Henry Lee Davis v. Commonwealth ( 1998 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Willis, Annunziata and Overton
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
HENRY LEE DAVIS
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 1279-97-2 JUDGE NELSON T. OVERTON
AUGUST 11, 1998
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LUNENBURG COUNTY
William L. Wellons, Judge
Joseph M. Teefey, Jr., Assistant Public
Defender, for appellant.
(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General; Steven A.
Witmer, Assistant Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee.
Henry Lee Davis (defendant) appeals his conviction of
driving in a manner that did endanger the life, limb, or property
of another while being a habitual offender, in violation of Code
§ 46.2-357(b)(2). He contends on appeal the trial court applied
an incorrect legal standard to the facts and, therefore, the
Commonwealth presented insufficient evidence to convict. Because
we hold the trial court applied the correct standard, and the
evidence presented was sufficient, we affirm.
The parties are fully conversant with the record in this
case and because this memorandum opinion has no precedental
value, no recitation of the facts is necessary.
Code § 46.2-357(b)(2) prohibits driving which "does endanger
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
the life, limb, or property of another." This Court in Bishop v.
Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 206, 210-11, 455 S.E.2d 765, 767
(1995), determined the prosecution must show recklessness on the
part of the defendant in order to prove him guilty. Accord
Lawrence v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 653, 655-56, 460 S.E.2d
259, 260 (1995). Therefore, we review the lower court's decision
to see if the recklessness standard was applied.
"Absent clear evidence to the contrary in the record, the
judgement of a trial court comes to us on appeal with a
presumption that the law was correctly applied to the facts."
Yarborough v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 971, 978, 234 S.E.2d 286, 291
(1977). That presumption is fully justified in the instant
matter. At the close of evidence, the defendant made a motion to
strike citing the Commonwealth's failure to prove defendant acted
recklessly. The Commonwealth erroneously argued it need not
prove recklessness. Defendant corrected the Commonwealth and
reminded the court the appropriate legal standard was
recklessness. The court, after discussing the facts of the case,
denied the motion to strike and found defendant guilty because
defendant's conduct met "the statutory requirements that the
operation of the vehicle does endanger the life, limb or property
of another." This argument among the attorneys and the court
indicates the trial court was aware of the correct standard and
applied it to the facts.
Those facts, taken in the light most favorable to the
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Commonwealth, were sufficient to convict defendant. See Traverso
v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 172, 176, 366 S.E.2d 719, 721 (1988).
Defendant drove his vehicle down a dirt road at a high, although
legal, speed. He was intoxicated. Upon entering a curve, he
turned the car twice, flipped it onto its roof and landed on the
right side of the road. This conduct clearly endangered the
life, limb, and property of another and rose to the standard of
recklessness. See, e.g., Travis v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App.
410, 417, 457 S.E.2d 420, 423 (1995); Lawrence, 20 Va. App. at
657, 460 S.E.2d at 260-61 (weaving into oncoming traffic lane
while intoxicated was sufficient). Combined with the undisputed
fact defendant was a habitual offender, these facts fully
supported the conviction.
Because the trial court applied the correct legal standard
to the facts and the facts were sufficient to prove defendant's
guilt, his conviction is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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