Mary Powers, n/k/a, etc. v. Chesterfield-Col. H DSS ( 1997 )


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  •                    COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present:   Judges Bray, Annunziata and Overton
    MARY POWERS, n/k/a
    MARY POWERS EVANGELISTA
    MEMORANDUM OPINION *
    v.   Record No. 0249-97-2                            PER CURIAM
    AUGUST 12, 1997
    CHESTERFIELD-COLONIAL HEIGHTS
    DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY
    Herbert C. Gill, Jr., Judge
    (Scott D. Landry, on brief), for appellant.
    (Steven L. Micas, County Attorney; Michael S. J.
    Chernau, Assistant County Attorney, on brief), for
    appellee.
    Mary Powers (Powers), now known as Mary Powers Evangelista,
    appeals the decision of the circuit court terminating her
    residual parental rights to her children, Kevin, Laura, and
    Barbara.   Powers contends that the trial court erred by
    (1) finding that the Chesterfield-Colonial Heights Department of
    Social Services (DSS) presented sufficient evidence to support a
    finding pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C)(2); and (2) finding that
    DSS presented sufficient evidence that termination of her
    parental rights was in the best interests of the children.       Upon
    reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that
    this appeal is without merit.    Accordingly, we summarily affirm
    the decision of the trial court.   Rule 5A:27.
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    "Code § 16.1-283 embodies '[t]he statutory scheme for the
    . . . termination of residual parental rights in this
    Commonwealth.'"   Lecky v. Reed, 
    20 Va. App. 306
    , 311, 
    456 S.E.2d 538
    , 540 (1995) (citation omitted).   "This 'scheme provides
    detailed procedures designed to protect the rights of the parents
    and their child,' balancing their interests while seeking to
    preserve the family.   However, we have consistently held that
    '[t]he child's best interest is the paramount concern.'"      Id.
    (citations omitted).
    "In matters of a child's welfare, trial
    courts are vested with broad discretion in
    making the decisions necessary to guard and
    to foster a child's best interests." The
    trial court's judgment, "when based on
    evidence heard ore tenus, will not be
    disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or
    without evidence to support it."
    Logan v. Fairfax County Dep't of Human Dev., 
    13 Va. App. 123
    ,
    128, 
    409 S.E.2d 460
    , 463 (1991) (citations omitted).
    I.
    Powers contends that the trial court erred when it found
    sufficient evidence that she had been unwilling or unable within
    a reasonable period of time not exceeding twelve months to remedy
    substantially the conditions which led to her children's foster
    care placement, notwithstanding the reasonable and appropriate
    efforts of rehabilitative agencies.   See Code § 16.1-283(C)(2).
    The record, however, demonstrates that, at the time they were
    placed in foster care, two of the three children displayed
    inappropriate sexual activity.   All of the children showed
    2
    various symptoms of psychological and emotional distress related
    to Powers' abuse and inappropriate parenting.    A home visit also
    revealed that Powers' housekeeping skills were poor and that
    roaches and flies were increasingly evident.
    Powers' compliance with the foster care plan was sporadic.
    She did not cooperate with the intensive family services provided
    through DSS, ultimately terminated as a result of Powers' poor
    attitude.   She refused to acknowledge any fault in connection
    with her children's placement into foster care.    She denied any
    fault with regard to her sexual abuse of her daughter, despite
    clear substantiation of the child's claims and Powers' subsequent
    plea of guilty to sexual battery.
    The record demonstrates that DSS did make sufficient
    reasonable and appropriate efforts to assist Powers, and that
    those services failed largely because Powers did not acknowledge
    any need for services and did not accept any responsibility for
    her children's traumatized state.     The record therefore supports
    the trial court's conclusion that DSS presented clear and
    convincing evidence that Powers, without good cause and for a
    period in excess of twelve months, was unwilling or unable to
    substantially correct the conditions which led to the children's
    foster care placement, notwithstanding the assistance of DSS.
    II.
    DSS produced clear and convincing evidence in the trial
    court that termination of Powers' parental rights was in the
    3
    children's best interests.   When the family began receiving
    services, the children showed signs of serious psychological
    trauma.   One heard voices telling her to kill her sister; another
    was masturbating, head banging, and suffering from enuresis.
    Powers yelled at the children, threatening to hit or kill them,
    and demonstrated few appropriate parenting skills.   Despite
    receiving services, the family did not progress, as one child
    tried to set the house on fire and another was acting out
    sexually at school.
    According to the written statement of facts, the children
    while in foster care
    continued in therapy with consistent
    improvements over time to the extent that
    they had finally worked through the major
    symptoms of trauma and were no longer in need
    of therapy. They were beginning to enjoy
    life as well-adjusted children.
    After the children were brought under DSS' custody, two of the
    children had a single contact with Powers.   Those two children
    also expressed an interest in seeing Powers again, although none
    of the children wanted to live with Powers and all expressed a
    desire to be adopted.   The eldest child consistently indicated
    she did not want to see Powers again.
    While Powers pled guilty to sexual battery of her eldest
    child and served time in jail, she refused to acknowledge any
    responsibility for the children's problems, and dismissed her own
    failures as a parent.   Thus, there was no realistic expectation
    that the children could be returned to Powers' care in the
    4
    foreseeable future, if at all.   "It is clearly not in the best
    interests of a child to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to
    find out when, or even if, a parent will be capable of resuming
    . . . responsibilities."   Kaywood v. Halifax County Dep't of
    Social Servs., 
    10 Va. App. 535
    , 540, 
    394 S.E.2d 492
    , 495 (1990).
    Therefore, we find no error in the trial court's determination
    that it was in the best interests of the children to terminate
    Powers' parental rights.
    Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is summarily
    affirmed.
    Affirmed.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 0249972

Filed Date: 8/12/1997

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014