Gloria A. Northcraft DeWald v. Andrew Andrew Dewald ( 1998 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Baker, Bray and Overton
Argued at Norfolk, Virginia
GLORIA ANN NORTHCRAFT DeWALD
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 0388-97-1 JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY
FEBRUARY 3, 1998
ANDREW ALFRED DeWALD
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH
Frederick B. Lowe, Judge
Henry M. Schwan for appellant.
Moody E. Stallings, Jr. (Kevin E.
Martingayle; Stallings & Richardson, P.C., on
brief), for appellee.
Gloria DeWald (wife) appeals a decree of the trial court
adjudicating the issues of spousal support and equitable
distribution, complaining that the court erroneously failed to
consider all factors specified by Code § 20-107.1 in fixing
support and denied wife a marital interest in the savings plan of
her husband, Andrew DeWald (husband). Because we are unable to
fully determine the classification and valuation of relevant
property interests of the parties, we must reverse and remand for
further consideration by the trial court.
There are three basic steps that a trial
judge must follow in making an equitable
distribution of property. "The court first
must classify the property as either
[separate, marital, or part separate and part
marital property]. The court then must
assign a value to the property based upon
evidence presented by both parties. Finally,
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
the court distributes the property to the
parties, taking into consideration the
factors presented in Code § 20-107.3(E)."
Alphin v. Alphin, 15 Va. App. 395, 403, 424 S.E.2d 572, 576
(1992) (citation omitted). "The burden is always on the parties
to present sufficient evidence to provide the basis on which a
proper determination can be made and the trial court . . . must
have that evidence . . . before determining to grant or deny a
monetary award." Hodges v. Hodges, 2 Va. App. 508, 517, 347
S.E.2d 134, 139 (1986).
"In reviewing an equitable distribution award on appeal, we
recognize that the trial court's job is a difficult one.
Accordingly, we rely heavily on the discretion of the trial judge
in weighing the many considerations and circumstances that are
presented in each case." Artis v. Artis, 4 Va. App. 132, 137,
354 S.E.2d 812, 815 (1987) (citing Rexrode v. Rexrode, 1 Va. App.
385, 394-95, 339 S.E.2d 544, 550 (1986)). However, "[i]n making
an equitable distribution award, formulating the award must go
beyond mere guesswork. There must be a proper foundation in the
record to support the granting of an award and the amount of the
award." Stumbo v. Stumbo, 20 Va. App. 685, 693, 460 S.E.2d 591,
595 (1995) (citations omitted).
Here, the commissioner's report fails to fully specify the
marital, separate and hybrid interests of the parties in all
properties in dispute, with attendant values, including
particulars of the savings plan and residence and related
- 2 -
transmutation/tracing issues. Indeed, the commissioner declared
it "impossible to determine what is the marital value of the
[savings] plan," funds from which enhanced the value of the home.
Nevertheless, both the commissioner and the trial court
concluded that an equitable distribution award was appropriate,
disagreeing on the correct sum. Under such circumstances, we are
unable to conduct a proper appellate review of the disputed award
and must reverse the decree and remand for further consideration
by the court, guided by Code § 20-107.3. 1
Because factors pertinent to spousal support are related to
any equitable distribution award, we likewise reverse and remand
the decree of spousal support for adjudication in accordance with
Code § 20-107.1. See Stumbo v. Stumbo, 20 Va. App. 685, 694, 460
S.E.2d 591, 595 (1995) (citation omitted).
Reversed and remanded.
1
Our disposition does not presuppose that the present award
is erroneous but results only from our inability to conduct a
proper appellate review.
- 3 -