Jesse Lee Bolin v. Commonwealth ( 1995 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Benton and Elder
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
JESSE LEE BOLIN
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 0954-94-2 CHIEF JUDGE NORMAN K. MOON
AUGUST 29, 1995
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF POWHATAN COUNTY
Thomas V. Warren, Judge
John L. Squires, III, for appellant.
Margaret Ann B. Walker, Assistant Attorney
General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney
General, on brief) for appellee.
Jesse Lee Bolin appeals from his conviction for driving
under the influence of alcohol in violation of Code § 18.2-266.
Bolin contends that the trial judge erred in refusing to suppress
a certificate of breath analysis and statements Bolin made to
police prior to his arrest. We affirm the conviction.
The evidence proved that State Police Trooper J.A. Olinger
received a radio call at 10:35 p.m. reporting an automobile
accident in Powhatan County. When she arrived at the scene, the
officer found an automobile in a ditch by the side of the road.
Bolin's mother testified that Bolin arrived home that evening and
told his parents that he had been in an automobile accident. His
parents left to retrieve the automobile and discovered a number
of police at the scene. Bolin's father remained at the accident
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
site, and his mother returned home.
Later, two uniformed deputy sheriffs arrived with Bolin's
father to their home. Bolin testified that he was told by the
deputies to accompany them to the accident scene and that he
believed that he was not free to refuse the deputies' demand.
His mother testified that Bolin was asked to accompany the
deputies and that he complied. Bolin was not handcuffed and was
transported in the rear of the deputies' vehicle to the accident
site.
Trooper Olinger testified that when Bolin arrived at the
accident site, his eyes were bloodshot and glassy, he smelled of
alcohol, and he stumbled out of the vehicle. The officer asked
Bolin if he had been driving the automobile at the time of the
accident, what time the accident occurred, and whether he had
consumed any alcohol before or after the accident. The officer
testified that Bolin had admitted that he was driving the
automobile at the time of the accident, that the accident had
occurred thirty minutes prior to his return, and that he had
consumed one beer before and none after the accident. After
Bolin poorly performed several field sobriety tests, the officer
arrested Bolin at 11:55 p.m. and advised him of his rights.
Bolin took a breath test at 1:10 a.m.
Bolin argues that the trial judge erred in refusing to
suppress the certificate of blood analysis and his statements
because he was in custody and had not been given Miranda warnings
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at the time he was interrogated. Furthermore, Bolin argues that
the trial judge erroneously based his ruling on the officer's
subjective belief that Bolin was free to leave up until the time
he was arrested.
When a suspect is subjected to "custodial interrogation,"
Miranda warnings are required. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
444 (1966). Custodial interrogation is "questioning initiated by
law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way." Id. "The totality of circumstances must be
considered in determining whether the suspect is in custody when
questioned, but the 'ultimate inquiry is simply "whether there is
a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement" of the
degree associated with a formal arrest.'" Wass v. Commonwealth,
5 Va. App. 27, 32, 359 S.E.2d 836, 839 (1987) (citations
omitted).
The judge believed the mother's testimony that Bolin was
asked to accompany the police officers to the accident site.
"The [fact finder] 'had the right to accept the evidence of one
witness and to reject that of the defendant.'" Bryant v.
Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 421, 427, 393 S.E.2d 216, 220 (1990)
(citation omitted). Bolin was also not restrained in any manner.
Thus, there is no evidence that Bolin's freedom of action was
restricted in any way. He voluntarily went to the accident scene
with the two deputies. See Nash v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App.
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550, 553, 404 S.E.2d 743, 744 (1991).
Any interview of one suspected of a crime by
a police officer will have coercive aspects
to it, simply by virtue of the fact that the
police officer is part of a law enforcement
system which may ultimately cause the suspect
to be charged with a crime. But police
officers are not required to administer
Miranda warnings to everyone whom they
question. Nor is the requirement of warnings
to be imposed simply because the questioning
takes place in the station house, or because
the questioned person is one whom the police
suspect. Miranda warnings are required only
where there has been such a restriction on a
person's freedom as to render him "in
custody." It was that sort of coercive
environment to which Miranda by its terms was
made applicable, and to which it is limited.
Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977).
"[T]he initial determination of custody depends on the
objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the
subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or
the person being questioned." Stansbury v. California, ___ U.S.
___, ___, 114 S. Ct. 1526, 1529 (1994). The officer testified
that when Bolin had arrived on the scene, she had not focused her
investigation on him. She believed that he was free to leave up
until the time she arrested him at 11:55 p.m. However, the
officer testified that she did not communicate this belief to
Bolin. The objective facts in this record that the trial judge
believed support a finding that Bolin was not in custody until
his arrest. Thus, we hold that the trial judge did not err in
refusing to suppress as evidence Bolin's statements and the
certificate of analysis.
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Because Bolin's statements were properly admitted, we need
not address his argument that the Commonwealth could not prove
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that Bolin was arrested within two hours of his offense pursuant
to Code § 18.2-268.2(A). Thus, we affirm his conviction.
Affirmed.
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BENTON, J., dissenting.
The objective facts prove that two uniformed deputies
employed by the sheriff's department who were at the scene of the
automobile accident arrived at Jesse Lee Bolin's residence with
Bolin's father. The statement of facts recites that Bolin
testified "[h]e was told by the deputies to accompany them to the
accident scene." The statement of facts also recites that
Bolin's mother testified that "[t]he deputies asked [Bolin] to
accompany them to the accident scene . . . [and Bolin] complied."
In ruling that Jesse Lee Bolin was not subjected to
custodial interrogation after he arrived at the accident site,
the trial judge relied, in part, upon "the testimony that Trooper
Olinger had not 'focussed' her investigation upon . . . [Bolin]
when he arrived at the accident scene and the testimony that
Trooper Olinger believed that . . . [Bolin] was free to leave the
scene at any time . . . [until] she placed . . . [Bolin] under
arrest." However, in Stansbury v. California, ___ U.S. ___, ___,
114 S. Ct. 1526, 1529 (1994), the United States Supreme Court
reaffirmed its previous holdings and ruled that "the initial
determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances
of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by
either the interrogating officers or the person being
questioned." As particularly pertinent to this case, the Court
noted "that any inquiry into whether the interrogating officers
have focused their suspicions upon the individual being
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questioned . . . is not relevant for purposes of Miranda." Id.
at ___, 114 S. Ct. at 1530.
Because the record contains objective facts that tend to
prove Bolin was in custody and because the trial judge erred in
considering subjective factors in deciding that Bolin was not
subjected to custodial interrogation, I would reverse the
conviction and remand the suppression motion to the trial judge
for reconsideration.
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