Hallett v. St. Mary's Hospital ( 1997 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Bray, Annunziata and Overton
LINN K. HALLETT
MEMORANDUM OPINION *
v. Record No. 0387-97-2 PER CURIAM
JULY 29, 1997
ST. MARY'S HOSPITAL AND
PENNSYLVANIA MANUFACTURERS
ASSOCIATION INSURANCE COMPANY
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
(Robert L. Flax; Flax, Billy & Stout, on
brief), for appellant.
(James G. Muncie, Jr.; Midkiff & Hiner, on
brief), for appellees.
Linn K. Hallett (claimant) contends that the Workers'
Compensation Commission (commission) erred in (1) failing to find
that her left shoulder, right knee, neck, back, and hip pain were
compensable consequences of her June 3, 1994 injury by accident;
and (2) reversing the deputy commissioner's credibility
determination. Upon reviewing the record and the briefs of the
parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit.
Accordingly, we summarily affirm the commission's decision. Rule
5A:27.
I.
On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prevailing party below. See R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v.
Mullins, 10 Va. App. 211, 212, 390 S.E.2d 788, 788 (1990).
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
Unless we can say as a matter of law that claimant's evidence
sustained her burden of proving a causal connection between her
injuries and her compensable injury by accident, the commission's
findings are binding and conclusive upon us. See Tomko v.
Michael's Plastering Co., 210 Va. 697, 699, 173 S.E.2d 833, 835
(1970). 1
In denying claimant's application, the commission found as
follows:
In an "Employee Occurrence Report" of
June 3, 1994, the only injury mentioned was
to the left knee, although there was a box on
the report for the right knee, shoulder, and
hip . . . . In the emergency room admission
record on the day of the injury, the claimant
was diagnosed with a left knee injury.
Additionally, she specifically stated that
she slipped due to a wet floor and twisted
her left knee, but did not fall. This is
contrary to the claimant's testimony at the
Hearing indicating: 1) that she felt pain in
her legs, hip, and neck at the time of
injury; 2) that a heavyset woman fell on her
legs; and 3) that her legs, hip, and shoulder
hit the floor . . . . The claimant was
subsequently treated by various orthopedic
surgeons, including Dr. William R. Beach, Dr.
William T. Johnstone, Dr. Donald G. Seitz,
and Dr. Kenneth R. Zaslav, and by
rheumatologist internist, Dr. Michael J.
1
Claimant contends on appeal that the commission erred by
not finding that she proved that her various conditions were
causally related to her June 3, 1994 industrial injury pursuant
to the doctrine of compensable consequences. Whether the issue
is framed as involving the doctrine of compensable consequence or
one involving whether a direct causal connection exists between
the June 3, 1994 accident and claimant's current conditions, the
dispositive issue is whether claimant's evidence proved a causal
connection between those conditions and her June 3, 1994 injury
by accident. See Bartholow Drywall Co. v. Hill, 12 Va. App. 790,
794, 407 S.E.2d 1, 3 (1991). Therefore, we will address that
issue in our opinion.
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Strachan. She was examined by Dr. Beach in
July 1994 and treated with him approximately
13 times; yet she failed to mention injuries
other than to her left knee. Drs. Beach,
Johnstone, and Seitz each responded to
defense counsel's questionnaire of April 10,
1995, and indicated: 1) that the claimant did
not suffer injury to any part of her body
other than her left knee on June 3, 1994; 2)
that she only complained of pain in her left
knee during their course of treatment; and 3)
that the complaints of pain to her neck,
back, hip, right knee, left shoulder, arm,
fingers, or hands, were not directly related
to the compensable injury.
The commission also noted that Dr. Zaslav could not render an
opinion on causation to a reasonable degree of medical certainty
and Dr. Strachan did not indicate whether claimant's left hip
pain was caused by the compensable injury.
The commission's factual findings are supported by the
record. In light of the inconsistencies between the occurrence
report, the medical histories, and claimant's testimony, and the
lack of any persuasive medical opinion supporting a causal
connection between claimant's injuries and her compensable
accident, the commission, as fact finder, was entitled to
conclude that "the medical evidence does not preponderate in
establishing that the claimant's current condition is caused by
the industrial injury." Based upon this record, we cannot find
as a matter of law that claimant's evidence sustained her burden
of proof. Accordingly, the commission's findings are binding and
conclusive upon us on appeal.
II.
3
Claimant contends that the full commission arbitrarily
disregarded the deputy commissioner's credibility determination
and failed to articulate a sufficient basis for its conclusion.
However,
[t]he principle set forth in [Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co. v. ] Pierce[, 5 Va. App. 374, 383,
363 S.E.2d 433, 438 (1987),] does not make
the deputy commissioner's credibility
findings unreviewable by the commission.
Rather, it merely requires the commission to
articulate its reasons for reversing a
specific credibility determination of the
deputy commissioner when that determination
is based upon a recorded observation of
demeanor or appearance of a witness. In
short, the rule in Pierce prevents the
commission from arbitrarily disregarding an
explicit credibility finding of the deputy
commissioner.
Bullion Hollow Enters., Inc. v. Lane, 14 Va. App. 725, 729, 418
S.E.2d 904, 907 (1992).
In this case, as in Bullion, upon a review of the deputy
commissioner's decision, we do not find a "specific recorded
observation" concerning claimant's demeanor or appearance related
to the deputy commissioner's credibility determination. The
deputy commissioner merely concluded from the evidence before him
that claimant met her burden of proof. "Absent a specific,
recorded observation regarding the behavior, demeanor or
appearance of [the witness], the commission had no duty to
explain its reasons for . . . [giving little weight to claimant's
version of events]." Id. In any event, the commission
thoroughly explained its reasons for denying claimant's
4
application, and the reasons given support the conclusion that it
did not act arbitrarily in reaching its decision. See Turcios v.
Holiday Inn Fair Oaks, 24 Va. App. 509, 515, 483 S.E.2d 502, 505
(1997).
For these reasons, we affirm the commission's decision.
Affirmed.
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