Deborah Lillian White v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 1997 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Baker, Coleman and Overton
Argued at Salem, Virginia
DEBORAH LILLIAN WHITE
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 2773-96-3 JUDGE SAM W. COLEMAN III
DECEMBER 23, 1997
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PITTSYLVANIA COUNTY
William N. Alexander, II, Judge
Jon Ian Davey (Law Office of Jon I. Davey, on
brief), for appellant.
Kathleen B. Martin, Assistant Attorney
General (Richard Cullen, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee.
Deborah Lillian White was convicted in a bench trial on two
counts of malicious wounding, one count of attempted malicious
wounding and one count of threatening to burn a dwelling. The
issues on appeal are (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to
prove that White acted with malice, and (2) whether the evidence
established as a matter of law that White was intoxicated and
could not form the requisite intent to commit malicious wounding.
Upon review, we affirm the malicious wounding convictions.
I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
To support a conviction for malicious wounding under Code
§ 18.2-51, the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant
inflicted the victim's injuries "maliciously and with the intent
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
to maim, disfigure, disable or kill." Campbell v. Commonwealth,
12 Va. App. 476, 483, 405 S.E.2d 1, 4 (1991) (en banc). "Malice
inheres in the doing of a wrongful act intentionally, or without
just cause or excuse, or as a result of ill will. It may be
directly evidenced by words, or inferred from acts and conduct
which necessarily result in injury." Hernandez v. Commonwealth,
15 Va. App. 626, 631, 426 S.E.2d 137, 140 (1993) (citations
omitted). Intent must often be proven by circumstantial
evidence, and the fact finder may "infer that a person intends
the natural and probable consequences of his acts." Campbell, 12
Va. App. at 483, 405 S.E.2d at 4. Whether the appellant acted
with the requisite mens rea was a question of fact to be
determined by the fact finder. See Branch v. Commonwealth, 14
Va. App. 836, 841, 419 S.E.2d 422, 426 (1992).
"On appeal, we review the evidence in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable
inferences fairly deducible therefrom." Martin v. Commonwealth,
4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987). So viewed, the
Commonwealth's evidence proved that the appellant's mother,
Odella Witcher, was driving her automobile from Chatham to
Danville accompanied by two of her friends and the appellant.
During the drive, the appellant demanded that Witcher stop at a
Chatham bank, cash her Social Security check, and give the
appellant money. When Witcher refused, the appellant stood up in
the back seat and said: "All you mother fuckers gonna die." She
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then reached over Witcher's right shoulder and grabbed the
steering wheel causing the car to lose control and strike a tree.
At the time, the car was traveling at about twenty miles per
hour. Witcher suffered fractured ribs and a bruised heart, and
another passenger suffered a lacerated mouth requiring several
stitches. After the crash, the appellant exited the vehicle and
told her mother, "you ain't dead yet, but you will be." She fled
the scene and did not attempt to help the injured persons.
On this evidence, we cannot say that the trial court's
judgment was "plainly wrong or without evidence to support it."
Josephs v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 87, 99, 390 S.E.2d 491, 497
(1990) (en banc). The Commonwealth's evidence was competent, not
inherently incredible, and sufficient to prove that the appellant
acted maliciously and with intent to personally maim, disable,
disfigure or kill Witcher and the other passengers in the car.
The car was traveling at a sufficient rate of speed that the fact
finder could conclude that the appellant intended to permanently
disable or disfigure or to kill the occupants of the car. In
fact, she specifically expressed her intent to kill her mother.
The evidence is sufficient to prove the counts of malicious
wounding.
II. INTOXICATION DEFENSE - RULE 5A:18
The appellant next asserts that she was too intoxicated to
form the requisite intent to commit malicious wounding. Our
consideration of this claim is precluded by Rule 5A:18. Rule
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5A:18 provides that "[n]o ruling of the trial court . . . will be
considered as a basis for reversal unless the objection was
stated together with the grounds therefor at the time of the
ruling, except for good cause shown or . . . to attain the ends
of justice." The appellant did not raise an intoxication defense
before the trial court. In fact, she testified that she was not
intoxicated and she made no claim to the trial judge that she was
too intoxicated to be able to form a specific intent. Because
the record demonstrates neither good cause nor a miscarriage of
justice, we may not consider her intoxication defense. Mounce v.
Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 433, 436, 357 S.E.2d 742, 744 (1987).
For these reasons, we affirm the convictions.
Affirmed.
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