Edwin Lester Falls, Jr. v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2008 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Felton, Judge McClanahan and Senior Judge Coleman
Argued at Salem, Virginia
EDWIN LESTER FALLS, JR.
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 1161-07-3 CHIEF JUDGE WALTER S. FELTON, JR.
NOVEMBER 4, 2008
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF AMHERST COUNTY
J. Michael Gamble, Judge
Gregory W. Smith for appellant.
(Robert F. McDonnell, Attorney General; Josephine F. Whalen,
Assistant Attorney General II, on brief), for appellee. Appellee
submitting on brief.
Following a bench trial, the trial court convicted Edwin Lester Falls, Jr. (“appellant”) of
possession of a firearm, after having been previously convicted of a felony, in violation of Code
§ 18.2-308.2. On appeal, he contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to strike the
Commonwealth’s evidence and finding the evidence sufficient to prove his guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. We conclude the trial court did not err in denying appellant’s motion to strike
the Commonwealth’s evidence and in finding the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to
convict appellant of violating Code § 18.2-308.2. Accordingly, we affirm appellant’s conviction.
On appeal, “[w]here the issue is whether the evidence is sufficient, we view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly
deducible therefrom.” Sandoval v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 133, 135, 455 S.E.2d 730, 731
(1995). “[W]e ‘presume the judgment of the trial court to be correct’ and reverse only if the trial
*
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
court’s decision is ‘plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.’” Burrell v. Commonwealth, 50
Va. App. 72, 84, 646 S.E.2d 35, 41 (2007) (quoting Davis v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 96, 99,
570 S.E.2d 875, 876-77 (2002)). See Code § 8.01-680. “It is the province of the [fact finder] to
evaluate the credibility of witnesses. It is ‘within the province of the [fact finder] to determine
what inferences are to be drawn from proved facts, provided the inferences are reasonably
related to those facts.’” Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 514, 578 S.E.2d 781, 786 (2003)
(quoting Inge v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 360, 366, 228 S.E.2d 563, 567-68 (1976)) (citations
omitted). “Thus, we do not ‘substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact.’” Kelly v.
Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 250, 257, 584 S.E.2d 444, 447 (2003) (en banc) (quoting Wactor v.
Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 375, 380, 564 S.E.2d 160, 162 (2002)).
To convict appellant of possession of a firearm after having been previously convicted of
a felony, the Commonwealth was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt both that
appellant possessed a firearm and that he had previously been convicted of a felony. Code
§ 18.2-308.2.
A conviction for the unlawful possession of a firearm can be
supported exclusively by evidence of constructive possession;
evidence of actual possession is not necessary. To establish
constructive possession of the firearm by a defendant, “the
Commonwealth must present evidence of acts, statements, or
conduct by the defendant or other facts and circumstances proving
that the defendant was aware of the presence and character of the
firearm and that the firearm was subject to his dominion and
control.” While the Commonwealth does not meet its burden of
proof simply by showing the defendant’s proximity to the firearm,
it is a circumstance probative of possession and may be considered
as a factor in determining whether the defendant possessed the
firearm.
Bolden v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 144, 148, 654 S.E.2d 584, 586 (2008) (quoting Rawls v.
Commonwealth, 272 Va. 334, 349, 634 S.E.2d 697, 705 (2006)) (citations omitted).
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At trial, appellant did not dispute that the Commonwealth’s evidence established that he
had been previously convicted of a felony. He contends, however, that the evidence presented
proved only that he drove John Maddox’s blue Chevrolet Blazer (“Blazer”), not that he
possessed the .22-caliber rifle located inside that vehicle. We disagree.
The evidence at trial proved that Maddox asked appellant to repair the brakes on his
Blazer and that he left the Blazer at appellant’s home for that purpose. Appellant then contacted
Maddox and asked to borrow Maddox’s .22-caliber rifle to teach his seven-year-old son to shoot.
Later that day, Maddox returned with the rifle to appellant’s house and, not seeing appellant,
“laid it across the back seat” of the Blazer. He left no ammunition for the rifle. When Maddox
retrieved the Blazer three days later, he found the rifle “in the back floorboard” covered with
newspaper.
Thereafter, appellant, who asked to borrow Maddox’s rifle to teach his son to shoot, told
Maddox that his son shot the rifle at appellant’s father’s farm, located some distance from
appellant’s house where Maddox left the rifle in the Blazer. While awaiting trial, appellant told a
fellow inmate that he had borrowed his friend’s rifle while he was repairing his friend’s truck
and that his seven-year-old son fired the rifle while he was teaching him to shoot. Further,
appellant told the same inmate that he had the rifle with him when he drove the Blazer to where
his girlfriend was staying, some distance from appellant’s house. Appellant also told Maddox
that he could keep the remaining .22-caliber bullets that appellant had placed in the Blazer under
the seat. Amherst County Investigator Duval Doss subsequently found a partially empty box of
.22-caliber bullets under the seat of the Blazer, when he came to Maddox’s house to investigate
an incident potentially involving the Blazer while it was in appellant’s possession.
Appellant told Investigator Doss that during the three days he possessed the Blazer he
only drove it a total of approximately thirty-two miles in order to check the repaired brakes.
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However, he was seen driving Maddox’s blue Blazer during that time period at a place some
thirty to thirty-five miles from appellant’s home. Maddox told the trial court that “a couple
hundred” miles had been logged on the Blazer’s odometer from the time he left it at appellant’s
home until he reacquired it.
Based on this evidence, the trial court found “sufficient circumstantial evidence that
[appellant] transported the firearm” and convicted him of violating Code § 18.2-308.2.
“‘A conviction for knowingly and intentionally possessing a firearm after having been
convicted of a felony . . . requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of either actual or
constructive possession of the firearm.’” Byers v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 174, 179-80,
554 S.E.2d 714, 716 (2001) (quoting Hancock v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 466, 468, 465
S.E.2d 138, 140 (1995)) (knowledge of, access to, and intent to obtain firearm sufficient to
sustain conviction under Code § 18.2-308.2). “Possession ‘need not always be exclusive. The
defendant may share it with one or more.’” Id. at 180, 554 S.E.2d at 716 (quoting Josephs v.
Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 87, 99, 390 S.E.2d 491, 497 (1990) (en banc), overruled on other
grounds by Young v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 587, 659 S.E.2d 308 (2008)). See also, Archer v.
Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 1, 13, 492 S.E.2d 826, 832 (1997) (appellant’s awareness of
firearm’s presence permitted inference that he exercised dominion and control necessary to show
constructive possession). From this record, we conclude that the trial court could find beyond a
reasonable doubt that, while in possession of Maddox’s Blazer, appellant was aware of the
presence and character of the rifle in the Blazer and that he exercised dominion and control over
it while driving the Blazer and using it to teach his seven-year-old son to shoot.
“Circumstantial evidence is not viewed in isolation. ‘While no single piece of evidence
may be sufficient, the “combined force of many concurrent and related circumstances, each
insufficient in itself, may lead a reasonable mind irresistibly to a conclusion.”’” Hudson, 265
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Va. at 514, 578 S.E.2d at 786 (quoting Derr v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 413, 425, 410 S.E.2d
662, 669 (1991)).
Appellant’s contention that the Commonwealth’s evidence failed to exclude all
reasonable hypotheses of innocence does not persuade us differently. “Circumstantial evidence
of guilt is sufficient to support a conviction when the Commonwealth’s evidence excludes every
reasonable hypothesis except guilt.” Stockton v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 124, 146, 314 S.E.2d
371, 385 (1984). “‘Whether an alternative hypothesis of innocence is reasonable is a question of
fact and, therefore, is binding on appeal unless plainly wrong.’” Stevens v. Commonwealth, 38
Va. App. 528, 535, 567 S.E.2d 537, 540 (2002) (quoting Archer, 26 Va. App. at 12-13, 492
S.E.2d at 832). “Moreover, this principle, ‘does not add to the burden of proof placed upon the
Commonwealth in a criminal case. The statement that circumstantial evidence must exclude
every reasonable theory of innocence is simply another way of stating that the Commonwealth
has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Kelly, 41 Va. App. at 258, 584 S.E.2d at
447-48 (quoting Hudson, 265 Va. at 513, 578 S.E.2d at 785).
From the record on appeal, we conclude the trial court’s finding that appellant, a convicted
felon, unlawfully possessed a firearm in violation of Code § 18.2-308.2 was not plainly wrong or
without evidence to support it. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in finding the
Commonwealth’s evidence sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant, a
previously convicted felon, unlawfully possessed a firearm.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm appellant’s conviction.
Affirmed.
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