Taylor Hope Wolfe, etc v. Va Birth-Related, etc ( 2003 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judge Elder and
Senior Judge Coleman
Argued at Salem, Virginia
TAYLOR HOPE WOLFE, INFANT, BY
RONDA L. WOLFE, MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 2489-02-3 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER
MAY 20, 2003
VIRGINIA BIRTH-RELATED NEUROLOGICAL
INJURY COMPENSATION PROGRAM
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
Robert W. Mann (Young, Haskins, Mann,
Gregory & Smith, PC, on brief), for
appellant.
Mahlon G. Funk, Jr. (M. Seth Ginther;
Hirschler Fleischer, on brief), for appellee.
Ronda L. Wolfe (Wolfe), suing as mother and next friend of
infant Taylor Hope Wolfe (claimant or Taylor), appeals from a
decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission (the
commission) concluding that Taylor is not entitled to benefits
from the Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Program
(the Program) under the Birth-Related Neurological Injury
Compensation Act (the Act), Code §§ 38.2-5000 to 38.2-5021. On
appeal, claimant contends the commission erroneously (1)
concluded she failed to prove a birth-related brain injury
caused by oxygen deprivation; (2) failed to infer the results of
umbilical cord blood gas testing, which she contends should have
been requested by the delivering physician, would have proved
Taylor suffered birth-related oxygen deprivation; (3) failed to
hold the Program was bound by what she alleges was a concession
that she was entitled to the Code § 38.2-5008 presumption; and
(4) failed to conclude the Program did not rebut the presumption
because it did not establish a specific non-birth-related cause
of Taylor's injury.
We hold the Program did not concede claimant's entitlement
to the Code § 38.2-5008 presumption and that the evidence,
absent an inference that the absent cord blood gas testing would
have shown oxygen deprivation, was insufficient to prove
claimant's entitlement to the Code § 38.2-5008 presumption.
However, we hold that such an inference is available to a
claimant under appropriate facts. Thus, we remand to the
commission to determine whether those facts were present in this
case and, if so, whether the evidence, including the inference,
was sufficient to prove claimant's entitlement to the statutory
presumption and benefits under the Act. Thus, we affirm in
part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
I.
BACKGROUND
Taylor was born on January 24, 1998, at thirty-seven weeks
two days of gestation. The day prior to Taylor's delivery, her
mother was found to have pregnancy-induced hypertension and was
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admitted to the hospital where labor was induced. At the time
of Taylor's birth, the delivering physician, Lenworth Beaver,
and hospital, Danville Regional Medical Center, were
participants under the Act.
Wolfe had good prenatal care and an uneventful delivery.
Wolfe's amniotic sac broke spontaneously about an hour before
delivery, and the amniotic fluid was clear. There were no signs
of meconium at any time during the delivery.
Hospital personnel monitored Taylor's heartbeat
continuously in utero until approximately 30 minutes before
delivery and at least every five minutes thereafter in
accordance with the standards of the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG). The fetal heart monitor
strips and subsequent auscultation or stethescopic heart
monitoring were normal and gave no indication of hypoxia or
fetal distress. The records also revealed no evidence of
utero-placental insufficiency or cord compression.
Dr. Beaver was present when Taylor crowned, and he
delivered the eight-pound-ten-ounce baby by vacuum extraction,
without incident, due to Wolfe's poor pushing ability. At the
time of delivery, Taylor was not breathing spontaneously. At
two minutes after delivery, medical personnel began ventilating
Taylor by mask and bag. At four minutes after delivery, Taylor
displayed poor respiratory effort, flaccidity and tremors, and
she was intubated. She "had clonus when disturbed."
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Despite the fact that Taylor was not breathing
spontaneously, she was pink at delivery and pink at one, two,
five and ten minutes following delivery. Her APGAR scores were
4 at one minute, 4 at five minutes, and 6 at ten minutes. Each
score included the maximum of two points allowed for heart rate
and color. All post-delivery arterial blood gases were within
acceptable limits. At 10:20 a.m., approximately six hours after
birth, Taylor was described as "pale pink." The records contain
no indication that umbilical cord blood gases were measured, and
a subsequent records review observed that "nurses' flow sheets
and any records from the delivery M.D." are "conspicuously
absent."
The day following Taylor's birth, she "developed seizure
activity" that was controlled with medication.
An EEG performed within the first twenty-four hours was
normal. Imaging studies showed no cystic degeneration, gray
matter or other neurological abnormalities. A CT scan performed
at one day of birth showed small left and right frontal lobe
hemorrhages. These hemorrhages were absent on MRIs performed
two days and twenty-three days after birth. Testing also
revealed no evidence of multi-organ failure (cardiovascular,
gastrointestinal, renal, hematologic, and pulmonary systems) in
the neonatal period.
Taylor has been diagnosed with cerebral palsy. She is fed
through a gastronomy tube and is unable to walk or speak.
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On March 26, 2001, Wolfe submitted a claim for benefits on
Taylor's behalf. The Program eventually denied the claim for
benefits. The Program conceded that Taylor is permanently
motorically and developmentally disabled but denied that
Taylor's condition results from a birth-related neurological
injury as defined in the Act.
The parties submitted evidence to the chief deputy
commissioner in support of their respective positions.
Claimant relied on the records of numerous treating
pediatric experts who opined that Taylor had "probable perinatal
anoxic brain injury."
Neurologist Francis X. Walsh reviewed Taylor's medical
records and opined to a reasonable degree of medical certainty
that she "suffer[ed] an anoxic ischemic event to the brain at or
about the time of delivery." Dr. Walsh admitted that "[t]he
actual delivery records do not pinpoint specific evidence of
anoxia having occurred at a particular time." He said, however,
that the records for the half-hour period immediately prior to
the delivery were "scanty" and that such a diagnosis was all
that remained after the elimination of congenital, infectious
and "any other explanation for the child's global developmental
delay" by "two well-respected pediatric neurologists."
Dr. Richard T. Welham, a member of ACOG, also reviewed
Taylor's records at her attorney's request. Dr. Welham opined
in relevant part as follows:
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[The infant's] color was reported as good
even in the face of no respiratory efforts.
Unfortunately, . . . immediate postpartum
umbilical cord gases were not done . . . .
Without these, it is difficult if not
impossible to be certain that the baby was
not anoxic and acidotic at the time of
delivery.
* * * * * * *
. . . [W]e have a normal appearing
fetal heart tracing and a very abnormal
infant outcome. The only event that
occurred between these two things was the
delivery itself. If an immediate postpartum
blood gas had been done and showed normal
findings, that would be consistent with a
neurological insult that could have occurred
distant from the delivery itself. Without
that vital piece of information, it is
impossible to exclude anoxia and asphyxia as
the cause of her neurologic problems.
The Program obtained an opinion from Obstetrician Daniel G.
Jenkins, who originally opined, "based on minimal evidence,"
that Taylor "qualifie[d] for the fund." Dr. Jenkins found "[n]o
evidence of negligence . . . , despite little documentation."
Jenkins subsequently changed his opinion and concluded that
Taylor "does not qualify for the fund." He explained as
follows:
I have re-read my review and note that I
omitted prematurity as a cause of cerebral
hemorrhage and cerebral palsy. I feel I may
have over-reacted to lack of documentation
by nurses, the M.D. (Dr. Beaver), or
possibly the hospital records department.
While there is little documentation, there
is no evidence, however, of real or
perceived intrapartum asphyxia that could
have caused this profound disability.
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Hence, one is left with one of the causes of
cerebral palsy, which is "unknown."
This then changes my opinion, and I feel
that this child does not qualify for the
fund as I had previously stated. . . . [I]n
rethinking this as well as the literature
regarding cerebral palsy, I feel that this
is a fairer decision than I previously
rendered.
The Program also offered the opinion of Lisa R. Troyer, a
physician who was board-certified in both obstetrics and
gynecology and high risk obstetrics. Dr. Troyer reviewed
Taylor's medical records before providing a written opinion and
testifying by deposition. She did not examine Taylor or
participate in her care. Dr. Troyer opined, to a reasonable
degree of medical certainty, that hypoxia "sufficient to account
for the neurologic injury that Taylor has" did not occur during
the second stage of Wolfe's labor. She testified that any gaps
in the fetal heart monitoring during labor occurred "mainly
before midnight in the earlier parts of labor" and that "[t]here
are lots of [fetal heart] tracings in what would appear to be
the active part of labor that are well-documented and adequate"
with no indication of hypoxia. When Wolfe entered the second
stage of labor at 3:58 a.m., "[t]here was no evidence of fetal
compromise at the time, the fetal heart tracing was reactive."
Thereafter, the records indicated that fetal monitoring occurred
by auscultation at 4:00, 4:05, 4:10, 4:15 and 4:20 a.m., and
that intermittent fetal tracings were obtained between 4:08 and
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4:12 a.m. Delivery occurred at 4:27 a.m. The delivery records
contained no mention of meconium "at the end of the delivery,"
which would have been indicative of fetal distress.
Dr. Troyer explained ACOG standards provide that "in the
absence of fetal distress or abnormal labor[,] [documented]
auscultation every five minutes" constitutes sufficient
monitoring. Dr. Troyer said she herself would have preferred
more detailed data on fetal heart activity during the second
stage of labor. However, she explained the fact that Taylor was
pink rather than blue at delivery, as noted in the delivery
records, "indicate[d] adequate oxygenation" "[d]uring the course
of the second stage." Based on the evidence of fetal heart
activity "ranging in the 120s and the 130s" "through labor and
delivery" as "shown on intermittent monitoring, either by the
tracing or by the nurse," and the baby's color, Dr. Troyer
opined, "[I]t's unlikely that [Taylor suffered] hypoxia [during
the labor and delivery] that [was severe enough to] result in
the degree of neurological injury [Taylor exhibited]."
Dr. Troyer explained that "keeping the baby on [external]
monitors with the [mother's] pushing" is "difficult[]." When
asked whether an internal monitor should have been used after
Wolfe's water broke at about 3:30 a.m., Dr. Troyer explained
that because "there was no evidence of fetal distress" at that
time, it was "okay to accede with an external monitor."
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Dr. Troyer opined that the standard of care is that
umbilical cord gas should be checked "if there is evidence of
concern during the labor and [about] the oxygenation status of
the baby." She also said that "[i]f at birth there is evidence
of difficulty," which she agreed there was in this case, "then
it is prudent to check a cord gas to assess the oxygenation
status." She agreed that, when Taylor was born, "everybody knew
there were problems immediately" and that the delivering
physician should have clamped the cord and cut a segment for
testing. She also agreed that the results of cord blood testing
"would have been diagnostic of whether [Taylor] had asphyxia
during this period of time." Nevertheless, after agreeing with
this statement, she opined, to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty, that hypoxia "sufficient to account for the
neurologic injury that Taylor has" did not occur during the
second stage of Wolfe's labor.
Dr. Troyer explained that under ACOG standards, four
criteria must be present to support a diagnosis of birth
asphyxia. Those criteria are (1) "a cord pH less than 7.0,"
indicating a metabolic acidosis; (2) APGAR scores "ranging from
zero to 3 at greater than five minutes of life"; (3)
"neurological sequella[e] as evidenced by coma, tumor, tremors,
seizures, poor tone"; and (4) multi-organ damage, that is damage
to the tissues in a second body system (cardiovascular,
respiratory, gastrointestinal, renal or hematologic) exhibited
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"during the time that [the infant] is in the [neonatal intensive
care unit] or in the nursery during the newborn period."
Dr. Troyer testified that although cord pH results were
unavailable, Taylor did not meet the multi-organ damage or APGAR
score requirements necessary for a diagnosis of birth-related
asphyxia.
Dr. Troyer testified that the presence of such small
hemorrhages in Taylor's brain and their subsequent disappearance
was "consistent with a normal neonate." The disappearance of
the hemorrhages and MRIs that reflected a normal brain and brain
stem were inconsistent with perinatal asphyxia/hypoxia and ACOG
criteria for the diagnosis of same.
The Program also submitted the opinion of a panel of
physicians comprising Dr. John W. Seeds, a neonatologist at the
Medical College of Virginia (MCV), and Drs. Thomas Peng and
Joseph Borzelleca, members of the obstetrics and gynecology
faculty at MCV, pursuant to Code § 38.2-5008(B). The panel
opined as follows:
[T]here is no evidence in the record that
supports a finding of oxygen deprivation
during labor, delivery, or the
resuscitation. The fetal monitor strip
shows no abnormalities consistent with such
a finding, the amniotic fluid was clear one
hour before birth, the neonatal heart rate
and the skin color were the two normal
findings as early as one minute of life, and
there was no evidence of multi organ failure
as required by both the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists [(ACOG)] and
the American Academy of Pediatrics [(AAP)]
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to support a diagnosis of perinatal
asphyxia. While multiple non obstetric
specialists opine that perinatal anoxia is
the cause of [Taylor's] injury because they
find no other, that basis by itself is not
accepted by either [ACOG] or [AAP].
There was no umbilical cord pH obtained. A
pH less than 7.0 would have supported
perinatal hypoxemia. However, lack of proof
that she wasn't acidotic is not proof that
she was acidotic. Therefore, we are left to
interpret clinical findings of normal heart
rate and normal color shortly after birth
and antenatal evidence in the normal heart
rate tracing that do not combine to support
a finding of perinatal hypoxemia as the
cause of her disabilities. While we cannot
exclude a remote hypoxemic event prior to
labor as the cause, this would not satisfy
the statute . . . . We do not propose to
know the cause of her disabilities, but
absence of an alternative cause does not
prove it was perinatal oxygen deprivation as
defined by the statute.
. . . We cannot, from these records,
conclude to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty, that this child's disabilities
resulted from oxygen deprivation during
labor, delivery, or the immediate
resuscitation.
At the hearing before the chief deputy commissioner,
claimant advanced a spoliation of evidence theory. She argued
the delivering physician should have obtained a cord blood gas
level and that his failure to do so entitled her to a
presumption that the results of such testing would have been
favorable to her. The chief deputy commissioner rejected the
spoliation argument on the ground that Dr. Beaver was not a
party. She found persuasive the opinions from Dr. Troyer and
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panel physician Dr. Seeds that no evidence established the
infant sustained a brain injury caused by oxygen deprivation.
The commission affirmed the denial of benefits by a vote of
two to one. The majority implicitly rejected the spoliation
argument, noting the lack of umbilical cord blood gas testing
and concluding the evidence established "that the cause of
Taylor's condition is uncertain." The dissenter would have
concluded the failure of the delivering physician to keep
adequate delivery records and obtain cord blood gases, which she
said were needed "to establish definitively the cause of
Taylor's injury," entitled claimant to a presumption that the
test results would have weighed in her favor. She reasoned that
holding no such presumption applied because Dr. Beaver was not
technically a party "would render the Act more restrictive than
a civil proceeding for medical malpractice, where the
obstetrician would be a party."
II.
ANALYSIS
A.
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE TO INVOKE CODE § 38.2-5008 PRESUMPTION
The Act establishes a framework to provide monetary relief
to claimants who have sustained a "[b]irth-related neurological
injury," which is defined as
injury to the brain or spinal cord of an
infant caused by the deprivation of oxygen
or mechanical injury occurring in the course
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of labor, delivery or resuscitation in the
immediate post-delivery period in a hospital
which renders the infant permanently
motorically disabled and (i) developmentally
disabled or (ii) for infants sufficiently
developed to be cognitively evaluated,
cognitively disabled . . . [and which]
disability cause[s] the infant to be
permanently in need of assistance in all
activities of daily living.
Code § 38.2-5001. The legislature, recognizing the difficulty
in proving when, but not whether, such an injury was sustained,
enacted a presumption to assist potential claimants in obtaining
benefits. Code § 38.2-5008(A)(1). Code § 38.2-5008(A)(1)
provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
A rebuttable presumption shall arise that
the injury alleged is a birth-related
neurological injury where it has been
demonstrated, to the satisfaction of the
Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission,
that the infant has sustained a brain or
spinal cord injury caused by oxygen
deprivation or mechanical injury, and that
the infant was thereby rendered permanently
motorically disabled and (i) developmentally
disabled or (ii) for infants sufficiently
developed to be cognitively evaluated,
cognitively disabled.
If either party disagrees with such
presumption, that party shall have the
burden of proving that the injuries alleged
are not birth-related neurological injuries
within the meaning of the chapter.
Claimant contends the presumption applied for three
reasons. First, she claims the Program conceded application of
the presumption. Second, she claims the evidence before the
commission compelled a finding that her disability resulted from
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perinatal birth asphyxia. Finally, she contends the delivering
physician's failure to obtain an umbilical cord blood gas
entitled her to a presumption that the results of such a test
would have been favorable to her claim. We consider each of
these arguments in turn.
1. "Judicial Admission" by the Program
Claimant contends the program conceded application of the
Code § 38.2-5008 presumption in argument before the chief deputy
commissioner and that the chief deputy erred in failing to
incorporate this concession into her ruling.
We hold this argument does not support a reversal for two
reasons. First, claimant failed to raise this alleged error
before the commission. Thus, Rule 5A:18 prevents her from
raising it for the first time in this Court.
Second, claimant's argument quotes the Program's statements
out of context and is factually incorrect. In the hearing
before the chief deputy, counsel for the Program spent
significant time outlining the Program's evidence and explaining
how and why that evidence established "noncompensability [of the
claim] in the sense of a nonhypoxic, nonasphy[x]ic event,
nonmechanical event to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty." Further, the Program expressly argued against
claimant's spoliation claim relating to evidence claimant
averred would have proved oxygen deprivation. The Program would
have had no reason to advance such arguments if it had conceded
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that claimant's injury resulted from oxygen deprivation and that
the statutory presumption applied. Viewed in this context, the
Program's statement, "[t]here is no dispute . . . that the
statute gives a rebuttable presumption to the claimant," was not
a concession that claimant's evidence was sufficient to entitle
her to the presumption.
2. Evidence of Oxygen Deprivation Causing Injury
Before the Code § 38.2-5008 presumption that an injury is
birth-related comes into play, a claimant must prove that her
injury was to the brain or spinal cord and that it was caused by
oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury. Here, claimant does
not allege that her disability resulted from mechanical injury
or injury to her spinal cord. Thus, we consider only whether
the evidence, in the absence of any inferences to be drawn from
a spoliation of evidence claim, was sufficient to support the
commission's finding that claimant failed to prove her apparent
brain injury was caused by oxygen deprivation.
"Claimant bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of
the evidence that [s]he suffered an oxygen deprivation. That
evidence must establish a probability of oxygen deprivation, not
merely a possibility." Kidder v. Virginia Birth-Related
Neurological Injury Comp. Pgm., 37 Va. App. 764, 778, 560 S.E.2d
907, 913 (2002). As with any medical question before the
commission,
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"[m]edical evidence is not necessarily
conclusive, but is subject to the
commission's consideration and weighing."
Hungerford Mech. Corp. v. Hobson, 11
Va. App. 675, 677, 401 S.E.2d 213, 214
(1991). . . . "Questions raised by
conflicting medical opinions must be decided
by the commission." Penley v. Island Creek
Coal Co., 8 Va. App. 310, 318, 381 S.E.2d
231, 236 (1989). . . . "The fact that there
is contrary evidence in the record is of no
consequence if there is credible evidence to
support the commission's finding." Wagner
Enters., Inc. v. Brooks, 12 Va. App. 890,
894, 407 S.E.2d 32, 35 (1991).
Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Comp. Pgm. v. Young,
34 Va. App. 306, 318, 541 S.E.2d 298, 304 (2001).
On this record, absent a spoliation inference, we find
credible evidence to support the commission's decision.
Claimant's experts opined that claimant's injury must have
resulted from birth-related oxygen deprivation only because they
were unable to find any other cause. However, both Dr. Troyer
and the panel physicians opined that the lack of evidence
suggesting another cause did not convince them that oxygen
deprivation was the cause of Taylor's disability. Thus, absent
application of a spoliation inference, credible evidence
supported the commission's decision that claimant did not prove
her injury resulted from oxygen deprivation.
3. Spoliation of Evidence Inference
Virginia law recognizes a spoliation or missing evidence
inference, which provides that "[w]here one party has within his
control material evidence and does not offer it, there is [an
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inference] that the evidence, if it had been offered, would have
been unfavorable to that party." Charles E. Friend, The Law of
Evidence in Virginia § 10-17, at 338 (5th ed. 1999); see Jacobs
v. Jacobs, 218 Va. 264, 269, 237 S.E.2d 124, 127 (1977) (holding
principle is an inference rather than a presumption).
In general, a party's conduct, so far as it
indicates his own belief in the weakness of
his cause, may be used against him as an
admission, subject of course to any
explanations he may be able to make removing
that significance from his conduct. . . .
"[Conduct showing the] [c]onceal[ment] or
destr[uction] [of] evidential material is
. . . admissible; in particular the
destruction (spoliation) of documents as
evidence of an admission that their contents
are as alleged by the opponents." 1
Greenleaf Ev. (16 Ed.), sec. 195, at 325.
Neece v. Neece, 104 Va. 343, 348, 51 S.E. 739, 740-41 (1905);
see also Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Aistrop, 183 Va. 23, 28-29, 31
S.E.2d 297, 299 (1944) (in wrongful death action where party's
agents failed to procure evidence of cause of death presumed to
be available through autopsy authorized by decedent's wife but
not performed before embalming, allowing "inference that
[agents] at least thought [autopsy results] would be adverse to
their principal").
"The textbook definition of 'spoliation' is 'the
intentional destruction of evidence[.'] . . . However,
spoliation issues also arise when evidence is lost, altered or
cannot be produced." Steve E. Couch, Spoliation of Evidence:
Is One Man's Trashing Another Man's Treasure, 62 Tex. B.J. 242,
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243 & n.4 (1999). Spoliation "encompasses [conduct that is
either] . . . intentional or negligent." Karen Wells Roby &
Pamela W. Carter, Spoliation: The Case of the Missing Evidence,
47 La. B.J. 222, 222 (1999). A spoliation inference may be
applied in an existing action if, at the time the evidence was
lost or destroyed, "a reasonable person in the defendant's
position should have foreseen that the evidence was material to
a potential civil action." Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 652
N.E.2d 267, 270-71 (Ill. 1995) (citations omitted), quoted in
Robert L. Tucker, The Flexible Doctrine of Spoliation of
Evidence: Cause of Action, Defense, Evidentiary Presumption,
and Discovery Sanction, 46 Def. L.J. 587, 603 (1997) (citing
Boyd language as representative of cases that have considered
issue).
Claimant contends she was entitled to a spoliation
inference based on the failure of the delivering physician to
preserve umbilical cord blood and request cord blood gas
testing. The Program responds that the delivering physician was
neither a party nor an agent of a party. Because the Program
itself had no duty to see that the evidence was preserved or the
testing performed, it argues that the presumption may not be
applied to a proceeding under the Act.
The commission found, based in part on "missing information
not in the record," that claimant failed to meet her burden of
proof, thereby implicitly rejecting the argument that it should
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infer cord blood gas testing results would have been favorable
to claimant. The commission did not state the reason for its
refusal to draw such an inference based on the spoliation claim.
Based on the requirement of Code § 38.2-5010 that the
commission's review shall be accompanied by "a statement of the
findings of fact, rulings of law and other matters pertinent to
the questions at issue," we conclude that, as to the issues on
which the commission's majority opinion was silent, its
affirmance of the chief deputy commissioner's denial of benefits
constituted an adoption of the deputy's reasoning. The
dissenter's express opinion--that the delivering physician
should have been treated as a party for purposes of application
of a spoliation of evidence inference--supports the conclusion
that the majority's rejection of the inference was based on a
contrary belief that the physician should not be considered a
party.
We previously considered in Kidder, albeit tangentially,
whether a missing evidence inference may be applied to a
claimant's duty to prove injury resulting from oxygen
deprivation under the Act. Kidder involved an absence of
evidence of both an umbilical cord pH and fetal heart tracings
from the last twenty minutes preceding the infant's birth. 37
Va. App. at 780 n.6, 560 S.E.2d at 914 n.6. There, we reasoned
as follows:
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Claimant complains that his claim should not
be denied due to a lack of objective
evidence of fetal distress because fetal
heart tracings and . . . blood gas readings
which could have confirmed fetal oxygen
deprivation were not obtained. However, the
statutory scheme places the burden of
proving oxygen deprivation on the claimant,
and no evidence establishes that this lack
of evidence resulted from negligence or
intentional behavior on the part of any
treating physician. Claimant concedes that
the fetal heart monitor was disconnected to
permit the emergency cesarean section, and
the panel opined that [the infant's]
"vigorous condition" at birth "may well have
been deemed adequate to verify his immediate
condition" without obtaining "an umbilical
cord pH."
Id. (emphasis added).
Thus, we intimated in Kidder that a claimant would be
entitled to a spoliation inference on proof that the absence of
critical evidence "resulted from negligence or intentional
behavior on the part of a[] treating physician." Id. Although
we did not discuss the implications of the fact that a physician
is not directly a party to a claim for benefits under the Act,
we implicitly held that the physician need not be a party in
order for his actions to be relevant in assessing a claimant's
ability to meet his or her burden of proving entitlement to the
Code § 38.2-5008 presumption. For the reasons that follow, we
conclude our implicit holding in Kidder remains sound.
Although a delivering physician will never be a party to a
"claim . . . for compensation" under the Act, Code § 38.2-5001,
the Act is structured such that a delivering physician who is
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also a participating physician under the Act is in privity with
a party--the Program.
It is generally held that privity means a
mutual or successive relationship to the
same rights of property, or such an
identification in interest of one person
with another as to represent the same legal
rights; and the term "privy" where applied
to a judgment or decree refers to one whose
interest has been legally represented at the
trial.
Patterson v. Saunders, 194 Va. 607, 613, 74 S.E.2d 204, 208
(1953). Because the Program is in privity with the physician, a
nonparty, invocation of the missing evidence inference against
the Program is appropriate. Cf. Bd. of Supervisors v. Southern
Cross Coal Corp., 238 Va. 91, 96, 380 S.E.2d 636, 639 (1989)
("[A] surety, defending an obligee's suit on the principal's
bonded obligation, stands in the principal's shoes and may
assert only those defenses available to the principal. Because
principal and surety are in privity, the defenses available to
both may be asserted by either." (Citation omitted)).
The Act expressly provides that, with certain exceptions
not relevant here, "the rights and remedies herein granted . . .
shall exclude all other rights and remedies of such infant, his
personal representative, parents, dependents, or next of kin, at
common law or otherwise arising out of or related to a medical
malpractice claim with respect to [a birth-related neurological]
injury." Code § 38.2-5002(B). The immunity from suit provided
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by the Act applies to all participating physicians. 1 Code
§ 38.2-5001. Participating physicians are licensed Virginia
obstetricians who, inter alia, paid to the Program the annual
assessment required by the Act and "had in force an agreement
. . . whereby the physician agreed to submit to review by the
Board of Medicine" if the Board "determines that there is reason
to believe that the alleged injury resulted from, or was
aggravated by, substandard care on the part of the physician."
Code §§ 38.2-5001, -5004(B). Thus, by virtue of the provisions
of the Act, the payment of an assessment to the Program, and the
existence of an agreement between the physician and the related
licensing arm of the Commonwealth, the Program is in privity
with the participating physician against whom a particular claim
is filed.
A ruling that would not allow the Program to be held
responsible for a participating physician's failure to secure
important evidence would provide a physician with little
incentive to obtain or preserve evidence critical to an injured
party's ability to prove her claim under the Act. But for the
Act, the physician would have such an incentive because a
claimant could sue the physician directly and the physician
would be a party against whom the claimant could assert the
right to a missing evidence inference under appropriate facts.
1
Physicians who choose not to participate in the Program
have no immunity from suit.
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Applying such an inference to the Program encourages the Program
to address the issue with its participating physicians, either
routinely as a part of its agreement with each participating
physician or at least episodically by requesting Board review of
a participating physician who has negligently or intentionally
failed to secure important evidence in a particular case. Thus,
allowing application of such an inference to the Program should
lessen the incentive a negligent physician might have to fail to
preserve relevant evidence. As the dissenting commissioner
observed, a claimant's burden of proof under the Act should be
no greater than it would have been at common law. Depriving a
claimant of the inference that missing evidence would have been
favorable to him would have just such a result.
Thus, we remand to the commission to make the factual
findings necessary to determine whether the missing evidence
inference should apply and, if so, whether the evidence,
including the inference, entitles claimant to benefits. We note
that Dr. Troyer's testimony, depending on how it is viewed by
the commission, could support a finding that Dr. Beaver was
negligent in failing to preserve umbilical cord blood for cord
blood gas testing. Further, even if the inference applies, it
is up to the commission to determine whether the lack of
evidence of two of the four criteria required by the ACOG for a
finding of birth-related asphyxia precludes a finding of
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birth-related asphyxia even with a presumed cord pH of less than
7.0.
III.
For these reasons, we hold the Program did not concede
claimant's entitlement to the Code § 38.2-5008 presumption and
that the evidence, without an inference that the absent cord
blood gas testing would have shown oxygen deprivation, was
insufficient to prove claimant's entitlement to the Code
§ 38.2-5008 presumption. However, we hold that such an
inference is available to a claimant under appropriate facts.
Thus, we remand to the commission to determine whether those
facts were present in this case and, if so, whether the
evidence, including the inference, was sufficient to prove
claimant's entitlement to the statutory presumption and benefits
under the Act.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
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