Robert Wesley Deans, Jr. v. CW ( 1998 )


Menu:
  •                    COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Benton, Willis and Annunziata
    Argued at Richmond, Virginia
    ROBERT WESLEY DEANS, JR.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.   Record No. 1881-96-2           JUDGE ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA
    FEBRUARY 24, 1998
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY
    Herbert C. Gill, Jr., Judge
    John H. Click, Jr. (White, Blackburn & Conte,
    P.C., on brief), for appellant.
    Daniel J. Munroe, Assistant Attorney General
    (Richard Cullen, Attorney General, on brief),
    for appellee.
    Robert Wesley Deans, Jr. (appellant) appeals his conviction
    for possession of marijuana in a county jail on the basis that
    the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to prove his
    guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.   We agree and reverse his
    conviction.
    On October 28, 1995, Chesterfield County deputies conducted
    a search of the Chesterfield County Jail dormitory in which
    appellant was housed.   The deputies ordered the inmates into the
    center of the room and then removed them from the dorm.
    Appellant occupied the bottom bunk of a bunk bed.   Deputy Brian
    Michaels, the Commonwealth's only witness, searched appellant's
    bed and the area surrounding the bed.   Underneath appellant's bed
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    were two jail-issued plastic tubs which inmates used to store
    their personal belongings.   In one of the tubs, Michaels
    discovered two paper bags, one of which contained plastic bags of
    tortilla and potato chips.
    Michaels checked each of the plastic bags of chips, and
    noticed that one of the bags had been resealed with a black putty
    substance and that it contained two balloons.   Michaels opened
    the balloons; he believed that one balloon contained marijuana
    and that the other balloon contained a mixture of tobacco and
    marijuana.    Michaels testified that he returned the paper bags to
    the plastic tub.    Deputy Cardelino testified, however, that the
    bags and contents of both inmates' plastic tubs were placed on
    the bunk bed.   When the inmates returned to the dorm, Michaels
    told appellant and the occupant of the top bunk to gather their
    personal belongings.   Appellant gathered his possessions, and
    picked up the paper bag which contained the altered chip bag.
    Michaels then left the room.   Subsequent testing confirmed that
    each of the balloons contained marijuana.
    At trial, appellant presented the testimony of another
    inmate, James Davis, who testified that he, appellant, and a
    third inmate routinely kept items in the same bags to avoid theft
    by other inmates.   Davis testified that the marijuana was his and
    that he had pled guilty to its possession.   He testified that he
    had placed the marijuana in the paper bag earlier in the day of
    the search.   The Commonwealth impeached Davis as a convicted
    2
    felon on cross-examination.
    On appeal, this Court reviews the evidence "'in the light
    most favorable to the Commonwealth and accord to the evidence all
    reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom.'"      Phoung v.
    Commonwealth, 
    15 Va. App. 457
    , 460, 
    424 S.E.2d 712
    , 714 (1992)
    (quoting Traverso v. Commonwealth, 
    6 Va. App. 172
    , 176, 
    366 S.E.2d 719
    , 721 (1988)).   A jury's verdict "shall not be set
    aside unless it appears from the evidence that such judgment is
    plainly wrong or without evidence to support it."   Code
    § 8.01-680; Phoung, 15 Va. App. at 460, 
    424 S.E.2d at 714
    (quoting Traverso, 6 Va. App. at 176, 
    366 S.E.2d at 721
    ).     The
    credibility of witnesses, the weight accorded the testimony of
    witnesses, and the inferences to be drawn from proven facts are
    questions within the province of the jury.   Spivey v.
    Commonwealth, 
    23 Va. App. 715
    , 724, 
    479 S.E.2d 543
    , 548 (1997)
    (citing Long v. Commonwealth, 
    8 Va. App. 194
    , 199, 
    379 S.E.2d 473
    , 476 (1989)).
    Possession of a controlled substance may be either actual or
    constructive.   McGee v. Commonwealth, 
    4 Va. App. 317
    , 322, 
    357 S.E.2d 738
    , 740 (1987) (citing Archer v. Commonwealth, 
    225 Va. 416
    , 418, 
    303 S.E.2d 863
    , 863 (1983)).   To support a conviction
    for constructive possession on appeal, "the Commonwealth must
    point to evidence of acts, statements, or conduct of the accused
    or other facts and circumstances which tend to show that the
    defendant was aware of both the presence and character of the
    3
    substance and that it was subject to his dominion and control."
    Powers v. Commonwealth, 
    227 Va. 474
    , 476, 
    316 S.E.2d 739
    , 740
    (1984) (citing Eckhart v. Commonwealth, 
    222 Va. 447
    , 450, 
    281 S.E.2d 853
    , 855 (1981)).   The Commonwealth may show possession of
    the controlled substance through circumstantial evidence provided
    the evidence "excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence."
    Spivey, 
    23 Va. App. at 724
    , 
    479 S.E.2d at
    548 (citing, inter
    alia, Tucker v. Commonwealth, 
    18 Va. App. 141
    , 143, 
    442 S.E.2d 419
    , 420 (1994)).
    The Commonwealth, relying upon the theory of constructive
    possession, points to three pieces of evidence in support of
    appellant's knowledge of the marijuana.
    First, the Commonwealth points to the fact that, when told
    to gather his belongings, appellant took the paper bag containing
    the marijuana enclosed in the plastic chip bag.   This evidence
    does not demonstrate, however, that appellant knew of the
    "presence and character" of the marijuana which the bag had
    contained.   Appellant's knowing possession of the paper bag does
    not establish that he knew that the paper bag contained the chip
    bag in question, much less that the chip bag contained marijuana.
    Second, the Commonwealth argues that the proximity of the
    marijuana to appellant's bunk supports the conclusion that he
    knowingly possessed the controlled substance.   "While proximity
    to a controlled substance is insufficient alone to establish
    possession, it is a factor to consider when determining whether
    4
    the accused constructively possessed drugs."    Brown v.
    Commonwealth, 
    15 Va. App. 1
    , 9, 
    421 S.E.2d 877
    , 882 (1992) (en
    banc) (citing Lane v. Commonwealth, 
    223 Va. 713
    , 716, 
    292 S.E.2d 358
    , 360 (1982)).   Thus, the proximity of the marijuana to
    appellant's bunk is some, but not sufficient, evidence of his
    knowledge of the contraband.
    Finally, the Commonwealth contends that the evidence was
    sufficient to convict appellant because Davis' testimony was not
    credible, and the jury could choose to disregard it.   Davis
    testified that he, appellant, and a third inmate kept their chips
    in a single paper bag to avoid theft by other inmates.     Davis
    further testified that he had placed the chip bag containing
    marijuana in the paper bag earlier that day.   Davis was impeached
    as a convicted felon.    See, e.g., Doss v. Commonwealth, 
    23 Va. App. 679
    , 685, 
    479 S.E.2d 92
    , 95 (1996).   Assuming without
    deciding that the jury concluded that Davis lied to conceal
    appellant's guilt, see Speight v. Commonwealth, 
    4 Va. App. 83
    ,
    88, 
    354 S.E.2d 95
    , 98 (1987) (en banc) (citing Carter v.
    Commonwealth, 
    223 Va. 528
    , 532, 
    290 S.E.2d 865
    , 867 (1982)), that
    credibility determination is not sufficient to exclude the
    reasonable hypothesis that appellant had no knowledge of the
    contraband concealed in the bag he picked up when directed to
    gather his belongings.    See Stover v. Commonwealth, 
    222 Va. 618
    ,
    624, 
    283 S.E.2d 194
    , 196 (1981); Tucker, 18 Va. App. at 144, 
    442 S.E.2d at 421
    .
    5
    Accordingly, we find the evidence insufficient to sustain
    the appellant's conviction beyond a reasonable doubt and reverse.
    See, e.g., Burchette v. Commonwealth, 
    15 Va. App. 432
    , 435-36,
    
    425 S.E.2d 81
    , 84 (1992); Hairston v. Commonwealth, 
    5 Va. App. 183
    , 186-87, 
    360 S.E.2d 893
    , 895 (1987).
    Reversed and dismissed.
    6