Virginia Commonwealth University v. Gail H. Blowe ( 1997 )


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  •                     COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Benton, Bray and Senior Judge Hodges
    Argued at Norfolk, Virginia
    VIRGINIA COMMONWEALTH UNIVERSITY
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.   Record No. 1034-97-1                JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY
    NOVEMBER 18, 1997
    GAIL HOWARD BLOWE
    FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
    Ingrid E. Olson (Richard Cullen, Attorney
    General; Peter R. Messitt, Senior Assistant
    Attorney General, on brief), for appellant.
    Gregory Camden (John H. Klein; Matthew H.
    Kraft; Rutter & Montagna, L.L.P., on brief),
    for appellee.
    Virginia Commonwealth University (employer) appeals an award
    of temporary total disability, and related benefits, by the
    Workers' Compensation Commission (commission) to Gail H. Blowe
    (claimant).   Employer argues that the evidence failed to
    establish that claimant's "psychological problems were a
    compensable consequence" of an earlier injury which was
    compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act (Act).    We
    disagree and affirm the award.
    The parties are fully conversant with the record, and this
    memorandum opinion recites only those facts necessary to a
    disposition of the appeal.
    Guided by well-established principles, we construe the
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    evidence in the light most favorable to the party prevailing
    below, claimant in this instance.      Crisp v. Brown's Tysons Corner
    Dodge, Inc., 1 Va. App, 503, 504, 
    339 S.E.2d 916
    , 916 (1986).
    "If there is evidence, or reasonable inferences can be drawn from
    the evidence, to support the commission's findings, they will not
    be disturbed on review, even though there is evidence in the
    record to support a contrary finding."      Morris v. Badger
    Powhatan/Figgie Int'l, Inc., 
    3 Va. App. 276
    , 279, 
    348 S.E.2d 876
    ,
    877 (1986); Code § 65.2-706(A).   This Court does not "retry the
    facts, reweigh the preponderance of the evidence, or make its own
    determination of the credibility of the witnesses."      Wagner
    Enters., Inc. v. Brooks, 
    12 Va. App. 890
    , 894, 
    407 S.E.2d 32
    , 35
    (1991) (citation omitted).   A "determination of causation is a
    factual finding."   Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Musick, 
    7 Va. App. 684
    ,
    688, 
    376 S.E.2d 814
    , 817 (1989).
    [W]here a causal connection between the
    initial compensable injury and the subsequent
    injury is established, the doctrine of
    compensable consequences extends the coverage
    of the [Act] to the subsequent injury . . .
    "as if it occurred in the course of and
    arising out of the . . . employment."
    Bartholow Drywall Co. v. Hill, 
    12 Va. App. 790
    , 794, 
    407 S.E.2d 1
    , 3 (1991) (citation omitted).   Thus, psychological injury
    resulting from compensable physical injury is likewise
    compensable, Teasley v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 
    14 Va. App. 45
    ,
    48-49, 
    415 S.E.2d 596
    , 598 (1992), provided claimant establishes
    the requisite nexus.   Hercules, Inc. v. Gunther, 
    13 Va. App. 357
    ,
    - 2 -
    362, 
    412 S.E.2d 185
    , 188 (1991).
    Claimant was originally awarded benefits resulting from
    carpal tunnel syndrome. 1   Subsequently, she was compensated for
    several periods of related temporary total and partial
    disability, the most recent award concluding on May 19, 1995.       On
    March 20, 1996, claimant again sought temporary total benefits,
    commencing February 29, 1996, for a psychiatric disability and
    attendant treatment, as a "reasonable and natural consequence of
    her work-related injury . . . ."    The commission concluded that
    claimant had "met her burden of proving a compensable consequence
    of the industrial accident" and awarded benefits, prompting this
    appeal by employer.
    Immediately before claimant's psychiatric consult, she had
    visited Dr. Adelaar, her treating orthopaedic/hand surgeon,
    complaining of "a lot of swelling in her hand," which had
    persisted for a "period of time," and "continu[ed] . . . problems
    in her employment position." 2   Dr. Adelaar "detect[ed]" no
    "problems" and claimant began treating with Dr. Agarwal, a
    psychiatrist, on February 29, 1996, following a referral by her
    "primary care physician."
    Dr. Agarwal initially noted that claimant reported
    1
    Employer does not challenge this award in the instant
    proceeding.
    2
    In an effort to accommodate claimant's restrictions and
    discomfort, employer changed her work assignment on several
    occasions.
    - 3 -
    "work-related stress" and "continue[d] . . . pain" and
    "disability due to pain" which rendered her "[un]able to do
    original work."   In correspondence to claimant's counsel, Dr.
    Agarwal observed that claimant was "still . . . encountering much
    pain" in "doing her job" and "daily duties" as a result of her
    "work-related injury," "creat[ing] much difficulty," including
    "depression-related . . . job stress," and the need for
    psychiatric care.   Dr. Agarwal's evidence was consistent with
    claimant's testimony and other evidence before the commission.
    Accordingly, the commission's finding that claimant's
    psychological disorder was a compensable consequence of an
    earlier compensable injury is supported by the record, and we
    affirm the attendant award.
    Affirmed.
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