Jerri Lynn Scearce v. Commonwealth of VA ( 2002 )


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  •                       COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Benton, Willis and Clements
    Argued at Salem, Virginia
    JERRI LYNN SCEARCE
    OPINION BY
    v.      Record No. 0638-01-3                JUDGE JAMES W. BENTON, JR.
    APRIL 9, 2002
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF DANVILLE
    James F. Ingram, Judge
    Jon Ian Davey for appellant.
    John H. McLees, Jr., Senior Assistant
    Attorney General (Randolph A. Beales,
    Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
    The trial judge convicted Jerri Lynn Scearce of attempting
    to procure a witness to commit perjury.       On appeal, Scearce
    contends the trial judge erred in ruling that the prosecutor
    laid a proper foundation to admit into evidence a statement
    under the past recollection recorded exception to the hearsay
    rule.     For the reasons that follow, we reverse the conviction
    and remand the case for a new trial.
    I.
    The evidence proved that a police officer arrested
    Scearce's fiancé, Henry Tickle, for driving on September 30,
    2000 between 4:00 a.m. and 4:30 a.m., which was outside the
    restricted hours of Tickle's driving permit.       A grand jury later
    indicted Scearce for attempting to induce or procure William
    Wesley Hyler to commit perjury, in violation of Code §§ 18.2-26
    and 18.2-436.
    At Scearce's trial, which occurred February 2, 2001, Hyler
    testified that Scearce asked him to testify in court that Tickle
    had been asleep on Hyler's sofa at 4:00 a.m.   Hyler testified
    that he "can't remember the exact date or month" he talked to
    Scearce and that he "believe[d] it was a Saturday or something
    like that," but "ain't sure."   Although Hyler testified that he
    later told a police officer about Scearce's request, Hyler could
    not recall, in relation to his conversation with the officer,
    when he had spoken with Scearce.
    The prosecutor informed the trial judge that immediately
    prior to trial the police officer read to Hyler, who cannot
    read, the statement the officer had transcribed on October 9,
    2000, when Hyler spoke to the officer.   Upon the prosecutor's
    motion, the trial judge permitted the bailiff to leave the
    courtroom with Hyler and refresh Hyler's memory again by reading
    to Hyler the statement the police officer had written.   When
    questioned by the prosecutor after this attempt to refresh his
    memory, Hyler testified that Scearce had come to his home "that
    Saturday before last, on October the 9th."   The prosecutor then
    asked, "[t]he Saturday . . . before last, when you talked to the
    police on October the 9th?"   After Hyler responded, "yes sir,"
    the prosecutor asked the judge to take "judicial notice of the
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    calendar . . . that would have been Saturday before last, from
    October the 9th, would have been September the 30th."
    In response to further questions by the prosecutor, Hyler
    testified twice that Scearce "didn't say what date" she wanted
    him to say Tickle was asleep on his sofa.       The prosecutor
    requested leave to prove, as a past recollection recorded, the
    statement Hyler gave to the officer and then asked Hyler the
    following questions:
    Q. [T]his is a statement that you gave to
    Officer Pace on October the 9th? Is that
    correct?
    A.   Yes sir.
    Q. [W]as your memory better then or is it
    better now?
    A.   My memory has never been real good.
    Q.   It's never been real good?
    A.   Yes sir.    I'll be honest with you?
    Q. Well, would you say it was better on
    October the 9th, than it was today, about
    what happened on September 30th?
    A.   No . . . I couldn't say.
    Q.   You couldn't say?
    *      *    *    *    *     *     *
    A. . . . like if somethin[g] happened today
    . . . say somethin[g] happened on Monday
    . . . if I had to go the next day and do
    somethin[g], then I mean I can remember it.
    Q. Well, but do you remember what [Scearce]
    told you that day she came to your house?
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    A. Yeah, she said she wanted me to go . . .
    go to Court and tell that [Tickle] was sleep
    on my couch.
    Q. Okay. Do you remember what time she
    said Henry would have been asleep on your
    couch?
    *    *     *    *      *    *     *
    A.     4:00 A.M.
    Q. 4:00 A.M. All right, but you don't
    remember what date she said that?
    A.     No sir.
    Q. But you told the police all of this on
    October the 9th, is that correct?
    A.     Yes sir.
    Q. And Officer Pace reduced your statement
    to writing?
    A.     Yes sir.
    Q. And he read it back to you?          Is that
    correct?
    A.     Yes sir.
    Q.     Well, was it correct at that time?
    A.     Yes sir.
    On cross-examination, Hyler admitted that his memory was
    such that he might not remember on Wednesday something that
    happened on Monday.    Scearce's counsel asked, "so if somebody
    came to you and told you something, or suggested something, on
    one day, then certainly nine days later, you may not remember
    accurately, would you?"      Hyler testified that he would "mostly
    not" remember.
    The prosecutor then recalled as a witness the officer who
    transcribed Hyler's statement.        The officer testified that he
    - 4 -
    spoke to Hyler on October 9, that Hyler was "clear" in relaying
    information on that day, that he wrote what Hyler told him, that
    he read his writing to Hyler, and that Hyler signed it.     The
    officer was then permitted, over the hearsay objection of
    Scearce's counsel, to read the statement into evidence.     In
    pertinent part, the statement was as follows:
    "I give the following statement . . . on
    10/9/2000 at 11:30 A.M., about a
    conversation between myself and Jerri
    Scearce. The Saturday before last, around
    6:00 o'clock, to 6:30 P.M., Jerri Scearce,
    and . . . . I went into my kitchen, where
    Jerri asked me to go to Court with her, to
    tell that Henry Tickle was asleep on my
    couch, at around 4:00 o'clock A.M. that
    morning. I told Jerri that I could not do
    that. I won't lie for my own brother. I
    ain't going to lie for anyone. I know
    that's perjury, and that's wrong." Signed
    by William Wesley Hyler . . . .
    Scearce presented testimony by an agent of a bonding service
    that she went to the magistrate's office prior to      5:00 p.m. on
    September 30 and remained there until after      7:00 p.m.   Tickle
    also testified that he left the jail with Scearce after 7:00 p.m.
    and remained with her until 8:00 p.m.   Scearce testified that she
    did not see Hyler on September 30 and that she was at the
    magistrate's office between 5:00 p.m. and       7:00 p.m.   She also
    testified that she never asked Hyler to
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    testify about Tickle and would not have done so because Tickle
    and Hyler were antagonistic to each other.
    The trial judge convicted Scearce of attempted subordination
    of perjury.   This appeal followed.
    II.
    "The general rule of past recollection recorded allows, over
    a hearsay objection, a witness with no independent recollection
    of an incident to testify directly from notes or reports if
    certain requirements are met."     James v. Commonwealth, 
    8 Va. App. 98
    , 102, 
    379 S.E.2d 378
    , 380 (1989).     We have held that the
    memorandum of past recollection recorded need not be made by the
    witness whose memory is at issue.
    "[T]he general rule [among courts
    nationwide] is that it is not essential that
    the record of past recollection shall have
    been made by the witness, if he knows that
    it is true as written. It is sufficient if
    the memorandum was made by someone else but
    has been examined by the witness and is
    known by him to be correct."
    Bailey v. Commonwealth, 
    20 Va. App. 236
    , 241, 
    456 S.E.2d 144
    , 146
    (1995) (citation omitted).
    Under the past recollection recorded exception, the
    proponent of the statement also must establish each of the
    following circumstances:
    "(1) [T]he witness must have had firsthand
    knowledge of the event, (2) the written
    statement must be an original memorandum
    made at or near the time of the event and
    while the witness had a clear and accurate
    memory of [the event], (3) the witness must
    lack a present recollection of the event,
    and (4) the witness must vouch for the
    accuracy of the written memorandum."
    - 6 -
    Scott v. Greater Richmond Transit Co., 
    241 Va. 300
    , 304, 
    402 S.E.2d 214
    , 217 (1991) (emphasis added and citation omitted).
    Scearce challenged at trial and now on appeal whether on October
    9 Hyler had a clear and accurate memory of the events contained
    in the officer's memorandum and whether Hyler was able to vouch
    for the accuracy of the memorandum.      We address Scearce's first
    contention that the evidence failed to prove Hyler's memory was
    clear and accurate on October 9.
    When accepting testimony under the past recollection
    exception, the trial judge relies heavily on the witness' pledge
    that the witness' memory was accurate at the time the memorandum
    was written.    The record clearly proves, however, that the
    prosecutor was unable to establish that Hyler's memory was clear
    and accurate on October 9, when the officer's memorandum
    indicated that Hyler's statement was made.     Hyler's own testimony
    was that he could not say that his memory was accurate on that
    date.    Indeed, Hyler testified that his memory is not good more
    than one or two days past the happening of an event.     Based on
    Hyler's own testimony, had Scearce approached him on September
    30, he would "mostly not" remember the event on October 9 in
    order to relay it accurately to the officers.     Indeed, Hyler
    specifically testified that he could not say his memory about the
    events at issue was better on October 9 than it was at trial.
    The officer's testimony that Hyler was "clear" in his statement
    cannot supplant Hyler's own testimony about his deficient memory.
    Thus, we hold that, although Hyler testified that the officer
    wrote his statement, the evidence fails to establish that Hyler's
    memory of his conversation with Scearce was clear and accurate
    - 7 -
    when he spoke to the officer.
    Furthermore, the trial judge's error in permitting the
    officer to read the statement into evidence was not harmless.
    The defense presented evidence that Hyler had a motive to
    fabricate his testimony that Scearce wanted him to perjure
    himself.    Scearce presented evidence that Hyler, whom she had
    dated twenty years ago, disliked Tickle, her fiancé.    Scearce
    also attempted to discredit Hyler with his admission that he
    sometimes drank heavily and that he had drunk beer on both
    September 30 and October 9.    Critically, Hyler was not able to
    testify without some aid as to the date of his conversation with
    Scearce.    In addition, Hyler testified twice that Scearce did not
    say what day she wanted him to say Tickle was asleep on the sofa,
    and Hyler did not testify that Tickle had never slept on his
    sofa.    Hyler's credibility was at issue.
    The officer who transcribed Hyler's statement also testified
    that after he asked Hyler "a few questions . . . as to the date
    and time [the conversation] had happened, . . . [he] checked
    [his] notes to make sure that that was the same date that [he]
    had seen Mr. Tickle driving.    Then . . . [he] wrote the
    statement."    In assessing whether Hyler fabricated the story, the
    trier of fact clearly could have substantially relied upon the
    officer's memorandum of Hyler's statement to determine that Hyler
    knew the details of the event.    Thus, we cannot say that the
    conviction was not substantially affected by the admission of the
    statement.     Clay v. Commonwealth, 
    262 Va. 253
    , 261, 
    546 S.E.2d 728
    , 732 (2001).
    III.
    - 8 -
    Scearce also challenges whether the evidence was sufficient
    to support the conviction.   "When an appellant challenges the
    sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction, we review
    the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and
    grant to it 'all reasonable inferences fairly deducible
    therefrom.'"   Kelley v. Commonwealth, 
    17 Va. App. 540
    , 548, 
    439 S.E.2d 616
    , 621 (1994) (citation omitted).     So viewed, Hyler
    provided testimony from which a trier of fact could find that
    Scearce had sought to have him give testimony in court on
    Tickle's behalf.   Scearce's "argument is based entirely on the
    issue of witness credibility."     Walker v. Commonwealth, 
    258 Va. 54
    , 70, 
    515 S.E.2d 565
    , 575 (1999).      The critical issue was
    whether the finder of fact could be persuaded that Hyler was
    truthful and could accurately recall the events.     That is a
    matter for the finder of fact to consider upon properly admitted
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    evidence.   Accordingly, we cannot say the evidence was
    insufficient. 1
    For these reasons, we reverse the conviction and remand the
    case for a new trial.
    Reversed and remanded.
    1
    We do not address Scearce's argument that she was
    improperly convicted of an attempted inchoate crime. She failed
    to properly preserve this issue for review.
    - 10 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 0638013

Judges: Benton, Willis, Clements

Filed Date: 4/9/2002

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/15/2024