Jamarrian Chanrelle Wingfield v. Commonwealth ( 1997 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Coleman, Elder and Fitzpatrick
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
JAMARRIAN CHANRELLE WINGFIELD
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 3000-95-2 JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK
APRIL 1, 1997
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND
Walter W. Stout, III, Judge
David P. Baugh for appellant.
Leah A. Darron, Assistant Attorney General
(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee.
On November 13, 1995, Jamarrian C. Wingfield (appellant) was
found guilty in a bench trial of possession of cocaine with
intent to distribute. The sole issue on appeal is whether the
procedure for admission of the certificate of drug analysis
provided by Code §§ 19.2-187 and 19.2-187.1 violates appellant's
right to confrontation guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the
Virginia Constitution. Finding no error, we affirm.
On May 12, 1995, at approximately 5:00 p.m. Richmond Police
Officer O'Kleasky (O'Kleasky) observed appellant participating in
a drug transaction. After witnessing an exchange of money and a
white substance, O'Kleasky saw appellant place the remainder of
the drugs down the front of his pants. He radioed a description
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
of appellant to his "take-down team," and Officers Corrigan and
Williams (Williams) located and arrested appellant. At that time
they recovered a bag containing a white substance from the front
of his pants, a pager and $1,489 in U.S. currency. The drugs
were forwarded to the Division of Forensic Science.
At trial on November 13, 1995, the Commonwealth moved
pursuant to Code §§ 19.2-187 and 19.2-187.1, to introduce the
certificate of analysis of the white substance taken from
appellant at the time of his search and arrest. The Commonwealth
sought to use the certificate to show that Williams submitted one
plastic bag containing caked tan powder for analysis, and that
Robert R. Steiner, a forensic scientist, analyzed the substance
and determined it to be 23.99 grams of cocaine. Appellant
objected to the admission of the certificate; however, the trial
court overruled appellant's "confrontation . . . as to the
certificate" objection, noted appellant's continuing objection,
and admitted the certificate.
Appellant contends that because Code §§ 19.2-187 and
19.2-187.1 permit the introduction of an affidavit (i.e., the
certificate of analysis) without requiring a face-to-face
confrontation with the person who performed the chemical
analysis, these sections violate his confrontation rights.
Appellant argues that Code §§ 19.2-187 and 19.2-187.1 are
unconstitutional because they allow the government to conduct a
trial by affidavit.
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It is well established that the admissibility of evidence
lies within the broad discretion of the trial court, whose ruling
will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of
discretion. Coe v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 83, 87, 340 S.E.2d 820,
823 (1986). The Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause, made
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment,
provides that "'[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against
him.'" Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 62 (1980). However, an
accused's right to confront and cross-examine is "'not absolute
and may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other
legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.'" Baugh v.
Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 368, 371, 417 S.E.2d 891, 893 (1992)
(quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973)); see
also Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990). Additionally, a
confrontation claim presupposes the denial of a request to
confront and cross-examine witnesses. See United States v.
Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 393-94 (1986); Evans v. Thompson, 881 F.2d
117, 123 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1010 (1990).
The rights granted to a defendant under the Confrontation
Clause are not violated by admitting into evidence against him
the certificate of analysis which falls within a "firmly rooted"
hearsay exception. See Raia v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 546,
551-52, 478 S.E.2d 328, 331 (1996) (citing White v. Illinois, 502
U.S. 346, 356-57 (1992)); see also Bourjaily v. United States,
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483 U.S. 171 (1987); Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. Moreover,
laboratory analyses identifying controlled substances have long
been admissible as a business record under Federal Rule of
Evidence 803(6). See United States v. Roulette, 75 F.3d 418,
421-22 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S. Ct.
147, 136 L. Ed. 2d 93 (1996). In the instant case, the certificate
of drug analysis was admitted under Code §§ 19.1-187 and
19.2-187.1, Virginia's statutory equivalent to FRE 803(6).
Code § 19.2-187 provides, in part:
In any hearing or trial of any criminal
offense . . . a certificate of analysis of a
person performing an analysis or examination,
. . . when such certificate is duly attested
by such person, shall be admissible in
evidence as evidence of the facts therein
stated and the results of the analysis or
examination referred to therein, provided (i)
the certificate of analysis is filed with the
clerk of the court hearing the case at least
seven days prior to the hearing or trial and
(ii) a copy of such certificate is mailed or
delivered by the clerk or attorney for the
Commonwealth to counsel of record for the
accused at least seven days prior to the
hearing or trial upon request of such
counsel.
* * * * * * *
Any such certificate of analysis
purporting to be signed by any such person
shall be admissible as evidence in such
hearing or trial without any proof of the
seal or signature or of the official
character of the person whose name is signed
to it.
Code § 19.2-187.1 provides:
The accused in any hearing or trial in
which a certificate of analysis is admitted
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into evidence pursuant to § 19.2-187 . . .
shall have the right to call the person
performing such analysis or examination or
involved in the chain of custody as a witness
therein, and examine him in the same manner
as if he had been called as an adverse
witness. Such witness shall be summoned and
appear at the cost of the Commonwealth.
In Winston v. Commonwealth, we held as follows:
The contents of a "written report
offered to prove the results of testing or of
an analysis would generally be inadmissible
hearsay evidence," absent authentication and
verification by "the person who conducted the
testing or prepared the report." However,
Code § 19.2-187 "imposes a condition for the
exoneration of an otherwise hearsay document
from the application of the hearsay rule,
thus making the document admissible."
Because this statute "deals with criminal
matters, and it undertakes to make admissible
evidence which otherwise" might be
objectionable, it "should be construed
strictly against the Commonwealth and in
favor of the accused."
16 Va. App. 901, 904, 434 S.E.2d 4, 5 (1993) (quoting Gray v.
Commonwealth, 220 Va. 943, 945, 265 S.E.2d 705, 706 (1980))
(other citations omitted). Thus, it is generally recognized that
"Code § 19.2-187 creates an exception to the hearsay rule and
permits the written analysis to be admitted into evidence without
requiring the in-court presence of the person who prepared the
document." Allen v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 657, 662-63, 353
S.E.2d 162, 165 (1987) (citation omitted).
"Since the statute authorizes the admission into evidence of
documents whose reliability had not been independently proven,
the requirement that the certificate be filed seven days in
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advance provides some guarantee of trustworthiness in that it
gives an accused an opportunity to verify the results or to
subpoena and challenge those who constructed the analysis, should
that be a contested issue." Myrick v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App.
333, 337, 412 S.E.2d 176, 178 (1991) (emphasis added). See also
Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476, 479-80 (4th Cir. 1958)
(holding that then Code § 18.2-75.2 did not violate the
Confrontation Clause); United States v. Farmer, 820 F. Supp. 259(W.D. Va. 1993) (holding that certificate of blood alcohol
analysis did not violate Confrontation Clause and was admissible
under the business records exception to the hearsay rule).
No violation of appellant's right of confrontation occurred.
Appellant had the express statutory right pursuant to Code
§ 19.2-187.1 to subpoena the chemist performing the analysis or
the person involved in the chain of custody to testify at trial
and be available for his examination. Appellant's choice not to
avail himself of that process does not constitute a denial of his
confrontation right. Virginia's statutory scheme provides a
mechanism for governmental and judicial economy by obviating the
need for the prosecution to call the preparer and chain of
custody witness. The statutes provide a defendant with adequate
notice that the prosecution intends to rely on the certificate
and affords a defendant the absolute right to call the preparer
or chain of custody witness as an adverse witness should he so
desire. Thus, no violation of either the United States or
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Virginia Constitution occurs by use of the statutory procedure
authorized by Code §§ 19.2-187 and 19.2-187.1.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the conviction.
Affirmed.
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