Deborah L. Miles v. City of Lynchburg Human Services ( 2004 )


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  •                                COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Annunziata, Clements and McClanahan
    Argued at Richmond, Virginia
    DEBORAH L. MILES
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.     Record No. 2254-03-3                                 JUDGE ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA
    APRIL 27, 2004
    CITY OF LYNCHBURG HUMAN SERVICES
    FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION
    Philip B. Baker (Sanzone & Baker, on brief), for appellant.
    Richard D. Lucas (Lucas Law Firm, on brief), for appellee.
    Deborah L. Miles appeals from a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commission
    denying her claim for benefits arising from injuries sustained when she fell in the parking lot
    outside her employer’s business. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the
    commission.
    I. Background
    On appeal, “we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party
    before the commission.” Clinchfield Coal Co. v. Reed, 
    40 Va. App. 69
    , 72, 
    577 S.E.2d 538
    , 539
    (2003). So viewed, the evidence established that Deborah L. Miles was employed by the City of
    Lynchburg Human Services (employer). On May 3, 2001, Miles arrived for work and parked her
    car in the parking lot. She exited her car and walked towards the employee entrance. Before
    reaching the entrance, Miles lost her balance and fell to the pavement, injuring her leg and
    fracturing her wrist.
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
    Miles filed a claim with the workers’ compensation commission seeking temporary total
    disability and medical benefits. At a hearing before the deputy commissioner, Miles testified
    that she stepped on “asphalt, rock, or whatever,” which twisted her foot and caused her to fall.
    However, she also testified that she was not “a hundred percent sure because I didn’t think to
    pick anything up or look for anything. It happened so fast and I went straight to the hospital . . .
    so I never saw it or picked it up or looked for it.”
    Miles introduced several photographs of the pavement near the area of her fall. The
    photographs showed that the pavement contained numerous small cracks. Miles repeatedly
    denied that a crack in the pavement caused her to fall. The deputy commissioner reviewed the
    photographs and, in his decision, stated: “Indeed, even the photographs submitted by Ms. Miles
    reveal no rocks or loose ‘chunks’ of concrete. While the parking lot does show obvious signs of
    deterioration, I still find no evidence of any debris meeting the description offered by claimant.”
    Blake Eisley, a risk manager for the City of Lynchburg, testified that he viewed the area
    where Miles fell and noticed nothing unusual. “There may have been . . . a couple of small . . .
    pieces of gravel,” Eisley stated, describing them as smaller in size than a marble and similar to
    that which one would find in any parking lot—the sort of gravel “found everywhere.”
    Based on Eisley’s testimony as to the absence of significant obstructions or objects and in
    light of the photographic evidence showing the pavement where Miles fell, the deputy
    commissioner concluded that Miles’s “injury was caused by her unexplained fall.” The deputy
    commissioner also noted that there was no evidence that the parking lot was swept or cleaned
    between the time when Miles fell and Eisley examined the scene. In short, the deputy
    commissioner concluded that Miles’s injury did not arise out of her employment.
    On appeal, the full commission, by divided vote, affirmed the decision of the deputy
    commissioner. Referencing the evidence before it, the commission noted that “[t]he photographs
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    depicting the scene where she fell do not reveal any chunks of rock or asphalt in the vicinity.” It
    further stated that “Mr. Eisley’s survey of the area after the accident failed to reveal any chunks
    of asphalt or rocks in the vicinity. He found one or two small marble-sized pieces of gravel . . . ,
    but nothing similar to that described by the claimant.” The commission thus stated that it could
    not “find that the condition of the parking lot caused her [sic] or contributed to her fall.”
    Accordingly, it determined that Miles’s accident “did not arise out of her employment” and
    denied her claim. This appeal followed.
    II. Analysis
    Miles argues that the commission erred in determining that her injury did not arise out of
    her employment. We disagree.
    To qualify for benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act, “the evidence must show
    that the employee suffered an injury by accident which arose out of and in the course of the
    employment.” Richmond Memorial Hosp. v. Crane, 
    222 Va. 283
    , 285, 
    278 S.E.2d 877
    , 878
    (1981). The burden is on the claimant to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, all the
    elements of a workers’ compensation claim. Central State Hosp. v. Wiggers, 
    230 Va. 157
    , 159,
    
    335 S.E.2d 257
    , 258 (1985). On appeal, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the
    employer as the party prevailing below. Reed, 40 Va. App. at 72, 577 S.E.2d at 539.
    Whether an injury arose out of employment is a mixed question of law and fact which we
    review de novo on appeal. Blaustein v. Mitre Corp., 
    34 Va. App. 344
    , 348, 
    550 S.E.2d 336
    , 338
    (2001). However, we afford great deference to the commission’s determination of the cause of
    the injury. “The actual determination of causation is a factual finding that will not be disturbed
    on appeal if there is credible evidence to support the finding.” Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Musick, 
    7 Va. App. 684
    , 688, 
    376 S.E.2d 814
    , 817 (1989). “The fact that contrary evidence may be in the
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    record is of no consequence if there is credible evidence to support the commission’s findings.”
    Russell Loungewear v. Gray, 
    2 Va. App. 90
    , 95, 
    341 S.E.2d 824
    , 826 (1986).
    Here, the commission determined as a fact that Miles failed to prove the cause of her
    injury. Although it is this Court’s duty to decide whether the facts establish that an accident
    arose out of employment, see Blaustein, 34 Va. App. at 388, 550 S.E.2d at 338, it is the
    commission’s responsibility, as the trier of fact, to determine the facts from the evidence. See
    Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Harris, 
    35 Va. App. 162
    , 167, 
    543 S.E.2d 619
    , 621 (2001).
    The commission determined that the fall had no discernible cause and remained
    unexplained. The commission reached this conclusion after weighing all the evidence, including
    the testimony of Miles and Eisley, as well as the photographic evidence depicting the scene of
    the accident. Although Miles testified that she stepped on a rock or asphalt, the photographs
    revealed no such conditions or defects in, or on, the pavement. Eisley further testified that he
    saw nothing unusual; he saw only “a couple” of pieces of gravel, which were smaller than the
    size of a marble. The commission determined that these pieces of gravel were “nothing similar
    to that described by claimant.” Because this factual finding is supported by credible evidence,
    we will not disturb it on appeal. See Musick, 7 Va. App. at 688, 376 S.E.2d at 817.
    It is well settled in Virginia that a claim for workers’ compensation cannot rest on an
    unexplained fall. PYA/Monarch & Reliance Ins. Co. v. Harris, 
    22 Va. App. 215
    , 223, 
    468 S.E.2d 688
    , 691 (1996). “‘[I]n a pure unexplained-fall case, there is no way in which an award
    can be justified as a matter of causation theory except by a recognition that [positional risk] but-
    for reasoning satisfies the ‘arising’ requirement.’” Id. at 224, 468 S.E.2d at 692 (quoting 1
    Arthur Larson, The Law of Workmen’s Compensation § 7.00, at 3-12 (1990)) (alteration in
    original). Because Virginia has rejected the “positional risk test” in favor of the “actual risk
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    test,” the claimant must establish “a causal connection between his or her employment and the
    fall.” Id.
    Here, Miles failed to establish the requisite causal connection. Accordingly, we affirm
    the decision of the commission denying her claim for benefits. 1
    Affirmed.
    1
    Miles also requested that we remand her case to the commission so that it could
    determine whether her accident occurred “in the course” of her employment. We need not
    remand for determination of this issue because we affirm the commission’s decision that Miles
    did not prove her accident “arose out of” her employment. Miles’s claim must, therefore, fail.
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