to the hearsay rule for
    affidavits estimating the cost of repairing the damage to motor vehicles, applicable only in civil
    cases. Id. at *12-13 (citing Code § 8.01-416(A)). The Court reasoned that the statutory
    exception would not be necessary if the legislature understood the rule allowing an owner’s
    testimony as to the value of property to mean that an owner could testify as to the estimated cost
    of repairs for property based upon estimates provided by third parties. Id. at *14. Further, the
    Court noted that it “would be inconsistent with our traditional maintenance of standards for the
    admission of evidence in criminal cases” to admit hearsay testimony in a criminal case which
    would be inadmissible in a civil case absent compliance with Code § 8.01-416(A). Id.
    We find the Court’s rationale in Brown persuasive. Because Gillespie’s testimony as to
    the cost of repairs to the property was based on inadmissible hearsay, we reverse appellant’s
    conviction for property damage over $1,000, and remand for a new trial on misdemeanor
    property damage, should the Commonwealth be so advised. See Crowder v. Commonwealth, 
    41 Va. App. 658
    , 666, 
    588 S.E.2d 384
    , 388 (2003) (citing Gorham v. Commonwealth, 
    15 Va. App. 673
    , 678, 
    426 S.E.2d 493
    , 496 (1993)).
    Reversed and remanded.
    -9-