Super Fresh Food Markets, Inc. v. Rejino C. Stultz ( 1998 )


Menu:
  •                      COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present:    Judges Bray, Annunziata and Overton
    SUPER FRESH FOOD MARKETS, INC.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION *
    v.   Record No. 1276-98-4                             PER CURIAM
    OCTOBER 6, 1998
    REJINO C. STULTZ
    FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
    (S. Vernon Priddy, III; Sands, Anderson,
    Marks & Miller, on brief), for appellant.
    (James E. Swiger; Swiger & Cay, on brief),
    for appellee.
    Super Fresh Food Markets, Inc. ("employer") contends that
    the Workers' Compensation Commission ("commission") erred in
    finding that the Supreme Court's holding in The Steinrich Group
    v. Jemmott, 
    251 Va. 186
    , 
    467 S.E.2d 795
     (1996), did not bar
    compensation for Rejino C. Stultz's ("claimant") left shoulder
    condition.    The commission found that the left shoulder condition
    was a compensable consequence of claimant's original February 14,
    1994 injury by accident.    Employer also argues that the
    commission should have dismissed claimant's claim, because he
    failed to file his claim for benefits as a new injury claim,
    rather than as a change in condition.    Upon reviewing the record
    and the briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is
    without merit.    Accordingly, we summarily affirm the commission's
    decision.     See Rule 5A:27.
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    I.
    In Virginia, "[t]he doctrine of compensable consequences is
    well established and has been in existence for many years."
    Williams Indus., Inc. v. Wagoner, 
    24 Va. App. 181
    , 186, 
    480 S.E.2d 788
    , 790 (1997).
    This doctrine, also known as the chain of
    causation rule, provides that "'where the
    chain of causation from the original
    industrial injury to the condition for which
    compensation is sought is direct, and not
    interrupted by any intervening cause
    attributable to the [employee's] own
    intentional conduct, then the subsequent
    [condition] should be compensable.'"
    Food Distributors v. Estate of Ball, 
    24 Va. App. 692
    , 697, 
    485 S.E.2d 155
    , 158 (1997) (quoting Leadbetter, Inc. v. Penkalski, 
    21 Va. App. 427
    , 432, 
    464 S.E.2d 554
    , 556 (1995)) (other citation
    omitted).   "'The simplest application of this principle is the
    rule that all the medical consequences and sequelae that flow
    from the primary injury are compensable.'"   American Filtrona Co.
    v. Hanford, 
    16 Va. App. 159
    , 163, 
    428 S.E.2d 511
    , 513 (1993)
    (citation omitted).   "[W]here a causal connection between the
    initial compensable injury and the subsequent injury is
    established . . . the subsequent injury 'is treated as if it
    occurred in the course of and arising out of the employee's
    employment.'"   Bartholow Drywall Co. v. Hill, 
    12 Va. App. 790
    ,
    794, 
    407 S.E.2d 1
    , 3 (1991) (quoting Leonard v. Arnold, 
    218 Va. 210
    , 214, 
    237 S.E.2d 97
    , 100 (1977)).
    Employer does not dispute that claimant proved a causal
    - 2 -
    connection between his initial February 14, 1994 compensable
    right shoulder injury and his subsequent left shoulder problems. 1
    However, employer contends that the commission erred in refusing
    to apply the rule set forth in Jemmott to bar compensation in
    this case.   Employer argues that Jemmott bars compensation for a
    cumulative trauma injury which is found to be a compensable
    consequence of an original injury by accident.    We disagree.
    In Jemmott, the Supreme Court held that "job-related
    impairments resulting from cumulative trauma caused by repetitive
    motion, however labeled or however defined, are, as a matter of
    law, not compensable under the present provisions of the Act."
    251 Va. at 199, 
    467 S.E.2d at 802
    .     Jemmott dealt with the
    compensability of a primary injury or condition, it did not
    address the compensability of a cumulative trauma injury caused
    by an intervening event, which was itself a result of the
    original compensable injury by accident.    Nothing in Jemmott
    expressly overruled or altered the well-established doctrine of
    compensable consequences.   Accordingly, the commission did not
    err in refusing to apply the holding in Jemmott to the facts of
    this case.
    II.
    Employer argues that the commission should have dismissed
    claimant's claim because he failed to file a claim for benefits
    1
    Claimant's testimony and the medical evidence established
    that his left shoulder symptoms were caused by overuse of his
    left extremity due to the injury to his right shoulder.
    - 3 -
    alleging a new injury by accident as required by Leonard v.
    Arnold, 
    218 Va. 210
    , 
    237 S.E.2d 97
     (1977).   Employer did not
    raise this specific argument before the commission.   Accordingly,
    we will not consider this issue for the first time on appeal.
    See Green v. Warwick Plumbing & Heating Corp., 
    5 Va. App. 409
    ,
    413, 
    364 S.E.2d 4
    , 6 (1988); Rule 5A:18.
    For these reasons, we affirm the commission's decision.
    Affirmed.
    - 4 -