Susan C. Latuche v. Randall A. Latuche, Sr. ( 1997 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Bray, Annunziata and Overton
SUSAN C. LATUCHE
MEMORANDUM OPINION *
v. Record No. 3145-96-2 PER CURIAM
AUGUST 26, 1997
RANDALL A. LATUCHE, SR.
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY
Herbert C. Gill, Jr., Judge
(Thomas O. Bondurant, Jr.; Bondurant &
Benson, on brief), for appellant.
(James M. Goff II, on brief), for appellee.
Susan C. Latuche (wife) appeals the decision of the circuit
court. Wife contends the trial court erred by (1) failing to
award her the marital residence or allowing her to occupy the
marital residence until the parties' youngest child reaches
majority; and (2) failing to award sufficient spousal support for
wife to retain the financial position she occupied during the
marriage. Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties,
we conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we
summarily affirm the decision of the trial court. Rule 5A:27.
Marital Residence
Wife sought an award of the marital residence in lieu of
spousal support. The trial court ordered that the marital
residence be sold. The uncontroverted evidence established that
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
the marital residence was jointly owned marital property and was
subject to joint marital debts in the form of tax liens. The
evidence also established that the sale of the marital residence
would eliminate the majority of the parties' joint debts.
"Fashioning an equitable distribution award lies within the
sound discretion of the trial judge and that award will not be
set aside unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to
support it." Srinivasan v. Srinivasan, 10 Va. App. 728, 732, 396
S.E.2d 675, 678 (1990). Under Code § 20-107.3(C), the trial
court was authorized to order the parties to sell the jointly
owned marital residence in order to reduce their marital debt.
While wife sought to remain in the marital residence for the next
eight years, she admitted that the home was in danger of
foreclosure at least one time; that she earned $85 a week but
that she worked sporadically and only approximately twenty hours
a month; that she did not want to work full time while her
children were in school; and that her oldest child was fifteen
and was the first one home from school. We cannot say that the
trial court abused its discretion in ordering the sale of the
parties' only significant asset to eliminate their joint debts.
Spousal Support
Wife framed her challenge to the award of spousal support as
based upon its inadequacy compared to her financial status during
the marriage. Wife's argument, however, asserts without
specificity that the trial court failed to consider the statutory
2
factors when determining the amount of spousal support. 1
Although the appellant argues that the trial
court did not consider all of the statutory
factors, [her] brief fails to identify which
factors were not considered and how they
would have affected the trial court's
determination. Since this argument was not
fully developed in the appellant's brief, we
need not address this question. Statements
unsupported by argument, authority, or
citations to the record do not merit
appellate consideration. We will not search
the record for errors in order to interpret
the appellant's contention and correct
deficiencies in a brief.
Buchanan v. Buchanan, 14 Va. App. 53, 56, 415 S.E.2d 237, 239
(1992) (citation omitted).
Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is summarily
affirmed.
Affirmed.
1
While wife cites Code § 20-107, which was repealed in 1982,
we assume she refers to Code § 20-107.1, which contains the
statutory factors relevant to an award of spousal support.
3