Kenneth Ray Lowe v. Commonwealth of Virginia , 36 Va. App. 163 ( 2001 )


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  •                      COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Annunziata and Agee
    Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
    KENNETH RAY LOWE
    OPINION BY
    v.   Record No. 1910-00-3                JUDGE ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA
    JULY 10, 2001
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BUCHANAN COUNTY
    Keary R. Williams, Judge
    (Freddie E. Mullins; Buddy H. Wallen, P.C.,
    on briefs), for appellant. Appellant
    submitting on briefs.
    (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General; Leah A.
    Darron, Assistant Attorney General, on
    brief), for appellee. Appellee submitting on
    brief.
    The appellant, Kenneth Ray Lowe, appeals his conviction in
    the Circuit Court of Buchanan County for manufacturing
    marijuana, in violation of Code § 18.2-248.1. 1     Lowe contends the
    evidence was insufficient to support the conviction.       We agree,
    and reverse.
    1
    The Court notes that the conviction and sentencing order
    reflects that the appellant pled guilty to the charge of
    manufacturing marijuana. However, after a review of the entire
    record in this case, it appears the appellant pled not guilty.
    Accordingly, this matter is remanded to the trial court for the
    sole purpose of correcting that clerical error.
    BACKGROUND
    On appeal, we view the evidence and all reasonable
    inferences fairly deducible therefrom, in the light most
    favorable to the Commonwealth.     Higginbotham v. Commonwealth,
    
    216 Va. 349
    , 352, 
    218 S.E.2d 534
    , 537 (1975).    On July 19, 1999,
    Buchanan County Sheriff's Investigator Blaine Crouse was looking
    for Jerry Lowe, the appellant's brother.    He drove to Jerry
    Lowe's home and spoke with a woman who lived with him.    The
    woman advised Crouse that Jerry Lowe "wasn't at home, that he
    had spent the night at [the appellant's] residence and then told
    [the officer] that [the appellant's] house was down there at the
    railroad trestle."
    Crouse was familiar with appellant's residence because he
    had been there "probably three or four times" in the prior four
    months, and he had once arrested appellant there.    Crouse also
    testified that when he arrived at appellant's home that day, a
    German Shepherd dog that he had seen on his previous visits was
    tied up in the backyard.
    Crouse walked onto the front porch and knocked on the door.
    When no one answered, he turned to leave, but saw a bucket
    containing a marijuana plant sitting on the hillside, fifteen
    feet from the residence.   He walked up on the hillside to check
    the plant and, when he turned around, saw four other buckets
    containing marijuana plants sitting on a table against the side
    of the house.   The dirt in the buckets looked like it had "just
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    been worked," and he observed finger and hand prints in the soil
    surrounding the plants.
    Crouse also observed a device nailed to the house that
    channeled water onto the plants.   The plants were sent to the
    Bureau of Forensic Science for analysis, which established that
    the plants were marijuana and weighed two grams.
    Crouse also testified that he had been at the same
    residence two hours prior to discovering the marijuana plants
    and that he had spoken to a young lady during that earlier
    visit, but had not learned her name.
    Defense counsel moved to strike at the close of the
    Commonwealth's evidence.   The trial court overruled the motion
    and found that the evidence established that freshly tended
    marijuana plants were found at the appellant's home and that
    this circumstantial evidence proved that appellant had dominion
    and control over the drugs.   Appellant was convicted of
    manufacturing marijuana and sentenced to five years in prison
    with four years of the sentence suspended.
    ANALYSIS
    In order to prove that the appellant manufactured the
    marijuana in question, the Commonwealth was required to prove
    that he "planted, cultivated, grew or harvested" the marijuana.
    Patterson v. Commonwealth, 
    19 Va. App. 698
    , 702, 
    454 S.E.2d 367
    ,
    369 (1995); King v. Commonwealth, 
    2 Va. App. 708
    , 710-11, 
    347 S.E.2d 530
    , 531 (1986).    In addition, because "[a] person cannot
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    manufacture marijuana without possessing it," Patterson, 19 Va.
    App. at 702, 454 S.E.2d at 369, the Commonwealth was required to
    prove the defendant was:   (1) aware of the presence and
    character of the particular substance; and (2) was intentionally
    and consciously in possession of it.     Clodfelter v.
    Commonwealth, 
    218 Va. 619
    , 622, 
    238 S.E.2d 820
    , 822 (1977).       The
    Commonwealth was not required to prove the defendant actually
    possessed the controlled substance, but could rely on proof of
    constructive possession.     Drew v. Commonwealth, 
    230 Va. 471
    ,
    473, 
    338 S.E.2d 844
    , 845 (1986).
    To support a conviction based on constructive possession,
    the Commonwealth must point to evidence of acts, statements or
    conduct of the accused or other facts and circumstances which
    tend to show the defendant was aware of both the presence and
    character of the substance and that it was subject to his
    dominion and control.   Garland v. Commonwealth, 
    225 Va. 182
    ,
    184, 
    300 S.E.2d 783
    , 784 (1983); Clodfelter, 218 Va. at 622, 238
    S.E.2d at 822.   Where the Commonwealth's case rests entirely
    upon circumstantial evidence, as in this case, the evidence not
    only must be consistent with guilt, but it also must exclude
    every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.     Clodfelter, 218 Va.
    at 623, 238 S.E.2d at 822.
    The Commonwealth's evidence failed to establish that the
    appellant occupied the home at the time the marijuana plants
    were found or that he was the only person with access to the
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    residence.   Although it proved that Lowe resided at the home and
    had been present there on previous occasions, evidence of
    ownership or occupancy of the premises, alone, is insufficient
    to prove constructive possession.   Nicholas v. Commonwealth, 
    186 Va. 315
    , 322, 
    42 S.E.2d 306
    , 310 (1947); see also Lane v.
    Commonwealth, 
    223 Va. 713
    , 716, 
    292 S.E.2d 358
    , 360 (1982)
    (citing Code § 18.2-250.1).
    While evidence of ownership or occupancy is probative on
    the question and constitutes a circumstance that may be
    considered along with other evidence, Powers v. Commonwealth,
    
    227 Va. 474
    , 476, 
    316 S.E.2d 739
    , 740 (1984), in this case, no
    other evidence connected the appellant to the marijuana.    No
    evidence showed the appellant had been at the house on the day
    the marijuana was found or during a period from which the finder
    of fact could reasonably conclude appellant constructively
    possessed the marijuana.   Furthermore, the Commonwealth's own
    evidence showed that two other people, the appellant's brother
    and the unidentified woman, were at the residence on the day
    Investigator Crouse discovered the recently "worked" marijuana
    plants.
    The Commonwealth's circumstantial evidence failed to
    eliminate the reasonable hypothesis that someone other than
    Lowe brought the pots of marijuana to the home on the day they
    were discovered.   See Burchette v. Commonwealth, 
    15 Va. App. 432
    , 438, 
    425 S.E.2d 81
    , 85 (1992) (where we found, "[t]he
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    evidence simply does not exclude the very real possibility that
    other members of [the defendant's] family or someone other than
    [the defendant] used or had access to the vehicle and had left
    the drugs there unbeknownst to him").   Therefore, we find the
    evidence to be insufficient, as a matter of law, to prove the
    appellant manufactured the marijuana.   Accordingly, we reverse
    the conviction and dismiss the indictment.
    Reversed and dismissed.
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