Samuel Bunyan Davis, Jr. v. Louise Barclay Davis ( 1997 )


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  •                     COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present:   Judges Benton, Coleman and Willis
    SAMUEL BUNYAN DAVIS, JR.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION *
    v.   Record No. 1125-97-1                          PER CURIAM
    NOVEMBER 18, 1997
    LOUISE BARCLAY DAVIS
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS
    James C. Godwin, Judge Designate
    (Samuel B. Davis, Jr., pro se, on brief),
    for appellant.
    (Kenneth B. Murov; Kevin W. Grierson;
    Jones, Blechman, Woltz & Kelly, on brief),
    for appellee.
    Samuel Bunyan Davis, Jr. (husband) appeals the equitable
    distribution decision of the circuit court.    Husband challenges
    the sufficiency of the service, alleges Louise Barclay Davis
    (wife) was subject to undue influence, and challenges the
    equitable distribution award.    Upon reviewing the record and
    briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without
    merit.   Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the
    trial court.   See Rule 5A:27.
    Husband contends that he did not receive proper service of
    the initial filings and that the pendente lite order was entered
    without proper service.    Code § 20-99 provides that process and
    notice in divorce cases "shall be served in this Commonwealth by
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    any of the methods prescribed in § 8.01-296 by any person
    authorized to serve process under § 8.01-293."   Code § 8.01-296
    provides for personal service or substituted service through
    posting at the usual place of abode.   The orders entered in the
    proceedings below noted that husband was not present but was duly
    served.   The commissioner's report also noted that husband was
    properly served.
    The record supports the findings of the court and the
    commissioner that husband was properly served.   The record
    reflects that husband was served with the bill of complaint on
    September 18, 1995, by posted service.   Husband was served by
    posting at his usual place of abode, the marital home, with
    notice of the rescheduled pendente lite hearing.   He was served
    with a supplemental notice of hearing for entry of the pendente
    lite order, and a copy of the bill of complaint, by posting at
    his residence on May 7, 1996, and was videotaped collecting the
    documents served.   He was similarly personally served prior to
    the commissioner's hearing.
    Moreover, husband made a general appearance in this matter
    by filing objections to the commissioner's report and a motion
    for summary judgment.   While the motion for summary judgment
    alleges that the "first order entered in this cause . . . was
    without jurisdiction and before [husband] was properly before the
    court," husband's filing of objections to the commissioner's
    report that did not attack the court's jurisdiction waived his
    2
    objections to the court's exercise of personal jurisdiction.       See
    Nixon v. Rowland, 
    192 Va. 47
    , 50, 
    63 S.E.2d 757
    , 759 (1951).
    Therefore, we find husband's contention that service was
    insufficient and that he thereby was denied due process of law to
    be without merit.
    Husband also alleges, without citation to the record, that
    wife was the victim of a conspiracy between the trial judge and
    wife's counsel, and that the distribution of marital assets was
    not equitable.    Husband elected not to present evidence at the
    hearings below.   Because no evidence supports his allegations,
    husband has not demonstrated that the trial court committed
    reversible error.
    Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is summarily
    affirmed.   In addition, we grant appellee's motion for attorney
    fees and remand this matter to the trial judge for an assessment
    of a reasonable fee.
    Affirmed.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1125971

Filed Date: 11/18/1997

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014