Jesse Wilson v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 1997 )


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  •                   COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Willis and Elder
    Argued at Richmond, Virginia
    JESSE WILSON
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.        Record No. 2636-96-2      JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR.
    NOVEMBER 4, 1997
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MECKLENBURG COUNTY
    William L. Wellons, Judge
    Joseph M. Teefey, Jr., Assistant Public
    Defender (Office of the Public Defender, on
    brief), for appellant.
    Leah A. Darron, Assistant Attorney General
    (Richard Cullen, Attorney General, on brief),
    for appellee.
    On appeal of his conviction for sexual battery in violation
    of Code § 18.2-67.4, Jesse Wilson contends that the evidence was
    insufficient to prove that he committed sexual abuse against the
    will of the complaining witness through the use of force.   We
    agree and reverse the judgment of the trial court.
    On appeal, we review the evidence in the
    light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
    granting to it all reasonable inferences
    fairly deducible therefrom. The judgment of
    a trial court sitting without a jury is
    entitled to the same weight as a jury verdict
    and will not be set aside unless it appears
    from the evidence that the judgment is
    plainly wrong or without evidence to support
    it.
    Martin v. Commonwealth, 
    4 Va. App. 438
    , 443, 
    358 S.E.2d 415
    , 418
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    (1987).
    G.W., the complaining witness, testified that during a
    scheduled work break, she went to the employee cafeteria to
    purchase a soda.    Upon entering the room, she went directly to
    the soda machine.    She did not speak to Wilson.    While standing
    in front of the soda machine, she felt someone grab and squeeze
    her buttocks.   She turned and saw Wilson standing behind her.
    She told him angrily, "Don't ever do that again."     He responded,
    "It looked so tempting, I just had to do it."      G.W. stated that
    Wilson grabbed her with such force that she had to step forward
    to maintain her balance.   At trial, she demonstrated how he
    grabbed her buttocks with an open hand and squeezed.     Wilson
    admitted being in the cafeteria with G.W., but denied touching
    her.
    Code § 18.2-67.4 provides, in part, that:    "An accused shall
    be guilty of sexual battery if he or she sexually abuses the
    complaining witness against the will of the complaining witness,
    by force . . . . "   "Sexual abuse" is defined, in part, as an act
    committed when "[t]he accused intentionally touches the
    complaining witness' intimate parts or material directly covering
    such intimate parts."   Code § 18.2-67.10(6)(a).     "Intimate parts"
    includes the "buttocks."   Code § 18.2-67.10(2).
    The Commonwealth argues that Wilson is barred from raising
    the issue of force for the first time on appeal. 1    Except for
    1
    While the trial transcript indicated that Wilson raised the
    issue of force in his motion to strike the evidence, the
    - 2 -
    "good cause shown" or to "attain the ends of justice," Rule 5A:18
    prohibits the consideration on appeal of questions not presented
    first to the trial court.   In deciding whether to apply the "ends
    of justice" exception, we have noted that:
    "[T]he 'ends of justice' provision may be
    used when the record affirmatively shows that
    a miscarriage of justice has occurred, not
    when it merely shows that a miscarriage might
    have occurred." Obviously, the applicability
    of this exception cannot be determined on the
    mere assertion of the general rule, but
    necessarily requires our review of the
    record.
    Johnson v. Commonwealth, 
    5 Va. App. 529
    , 532, 
    365 S.E.2d 237
    , 239
    (1988) (emphasis in original) (quoting Mounce v. Commonwealth, 
    4 Va. App. 433
    , 436, 
    357 S.E.2d 742
    , 744 (1987)).   For the reasons
    that follow, we invoke the "ends of justice" exception and
    consider the merits of Wilson's appeal.    See Johnson, 5 Va. App.
    at 532-35, 365 S.E.2d at 239-40 (evidence showed that "force," an
    element of the offense of aggravated sexual battery, was not
    present).
    Wilson touched G.W. in an intimate area against her will.
    transcript was never properly made a part of the record on
    appeal. See Rules 5A:7(a)(7), 5A:8. In the written statement of
    facts, Wilson's motion to the trial court stated that:
    [T]he Commonwealth failed to prove that the
    Defendant sexually abused the complaining
    witness pursuant to Va. Code § 18.2-67.4.
    The Defendant further argued that . . . the
    Commonwealth bears the burden of proof that
    the defendant performed the act with the
    intent to sexually molest, arouse or gratify
    any person.
    - 3 -
    To constitute sexual battery, the force employed by Wilson to
    overcome G.W.'s will requires "some force other than merely that
    force required to accomplish the unlawful touching . . . ."     Id.
    at 534, 365 S.E.2d at 240.   G.W. had her back to Wilson and was
    unaware that he was behind her.   Wilson employed no force beyond
    that necessary to squeeze G.W.'s buttocks.   While the unlawful
    touching was patently nonconsensual, it was accomplished by
    surprise, not by force.   See id. at 535, 365 S.E.2d at 240
    (defendant got into bed with complainant and touched his
    genitalia).   Convicting Wilson for a sexual offense that the
    evidence proves he did not commit constituted a miscarriage of
    justice.   Despite Wilson's harassing and reprehensible conduct,
    the evidence in this case is insufficient to sustain a conviction
    under Code § 18.2-67.4.
    Accordingly, we reverse the conviction and remand the case
    for further proceedings, if the Commonwealth be so advised.
    Reversed and remanded.
    - 4 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2636962

Filed Date: 11/4/1997

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014