Robert Daniel King, a/k/a, etc v. Commonwealth , 40 Va. App. 364 ( 2003 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judge Elder and
Senior Judge Coleman
Argued at Salem, Virginia
ROBERT DANIEL KING, A/K/A DAN KING, A/K/A
DANIEL ZANONE, A/K/A DANIEL R. KING, A/K/A
DAN KONSKI, A/K/A DANIEL QUEEN OPINION BY
JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER
v. Record No. 1313-02-3 APRIL 29, 2003
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ROANOKE
Jonathan M. Apgar, Judge
Christopher K. Kowalczuk for appellant.
Michael T. Judge, Assistant Attorney General
(Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee.
Robert Daniel King (appellant) appeals from his
convictions, entered upon conditional guilty pleas, for two
counts of embezzlement and two counts of grand larceny. On
appeal, he contends the trial court erroneously declared a
mistrial when one of the twelve jurors impaneled became too ill
to serve. He contends no manifest necessity existed for a
mistrial because he agreed to waive his right to have twelve
jurors hear the case, even though the Commonwealth objected to
proceeding with only eleven jurors. We hold the Commonwealth
had a co-equal right to have twelve jurors hear the case.
Further, under the facts of this case, in the absence of the
Commonwealth's consent to proceed with fewer than twelve jurors,
manifest necessity supported the trial court's declaration of a
mistrial. Thus, we affirm appellant's convictions.
I.
BACKGROUND
Appellant was indicted for two counts of embezzlement and
two counts of grand larceny. 1 Appellant entered pleas of not
guilty and requested trial by jury. On February 19, 2002, the
court impaneled a jury of twelve. Neither party requested that
alternates be selected, and the court made no mention of this
possibility. After counsel delivered their opening statements,
the court recessed for lunch.
Upon reconvening after lunch, the court indicated one of
the jurors had fallen ill during the lunch break and did not
believe he "[was] in a position to be able to fully pay
attention and listen to the evidence." The court noted
appellant indicated he was willing to proceed with eleven jurors
but that the Commonwealth was not willing. With agreement of
the parties, the trial court opted to "tak[e] an adjournment"
until the following morning, the second day scheduled for trial,
to determine whether the ill juror would be able to return at
that time.
1
Appellant also was indicted for obtaining goods by false
pretenses, but that charge was disposed of by nolle prosequi
prior to trial.
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On the second day of trial, the court noted the juror
remained too ill to return. Appellant remained willing to
proceed with eleven jurors. The Commonwealth, however, "[felt]
that it would be best served by having twelve Jurors" and
indicated it "[did] not waive the absence of the one Juror."
Appellant objected to the court's statement that, in the absence
of the Commonwealth's consent, a mistrial "would be [the
court's] only remedy." Appellant said "it [was] [his]
understanding the Commonwealth did not want a trial by jury" and
that since appellant requested a jury and jeopardy had attached,
"I don't know that the Commonwealth has a right at this point to
take [appellant's] jury away from him." The trial court
observed, "Well, of course, once [appellant] exercised his right
to have the community hear the case, I really don't make any
further inquiry to the Commonwealth as to what their wishes were
. . . because [appellant] has spoken . . . ."
The court then asked appellant whether proceeding with
fewer than the required number of jurors required the
Commonwealth's concurrence, and the following exchange took
place:
[APPELLANT'S COUNSEL]: Yes,
Judge. . . . Article One, Section Eight of
the . . . Virginia Constitution is clear
that upon his . . . plea of not guilty,
[appellant] may demand trial by Jury or
waive the right to a Jury, or waive the
right to be tried by twelve, and then the
language says with the concurrence of the
Commonwealth and the Court. So it is clear
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that the black letter law says that the
court and the Commonwealth have to concur
before . . .
[THE COURT]: That the Commonwealth has
standing to take the position they are
taking.
[APPELLANT'S COUNSEL]: Correct, with
regard to twelve or fewer jurors, but I
would say that even given that very clear
language, we are in a slightly different
universe, which would allow us to make our
objection, and we have done so, and if the
Court overrules that objection, we would ask
the Court to respectfully note our exception
thereto.
Appellant then agreed with the court's statement that the
Commonwealth acted in good faith when it objected to proceeding
with fewer than twelve jurors. Appellant also observed, "The
Commonwealth certainly has a right to exercise her rights to
prosecute, and . . . this is not anything other than the
Commonwealth exercising her rights."
Appellant did not ask the court to continue the case rather
than declare a mistrial. He objected to the mistrial
declaration only on the ground that the court should have
allowed trial to proceed with eleven jurors and did not argue
the court should have continued the case again to see if the
sick juror recovered in a timely fashion.
The court said it "[did not] have any other recourse but to
declare a mistrial." The court's order indicated it declared a
mistrial because "the concurrence of the Commonwealth [was]
required by Article I, §8 of the Virginia Constitution, . . . as
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the number of jurors required by §19.2-262 could not be present
at any time during which this trial was scheduled."
On March 1, 2002, appellant filed a motion to dismiss the
indictments as violative of double jeopardy principles. In that
motion and subsequent argument, appellant represented the
Commonwealth had indicated at docket call in September 2001
"that she waived her right to demand trial by jury" and that in
chambers before trial on February 19, 2002, the Commonwealth
"reaffirmed her willingness to have the Court hear this case
without benefit of a jury." Appellant argued that once he
elected to be tried by a jury and the jury was impaneled, the
Commonwealth lost the right to veto appellant's decision to be
tried by a jury of fewer than twelve members. Thus, he
concluded, the trial court's declaration of a mistrial was
without manifest necessity and his retrial would violate double
jeopardy principles.
The Commonwealth averred that it "never waived its [right
to] trial by Jury" "on the record." The court concluded the
Commonwealth's statement was accurate because, when appellant
said he wanted a jury, "[the court] didn't go any farther than
that" and "on the Record . . . never inquired of the
Commonwealth."
The court then denied appellant's motion to dismiss, ruling
as follows:
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In the absence of any authority to the
contrary, I am not in a position to rule and
interpret the Constitution to say that the
Commonwealth's concurrence disappears at
some point under factually important
settings, because the language of the
Constitution would then say, "and with the
concurrence of the Commonwealth unless A, B,
or C has happened, you can proceed with
less."
So . . . my interpretation is the . . .
Commonwealth's concurrence was required at
any time during this trial.
In terms of manifest necessity, we only
had eleven. There was no reasonable
expectation of ever getting [the sick juror]
back, because we didn't have any information
that he was improving. The logistics of
trying to look later in the week . . .
[were] to me, I think, a daunting
proposition . . . to the extent that I
really didn't explore that, and was not
requested by either Counsel to explore
that. . . .
So without twelve, and giving the
Commonwealth the concurrence that they were
I believe given by the Virginia
Constitution, . . . [a]nd being in an
untenable position where I felt that it was
impossible to go forward, I found manifest
necessity . . . .
Appellant subsequently entered into a conditional plea
agreement that preserved his right to appeal the instant
mistrial issue. Appellant was convicted pursuant to the plea
agreement and noted this appeal.
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II.
PROCEDURAL BAR
The Commonwealth contends appellant waived his right to
object to the declaration of a mistrial because, as the
Commonwealth argues on brief, appellant "conceded that if the
trial were to continue with [fewer] than twelve jurors, the
'black letter law,' Article I, Section 8 of the Virginia
Constitution, required the concurrence of both the court and the
Commonwealth." The Supreme Court has made clear that a
defendant may "waive[] his double jeopardy rights" by failing to
make "an express objection to the circuit court's declaration of
a mistrial." Commonwealth v. Washington, 263 Va. 298, 304-05,
559 S.E.2d 636, 639 (2002). However, we disagree with the
Commonwealth's construction of appellant's argument to the trial
court regarding "the black letter law" and hold the argument was
sufficient to preserve for appeal appellant's claim that retrial
following the court's declaration of a mistrial based on the
Commonwealth's refusal to proceed with eleven jurors violated
double jeopardy principles.
When the sick juror remained too ill to appear on the
second day scheduled for trial and the Commonwealth refused to
proceed with eleven jurors, the trial court commented that
"[declaring a mistrial] would be [the court's] only remedy."
Appellant responded, "[W]e object to a mistrial on the following
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grounds." 2 He then argued that "the Commonwealth did not want
trial by Jury," "this is a Defendant's Jury," and "I don't know
that the Commonwealth has a right at this point to take the
Defendant's Jury away from him" by refusing to proceed with
eleven jurors. (Emphasis added). Appellant's counsel conceded
"the black letter law says that the Court and the Commonwealth
have to concur" but was unable to complete his sentence because
the trial court interrupted him. Counsel then said, "[E]ven
given that very clear language, we are in a slightly different
universe, which would allow us to make our objection." We hold
that this statement, in the context of the entire argument
appellant made before the trial court granted the mistrial, was
sufficient under Rule 5A:18 to preserve this issue for appeal. 3
2
In Washington, by contrast, the Court noted defense
counsel's "conce[ssion] that she could point to no part of the
record of the defendant's first trial to show that she had made
an express objection to the . . . declaration of a mistrial" and
her request for the setting of a new trial date. 263 Va. at
305-06, 559 S.E.2d at 639-40.
3
Appellant conceded in the trial court that the court was
not "hasty" in granting the mistrial without attempting to reset
the matter for trial with the same jury on a later date after
the ill juror had had a chance to recuperate. The trial court
also noted that neither counsel asked the court to attempt to
reset the case for another date with the same jury before the
court declared a mistrial. Finally, appellant did not raise
this issue in his petition for appeal or brief. Thus, we do not
consider whether the court's failure to take such steps might
have prevented a finding of manifest necessity to declare a
mistrial. See Rules 5A:12(c), 5A:18.
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III.
JURY SIZE AND MANIFEST NECESSITY FOR MISTRIAL
"[I]n criminal prosecutions . . . [the accused] shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of
his vicinage . . . ." Va. Const. art. 1, § 8. "Twelve persons
from a panel of twenty shall constitute a jury in a felony
case." Code § 19.2-262(B). "If the accused plead not guilty,
he may, with his consent and the concurrence of the attorney for
the Commonwealth and of the court entered of record, be tried by
a smaller number of jurors, or waive a jury." Va. Const.
art. 1, § 8.
After the jury is sworn, "the court may discharge the jury
when it appears that they cannot agree on a verdict or that
there is manifest necessity for such discharge." Code
§ 8.01-361. In evaluating whether manifest necessity exists to
discharge an empanelled jury, a trial court is vested with broad
discretion to determine whether "'[declaring a mistrial] was
necessary to prevent great injustice either to the Commonwealth
or to the defendant.'" Brandon v. Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 82,
90-91, 467 S.E.2d 859, 862-63 (1996) (quoting Mack v.
Commonwealth, 177 Va. 921, 931, 15 S.E.2d 62, 66 (1941))
(emphasis added).
When manifest necessity compels a mistrial, retrial does
not violate double jeopardy principles. Arizona v. Washington,
434 U.S. 497, 505, 98 S. Ct. 824, 830, 54 L. Ed. 2d 717 (1978).
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However, absent a finding of manifest necessity, the
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy entitles a
defendant to the "valued right to have his trial completed
before a particular tribunal," Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684,
689, 69 S. Ct. 834, 837, 93 L. Ed. 2d 974 (1949), that is, "the
right . . . to have his trial completed before the first jury
empanelled to try him," Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 673,
102 S. Ct. 2083, 2088, 72 L. Ed. 2d 416 (1982). See also
Washington, 263 Va. at 302-03, 559 S.E.2d at 638.
Appellant argues the trial court erroneously concluded,
under Article 1, section 8, of the Virginia Constitution, that
the Commonwealth's concurrence was required in order for trial
to continue when one of the twelve jurors already sworn became
ill and was unable to serve. This provision, appellant
contends, applies only at the beginning of trial before jeopardy
has attached. Contrary to appellant's contention, we hold the
constitutional provision at issue contains no such limitation.
"When the language of an enactment is plain and
unambiguous, as in this case, we apply its plain meaning." Bray
v. Brown, 258 Va. 618, 621, 521 S.E.2d 526, 527 (1999). The
provision at issue, quoted above, plainly states that, "[i]f the
accused pleads not guilty, he may, with his consent and the
concurrence of the attorney for the Commonwealth and of the
court entered of record, be tried by a smaller number of jurors,
or waive a jury." Va. Const. art. 1, § 8. It contains no
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limitation on the time frame during which the consent of the
Commonwealth and the court is required to proceed with fewer
than twelve jurors.
Although an accused has no constitutional right to a bench
trial, see, e.g., O'Dell v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 672, 689, 364
S.E.2d 491, 501 (1988), the accused does have a constitutional
right to a jury trial, and the Virginia Constitution gives the
Commonwealth "an equal voice" in determining whether the case
will be heard by a jury, see id. Thus, if the accused does not
demand trial by jury, the Commonwealth nevertheless may choose a
jury trial. See id. Similarly, therefore, if an accused
charged with a felony consents to be tried by a smaller number
of jurors than the twelve specified by Constitution and statute,
the Commonwealth retains the authority to demand a jury of
twelve. Nothing in the language of Article 1, section 8, of the
Virginia Constitution or the case law interpreting it indicates
that the requirement for the Commonwealth's concurrence is
limited to the time before trial has commenced or jeopardy has
attached. See Moffett v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 387, 392-93,
482 S.E.2d 846, 849 (1997) (noting in dicta that decision of
accused, who had elected to be tried by jury, to proceed with
fewer than twelve jurors when one juror was dismissed for cause
after jeopardy had attached required concurrence of
Commonwealth's attorney and court). Thus, we hold that the
accused's willingness to proceed with a jury of fewer than
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twelve members is subject to the Commonwealth's co-equal right
to a jury trial, even where jeopardy has already attached.
As the trial court noted, if the drafters of the
Constitution had intended that the provisions of Article 1,
Section 8--requiring the Commonwealth's consent for trial by
fewer than twelve jurors--apply only to the period before
jeopardy has attached, it could have said so. See, e.g., State
v. Madison, 560 P.2d 405, 408 (Ariz. 1977) (noting that, under
applicable Arizona statute, "the parties with the consent of the
court in a criminal case, may waive trial by jury, or at any
time before a verdict is returned consent to try the case with
or receive a verdict concurred in by a lesser number of jurors
than that specified [elsewhere in the statute]" (emphasis added)
(quoting Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 21-102(E)). As this case amply
demonstrates, situations in which the number of jurors able to
continue with a felony trial drops below twelve may arise after
trial has begun, and based on the plain language of Article 1,
section 8, we must assume the drafters contemplated its
application to such an event.
Appellant also challenges what he terms the court's "per se
finding of manifest necessity" based on the Commonwealth's
refusal to continue the trial with the remaining eleven jurors.
He argues that any right the Commonwealth had under the facts of
this case to trial by a jury of twelve members rather than trial
by a jury of eleven is subordinate to the right of an accused
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not to be placed in jeopardy twice for the same offense. We
disagree.
The right to trial by jury is "a sacred right [that] should
be sedulously guarded," Buntin v. City of Danville, 93 Va. 200,
212, 24 S.E. 830, 833 (1896), quoted with approval in Supiner v.
Stakes, 255 Va. 198, 203, 495 S.E.2d 813, 815 (1998), and
"'[t]rial by jury,' in the primary and usual sense of the term
at the common law and in the American constitutions, is . . . a
trial by a jury of twelve . . . ." Capital Traction Co. v. Hof,
174 U.S. 1, 13, 19 S. Ct. 580, 585, 43 L. Ed. 2d 873, 877-78
(1899). For example, "[i]t is well established that 'trial by
jury' contemplated by [the United States Constitution's] Article
III, Section 2, and the Sixth Amendment is a trial by a jury of
twelve persons, neither more nor less." United States v.
Virginia Erection Corp., 335 F.2d 868, 870 (4th Cir. 1964)
(emphasis added). Because the right to trial by jury is a
"sacred right" and, as stated above, the Commonwealth's right to
demand trial by jury is "co-equal" to that of the accused, see
O'Dell, 234 Va. at 689, 364 S.E.2d at 501, we hold that when the
Commonwealth asserts its right to trial by a jury of twelve
after jeopardy has attached and at a time when fewer than twelve
jurors remain available to continue with the trial, 4 manifest
4
As discussed in footnote 2, supra, appellant waived the
right to object to the mistrial on the ground that the trial
court failed to consider other options such as continuing the
case for a reasonable amount of time to attempt to allow the ill
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necessity for the declaration of a mistrial exists, see Brandon,
22 Va. App. at 91, 467 S.E.2d at 863 (holding manifest necessity
exists where "'[declaring a mistrial] was necessary to prevent
great injustice either to the Commonwealth or to the defendant'"
(quoting Mack, 177 Va. at 931, 15 S.E.2d at 66) (emphasis
added)), at least where the Commonwealth acts in good faith. 5
Thus, under the facts of this case, a second trial for the
same offenses did not violate double jeopardy principles. See
Johnson v. United States, 619 A.2d 1183, 1186-87 (D.C. Ct. App.
1993) (under facts similar to those in appellant's case,
rejecting argument that "the government violated 'fundamental
fairness' by refusing to agree to a jury of less than twelve,"
without directly addressing argument that such a holding
elevates government's right to jury of twelve over accused's
right not to be placed in jeopardy twice for the same offense);
juror to recover. Our holding presumes that fewer than twelve
jurors (or a sufficient number of alternates, if any) are
available and that fewer than twelve are expected to be
available within a reasonable time during which the trial might
be continued. Thus, we do not address the merits of that issue
in this opinion.
5
Where a defendant moves for a mistrial based on
prosecutorial misconduct and the court finds the conduct was
"intended to 'goad' the defendant into moving for a mistrial,"
the defendant may successfully plead double jeopardy as a bar to
a second trial. See Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 676, 102 S. Ct. at
2089. We need not decide whether the Commonwealth's withholding
of its consent to proceed with fewer than twelve jurors also
must be made in good faith in order to avoid a subsequent
invocation of the double jeopardy bar. Here, the trial court
found the Commonwealth acted in good faith, and appellant agreed
with that finding.
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cf. Pope v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 114, 122, 360 S.E.2d 352, 358
(1987) (stating, without specifically addressing impact on
double jeopardy after trial has commenced, that the "requirement
of consent by the Commonwealth and by the court [before an
accused may waive his right to trial by jury under Code
§ 19.2-257] does not violate any constitutional right of the
defendant").
For these reasons, we hold the trial court's denial of
appellant's motion to dismiss was not error, and we affirm.
Affirmed.
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