Chris Gary Peters v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 1998 )


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  •                      COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present:  Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Annunziata and
    Bumgardner
    Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
    CHRIS GARY PETERS
    MEMORANDUM * OPINION BY
    v.   Record No. 3060-96-4            JUDGE ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA
    FEBRUARY 3, 1998
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA
    Donald H. Kent, Judge
    Jeffrey T. Barbour, Assistant Public Defender
    (Office of the Public Defender, on brief),
    for appellant.
    Eugene Murphy, Assistant Attorney General
    (Richard Cullen, Attorney General, on brief),
    for appellee.
    Chris Gary Peters (appellant) appeals his conviction for
    distribution of cocaine in violation of Code § 18.2-248.      He
    contends that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to
    compel the disclosure of the Commonwealth's surveillance location
    and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction.
    We disagree and affirm.
    On May 1, 1996, appellant was arrested for distribution of
    cocaine after Officer William Bunney, concealed in an observation
    post, observed appellant hand what he believed to be crack
    cocaine to another man on the 3800 block of Old Dominion
    Boulevard in Alexandria, Virginia.    Appellant filed a Motion to
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17-116 this opinion is not designated
    for publication.
    Compel Disclosure of Surveillance Location in an attempt to
    discover Bunney's exact location.
    At a hearing on appellant's motion, Bunney testified that at
    9:05 p.m. on May 1, 1996, he was conducting a surveillance of the
    3800 block of Old Dominion Boulevard from a concealed location
    using a Sorovsky spy scope with a magnification of 20-60 times.
    Streetlights and lights on the fronts of buildings lit the block,
    as the sun had gone down.   Bunney testified that his observation
    post was within the 3800 block, elevated between twenty and
    thirty feet, and that there were no obstructions between him and
    the area he was viewing.    There was no precipitation, and the
    area Bunney was observing was directly in front of him.   Bunney
    stated that, within the previous year, he had told the owner of
    the building in which he was concealed that the location "would
    never be revealed because they were concerned about reprisals
    from individuals on the street."
    Bunney saw appellant walk past two individuals standing
    outside an apartment building at 3816 Old Dominion Boulevard and
    into the apartment building.   Appellant came out of the building
    with his right hand closed, and gave "at least one rock of what
    appeared to be crack cocaine" to one of the individuals standing
    outside of the building, later identified as William Brown.
    Bunney called other members of his unit for the arrest of
    appellant and Brown.
    On cross-examination, Bunney acknowledged that there are at
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    least four trees on the west side of the 3800 block of Old
    Dominion Boulevard, the side opposite that of his observation
    post.    However, they are located south of the doorway where the
    transaction involving appellant occurred.    He testified that,
    although one tree at least partially blocked his view of the
    sidewalk south of 3816 Old Dominion Boulevard for twenty to
    thirty feet, and that a building blocked his view of the end of
    the block, his view of the location where the transaction
    occurred was not blocked.
    The court denied appellant's motion, ruling that the defense
    had not "established that there are no alternative means of
    getting at the same point," given counsel's cross-examination of
    Bunney.    The court also ruled that the interests of the
    Commonwealth in protecting the surveillance location outweighed
    appellant's interest in knowing the location.
    At trial before the court sitting without a jury, Bunney
    testified that he saw appellant "pour[] one rock or at least one
    rock of crack cocaine from his right hand into palm up, left hand
    of Mr. Brown" after leaving the building at 3816 Old Dominion
    Boulevard.    Brown put his left hand, containing the cocaine, into
    his left pants pocket.    Bunney notified other officers to arrest
    Brown and appellant, and confirmed that they had arrested the
    correct people.    Officer Christopher Wimple testified that he
    arrested Brown, and found a rock of an off-white substance in
    Brown's left pants pocket; testing determined the substance to be
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    crack cocaine.
    Appellant testified in his own defense that he had gone with
    his father-in-law to look at a car on Old Dominion Boulevard.    He
    testified that as he walked down Old Dominion Boulevard, he had
    passed some men, the shorter one of whom asked him for a
    cigarette; he gave the man his lit cigarette.
    The court found appellant guilty and sentenced him to five
    years imprisonment, with four years suspended.
    I.
    Disclosure of Surveillance Location
    Appellant first contends that the court erred in denying his
    motion to compel the Commonwealth to reveal the location from
    which Bunney observed him.   We review a court's denial of such a
    motion for an abuse of discretion.     Hollins v. Commonwealth, 
    19 Va. App. 223
    , 228, 
    450 S.E.2d 397
    , 400 (1994).
    The Commonwealth "has a qualified privilege not to disclose
    the location" of a concealed surveillance post.     Hollins, 19 Va.
    App. at 226, 
    450 S.E.2d at 399
    .    "The Commonwealth's privilege is
    limited, however, by 'the fundamental requirements of fairness,'
    which require consideration of an accused's right to prepare [a]
    defense."   Davis v. Commonwealth, 
    25 Va. App. 588
    , 593, 
    491 S.E.2d 288
    , 290 (1997) (quoting Roviaro v. United States, 
    353 U.S. 53
    , 60, 62 (1957)).   In order to overcome the Commonwealth's
    privilege, a defendant
    must "show that he needs the evidence to
    conduct his defense and that there are no
    other adequate alternative means of getting
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    at the same point." Only then must the court
    balance the public interest in effective law
    enforcement and citizens' safety against the
    defendant's constitutional right to confront
    government witnesses.
    Hollins, 19 Va. App. at 227, 
    450 S.E.2d at 399
     (citation
    omitted).
    Appellant has not satisfied his burden to "'show that he
    needs the evidence to conduct his defense.'"    Hollins, 19 Va.
    App. at 227, 
    450 S.E.2d at 399
     (quoting United States v. Harley,
    
    682 F.2d 1018
    , 1020 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).    While appellant
    established that a number of possible obstructions in the 3800
    block of Old Dominion Boulevard existed, including at least four
    trees, both the testimony of Bunney and the photos make clear
    that Bunney's view of the transaction was unobstructed.
    Furthermore, the record contains significant evidence
    corroborating the evidence that Bunney's view was not obstructed
    and that the transaction occurred as Bunney reported it.     See
    Davis, 25 Va. App. at 594, 491 S.E.2d at 291 (considering the
    quality of corroborating evidence as a factor); Hollins, 19 Va.
    App. at 227, 
    450 S.E.2d at 399
     (same).    Bunney testified that he
    saw appellant distribute crack cocaine to Brown.    While denying
    that he had given crack cocaine to Brown, appellant admitted
    passing a small object which he characterized as "a lit
    cigarette," to a man standing with another on Old Dominion
    Boulevard.    The men described by appellant matched the
    description of the men Bunney observed, one of whom took part in
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    the illegal transaction.   That appellant denied that the small
    white object in question was cocaine does not materially detract
    from the substance of the corroborating evidence.   Appellant's
    testimony further corroborates Bunney's testimony that a
    transaction involving the passing of a small white object to
    another took place and confirms that Bunney was not obstructed
    from observing the transaction.
    The other factors identified as relevant in Hollins, 19 Va.
    App. at 227-28, 
    450 S.E.2d at 400
    , also support a finding that
    appellant failed to show that he had a need for the information.
    Bunney was elevated and used a vision-enhancing device; these
    factors support the inference that Bunney could clearly see
    appellant and the events in question.   Although the sun had gone
    down, Bunney testified that the area was well lit by streetlights
    and lights on the front of the buildings themselves.
    Looking at the relevant factors as a whole, we find that the
    court did not err in denying appellant's motion to compel the
    disclosure of the exact surveillance location.   Cf. Davis, 25 Va.
    App. at 594, 
    450 S.E.2d at 291
    .
    Sufficiency of the Evidence
    Appellant next contends that the evidence was insufficient
    to support his conviction for distribution of cocaine.   Where the
    sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on appeal, this Court
    must consider all the evidence and any reasonable inferences
    fairly deducible from it in the light most favorable to the
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    Commonwealth.   Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 
    216 Va. 349
    , 352,
    
    218 S.E.2d 534
    , 537 (1975); Traverso v. Commonwealth, 
    6 Va. App. 172
    , 176, 
    366 S.E.2d 719
    , 721 (1988).   A trial court's judgment
    will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is plainly wrong or
    without evidence to support it.   Stockton v. Commonwealth, 
    227 Va. 124
    , 145-46, 
    314 S.E.2d 371
    , 385 (1984).
    Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the
    evidence establishes that appellant distributed crack cocaine to
    Brown.   Bunney testified that he saw appellant pour a rock of
    crack cocaine into Brown's left hand, and saw Brown put the rock
    into his left pocket.   When Brown was arrested, the police found
    a rock of crack cocaine in his left pocket.    Even if, as
    appellant contends, Brown threw the cocaine that he acquired from
    appellant away as he saw the police approach, Bunney's testimony
    that he saw appellant hand a rock of cocaine to Brown is
    sufficient to support his conviction.
    Affirmed.
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