Commonwealth of Virginia v. Shawn Anthony Mayfield ( 2004 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Benton, Elder and Frank
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
v. Record No. 0090-04-1 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER
MAY 18, 2004
SHAWN ANTHONY MAYFIELD
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK
Charles E. Poston, Judge
(Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General; Richard B. Smith, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellant. Appellant
submitting on brief
No brief for appellee.
Shawn Anthony Mayfield (defendant) stands indicted for possession of marijuana with
intent to distribute. Pursuant to Code § 19.2-398, the Commonwealth appeals a pretrial ruling
granting defendant’s motion to suppress all evidence resulting from the encounter in which the
marijuana upon which the indictment is based was found. We hold the court’s ruling constituted
a finding that defendant was seized without reasonable suspicion and that this illegal seizure
tainted defendant’s consent to search. Because the evidence supports such a ruling, we affirm
the ruling and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
On appeal of a ruling on a motion to suppress, we view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the party prevailing below. Commonwealth v. Grimstead, 12 Va. App. 1066, 1067,
407 S.E.2d 47, 48 (1991). “[W]e are bound by the trial court’s findings of historical fact unless
‘plainly wrong’ or without evidence to support them.” McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App.
*
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
193, 198, 487 S.E.2d 259, 261 (1997) (en banc). However, we review de novo the question
whether a person has been seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Reittinger v.
Commonwealth, 260 Va. 232, 236, 532 S.E.2d 25, 27 (2000); see also Ornelas v. United States,
517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1663, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911 (1996) (noting review of
application of legal standards such as reasonable suspicion and probable cause is de novo).
“Fourth Amendment jurisprudence recognizes three categories of police-citizen
[contacts]: (1) consensual encounters, (2) brief, minimally intrusive investigatory detentions
[that must be] based upon specific, articulable facts, commonly referred to as Terry stops, and
(3) highly intrusive arrests and searches founded on probable cause.” Wechsler v.
Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 162, 169, 455 S.E.2d 744, 747 (1995) (citation omitted). “A
seizure occurs when an individual is either physically restrained or has submitted to a show of
authority.” McGee, 25 Va. App. at 199, 487 S.E.2d at 262. “Whether a seizure has occurred . . .
depends upon whether, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would have
believed that he or she was not free to leave.” Id. at 199-200, 487 S.E.2d at 262.
Various factors have been identified as relevant in determining
whether a seizure has occurred, including the threatening presence
of a number of police officers, the display of weapons by officers,
physical contact between an officer and a citizen, an officer’s
language or tone of voice compelling compliance, the retention of
documents requested by an officer, and whether a citizen was told
that he or she was free to leave. See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S.
33, 36, 117 S. Ct. 417, 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996); [Florida v.] Royer,
460 U.S. [491,] 504, 103 S. Ct. 1319[, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983)];
[United States v.] Mendenhall, 446 U.S. [544, 554, 100 S. Ct.
1870, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497 (1980)]. The decision whether the
encounter was consensual must be made based on the totality of
the circumstances. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554, 100 S. Ct. 1870.
Harris v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 28, 32, 581 S.E.2d 206, 209 (2003).
Here, Officer Spencer and seven other uniformed officers on bicycles, each of whom
wore a gun belt and holster containing a pistol, approached defendant as a group as defendant
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stood with seven or eight other people on the property of an apartment complex posted with
prominent “No trespassing” signs. Several members of the group with which defendant stood
held open containers of alcohol, although defendant did not. The containers were visible from
the adjacent public street, which constituted a violation of the city code. Although only Officer
Spencer interacted directly with defendant, this interaction took place in a crowded and confined
area--a ten-foot-square area of the parking lot in which a total of seven other officers stood with
seven or eight other individuals whom they questioned. Further, Officer Spencer simply began
to question defendant and did not ask whether defendant minded answering some questions.
During the encounter, Officer Spencer asked appellant his name and why he was on the property;
asked for identification, which he “[r]an . . . over the radio” in defendant’s presence to determine
whether defendant “was wanted”; and asked if defendant “had any guns, drugs or knives on
him.” When defendant confirmed that he did not live there, Officer Spencer gave defendant no
indication that he was free to leave, and defendant made no attempt to do so.
Except where the contrary is specifically provided by law, see, e.g., Code § 20-108.1(B)
(requiring court to follow statutory guidelines for calculating child support and to make specific
findings of fact justifying any deviation from amount due under guidelines), Virginia courts are
not required to state the factual findings or legal conclusions that underlay their ultimate rulings.
Akers v. Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 521, 532 n.5, 525 S.E.2d 13, 18 n.5 (2000). A trial court
is presumed to know and properly apply the law, “[a]bsent clear evidence to the contrary in the
record.” Yarborough v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 971, 978, 234 S.E.2d 286, 291 (1977).
Here, the trial court was not required to give any explanation for its ruling granting
defendant’s motion to suppress. However, it chose to provide such an explanation, and the
Commonwealth contends that explanation constituted an erroneous interpretation of applicable
law. We hold the record does not support such a conclusion. The trial court assumed defendant
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gave consent to a search but that Officer Spencer did not have “any reason to request that
permission.” Viewing these comments in the light most favorable to defendant, we hold they
constituted a finding that defendant was illegally seized and, thus, that any purported consent to
search was tainted by the illegal seizure. The court’s comments do not constitute “clear
evidence” to rebut the presumption that the trial court knew and properly applied the law. See
id.We hold the evidence, including the presence of so many visibly armed police officers in
a small space, with several individuals in obvious violation of the city’s open container
ordinance who may also have been trespassing, supported the trial court’s conclusion that
defendant was not free to leave. Based on the Commonwealth’s concession that Officer Spencer
lacked reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop, this seizure of defendant’s person was
unreasonable.
Further, the trial court’s findings support the implicit conclusion that defendant’s
purported consent to search was tainted by the illegal seizure. See Harris, 266 Va. at 33-34, 581
S.E.2d at 210 (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9
L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963)).
For these reasons, we affirm the granting of the motion to suppress and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Affirmed and remanded.
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