Catherine C. Hurt v. Charles William Hurt ( 1997 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Coleman, Elder and Senior Judge Cole
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
CHARLES WILLIAM HURT
v. Record No. 0111-96-2
CATHERINE C. HURT MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
JUDGE MARVIN F. COLE
CATHERINE C. HURT JANUARY 21, 1997
v. Record No. 0130-96-2
CHARLES WILLIAM HURT
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ALBEMARLE COUNTY
Paul M. Peatross, Jr., Judge
Peter L. McCloud; Ronald R. Tweel (William C.
Scott IV; Boyle & Bain; Michie, Hamlett,
Lowry, Rasmussen & Tweel, on briefs), for
Charles William Hurt.
Robert C. Rice (Carrell & Rice, on brief),
for Catherine C. Hurt.
Charles William Hurt (husband) and Catherine C. Hurt (wife)
separately appeal the trial court's award of spousal support,
each contending that the trial court made numerous errors in the
trial requiring a reversal of the court's order. We address
seriatim each issue raised in both appeals. We affirm in part
and reverse in part and remand for a modification of the spousal
support order.
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
I. Background
Charles W. Hurt and Catherine C. Hurt were married on May
20, 1984, and separated on March 31, 1986, a marriage of
twenty-two (22) months. Husband filed for a divorce upon a
charge of desertion on April 11, 1986. Wife filed a cross-bill
alleging cruelty and desertion on husband's part. The parties
were divorced by a final divorce decree entered June 17, 1987, on
the ground of one year separation.
After several years of hearings, the trial court awarded
wife the sum of three hundred and fifty thousand dollars
($350,000) as equitable distribution to be paid in seven annual
installments of fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) without
interest. By letter opinion dated February 21, 1991, the trial
court found that wife was barred from receiving spousal support
based upon her desertion of husband, even though the divorce had
already been granted based upon a one year separation. Wife
appealed the equitable distribution award, the finding that she
deserted husband, and the bar of spousal support.
In Hurt v. Hurt, 16 Va. App. 792, 433 S.E.2d 493 (1993),
this Court upheld the equitable distribution award. We further
held that spousal support was barred only "if there exists in
such spouse's favor a ground of divorce under the provisions of
Code § 20-91(1), (3) or (6)." Id. at 801, 433 S.E.2d at 499.
See Code 20-107.1 (Supp. 1986). This decision found that husband
failed to corroborate his allegation that wife deserted the
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marriage, that husband's testimony alone was "insufficient as a
matter of law to establish a ground of divorce [and] . . . it
cannot operate to bar permanent spousal support to wife." Hurt,
16 Va. App. at 801, 433 S.E.2d at 499. The trial court's
decision on spousal support was reversed and remanded.
On August 3, 1995, the issue of spousal support was heard in
the trial court. In a letter opinion dated August 16, 1995,
embodied in an order entered on December 12, 1995, the trial
court awarded wife spousal support in the amount of one thousand
five hundred dollars ($1,500) per month retroactive to May 1,
1991. The retroactive award created an immediate arrearage of
seventy-eight thousand dollars ($78,000) for the period from May
1, 1991 to August 1, 1995. Husband was ordered to pay one-half
of the arrearage by December 1, 1995, and the balance by March 1,
1996, carrying interest at nine percent annually.
Both parties separately appealed the decision of the trial
court, each asserting numerous errors of the trial court. We
shall discuss each issue in the order presented.
II. Charles W. Hurt v. Catherine C. Hurt
At the beginning of the hearings, husband moved the trial
judge to recuse himself from conducting the hearings because the
judge had formerly represented wife in a prior domestic relations
matter. Husband contends that this created a conflict of
interest demanding that the judge recuse himself from hearing the
matter.
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The record proves that in 1978, fourteen years prior to the
1992 hearing, the trial judge represented the wife (then
Catherine Kirtley) in a child support matter in a juvenile and
domestic relations court. After their divorce was granted in
1978, Mr. Kirtley filed a petition in a juvenile and domestic
relations court to decrease the amount of child support. Mrs.
Kirtley, represented by the trial judge, filed a petition asking
for an increase. The trial judge indicated that he did not
recall anything that wife told him in confidence and that he had
"absolutely no knowledge of her current circumstances." He
stated that "I don't know of anything that's pertinent in what I
would hear today that relates back to 1978 that tells me anything
about her current circumstances and need for support, or her
current medical condition." He refused to disqualify himself.
"It is within the trial judge's discretion to determine
whether he harbors bias or prejudice which will impair his
ability to give the defendant a fair trial." Terrell v.
Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 285, 293, 403 S.E.2d 387, 391 (1991).
Exactly when a judge's impartiality might reasonably be called
into question is a determination to be made by that judge in the
exercise of his or her sound discretion. Justus v. Commonwealth,
222 Va. 667, 673, 283 S.E.2d 905, 908 (1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 983 (1982). See also Stamper v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 707,
714, 324 S.E.2d 682, 686-87 (1985).
There is no indication in the record that the trial judge
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abused his discretion, and we find no merit to this contention.
The husband alleges that the trial judge determined the
issue of spousal support under Code § 20-107.1 in effect at the
date of hearing instead of the statute in effect when the case
was filed in 1986. In its letter opinion, the trial judge did
state that the trial court was governed by Code § 20-107.1 in
effect in 1991. Both parties agree that this was error and that
statutes are prospective in the absence of an express provision
to the contrary, and that the case is governed by the law in
existence in 1986 when the action was commenced.
However, the provisions of Code § 20-107.1 governing the
trial court's determination of the amount of spousal support are
the same in both versions of the statute. It is of no
consequence that the trial judge referred to the 1991 statute in
his letter opinion. The error is harmless and furthermore, it
can be easily corrected on remand.
Husband contends that the trial court erred when it failed
to consider all of the factors and circumstances enumerated in
Code § 20-107.1 which contributed to the dissolution of the
marriage, including wife's desertion.
In his letter opinion dated August 16, 1995, the trial judge
discussed the factors to be considered in determining the amount
of spousal support. He stated:
The other factor to be considered is the
uncorroborated finding of desertion by this
Court previously. The legal effect of this
factor has been discussed based on the
guidance of Barnes v. Barnes, [16 Va. App.
598, 428 S.E.2d 294 (1993),] supra.
It is clear from this statement that the trial court did
consider fault under Code § 20-107.1(9) in determining the amount
of the spousal support. The only "uncorroborated finding of
desertion" was the alleged desertion by wife, not any fault on
the part of husband. Thus, the trial court may have improperly
considered evidence of the wife's desertion, but did not commit
any error with respect to the husband. The trial court did not
commit reversible error with respect to the husband's case. We
will further discuss this issue in wife's case against husband.
Husband claims that the trial court erred when it considered
only wife's income and expense statement without giving effect to
her testimony, which contradicted the income and expense shown
thereon. Wife asserts that her monthly expense statement
establishes her expenses to be $9,883 monthly. Since the court
only awarded $1,500 monthly, it made a substantial reduction in
the amounts shown on the monthly expense statement, conclusively
showing that the trial judge did not rely only upon the expense
statement. She further alleges that it is abundantly clear that
the award would have been substantially higher if the trial court
had only considered the calculations on the monthly expense
statement.
The letter opinion of the trial judge dated August 16, 1995,
shows that in determining spousal support, he considered all of
the factors set forth in Code § 20-107.1, including earnings,
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earning capacity and financial resources, education and training
of the parties, standard of living, duration of the marriage, age
and health, contributions to the marriage (monetary and
non-monetary), and equitable distribution considerations. We
find no merit in this issue raised by husband.
Husband asserts that the evidence does not support the trial
court's finding that he made two to four million dollars in the
last two years, and the trial court was not justified in relying
upon the 1983 prenuptial agreement in determining his present
financial ability.
In its letter opinion dated August 16, 1995, the trial court
said:
He has been involved in the real estate
business since 1955 and gave his full
attention to real estate development
beginning in approximately 1960. Since that
time he has acquired property appraised at
$40,325,985.00. . . . Dr. Hurt testified
that in the last two years he sold from two
to four million dollars worth of property and
that he had either borrowed or used the sale
proceeds to pay for his living expenses.
This Court has considered his testimony as to
his financial holding, his obligations, and
his assessment of the value of his property
at present.
On January 1, 1994, husband prepared a financial statement
for banking purposes showing total assets of $40,202,809,
liabilities of $18,240,324, giving a net worth of $21,962,485.
The statement indicated that he had "cash on hand" of $734,655
and "accounts receivable" in the amount of $652,932. The record
also contains a January 1, 1995 financial statement. It is
7
essentially the same as the 1994 statement, except that the asset
values have been reduced based upon seventy percent of appraised
value due to the results of an auction in Pennsylvania he
attended.
Husband testified that "I sell two to four million dollars
worth of property a year."
We find credible evidence in the record to support the
finding of the trial court.
Husband claims that the trial court erred in relying upon
the 1983 prenuptial agreement to determine his present financial
ability to pay spousal support. The prenuptial agreement was
introduced in evidence in 1986 by the husband himself as
Complainant's Exhibit 4. Appellate courts will not permit a
party to use as a grounds for reversal an alleged trial court
error which the party invited. See Commonwealth v. Kilgore, 15
Va. App. 684, 692, 426 S.E.2d 837, 841 (1993). In addition, any
fact, however remote, that tends to establish the probability or
improbability of a fact in issue is admissible. Charles E.
Friend, The Law of Evidence in Virginia, 4th ed., § 11-2, at 452
(1993). The fact that husband admittedly had a gross income of
approximately two million dollars in 1983 is part of his history
of earnings and earning capacity and, therefore, is relevant in
some degree to prove current earning capacity. The record does
not support the husband's allegation that the trial judge
considered that he made two million dollars a year in fixing
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spousal support. The award of $1,500 a month negates such a
contention. It is significant that the statement attributable to
the trial judge is placed under the section headed "Discussion of
Law" and not under the section where he considered the factors to
be considered under Code § 20-107.1. We find no merit in this
claim.
Husband contends that the trial judge erred in failing to
accord meaningful, substantive consideration to the short
duration of the marriage in determining wife's entitlement to
spousal support. This contention is not supported by the record.
In his letter opinion, the trial judge stated that he considered
that the marriage only endured from May 20, 1984 until March 31,
1986, when the parties separated. Thus, we find no merit to this
contention.
Lastly, husband asserts that the trial court erred when it
awarded wife retroactive spousal support. He acknowledges that
the trial court has discretion to enter an award of spousal
support effective any time after the date of the commencement of
the suit. The trial judge commented that the temporary support
order in the amount of $2,600 monthly was terminated at the end
of April 1991. He commenced the final order of permanent spousal
support on May 1, 1991. Husband claims only that the spousal
support award was not "fair and just" and operates as an
"injustice" to him. He has not identified any unfairness and
simply complains that he has paid enough in temporary support.
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We do not find that the trial judge abused his discretion.
III. Catherine C. Hurt v. Charles W. Hurt
In her separate appeal, wife raises the following issues:
First, she asserts that the trial court erred when it improperly
considered evidence of her desertion in determining the amount of
spousal support. She contends that the trial court, once it
concluded that spousal support should be awarded, was obligated
to determine the amount of spousal support based upon the nine
factors enumerated in Code § 20-107.1. In its letter opinion
dated August 16, 1995, the trial court properly discussed the
first eight factors and further considered the following evidence
under paragraph nine (9) of that section:
The other factor to be considered is the
uncorroborated finding of desertion by this
Court previously.
It is clear from this statement that the trial court
considered fault in determining the amount of spousal support
under Code § 20-107.1(9). The only "uncorroborated finding of
desertion" was the alleged desertion by wife and not any fault on
the part of husband. Thus, the trial court may have improperly
considered wife's desertion, and committed error with respect to
the wife's case against her husband.
Is fault a factor to be considered under Code § 20-107.1(9)
(Supp. 1986) in effect at the time this case was commenced? We
find no Virginia law expressly addressing this issue. The
statute provides:
Any maintenance and support shall be subject
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to the limitations set forth in § 20-109, and
no permanent maintenance and support shall be
awarded from a spouse if there exists in such
spouse's favor a ground for divorce under any
provision of § 20-91 (1), (3) or (6) or
§ 20-95. . . .
The court, in determining support and
maintenance for a spouse, shall consider the
following:
* * * * * * *
(9) Such other factors, including the tax
consequences to each party, as are necessary
to consider the equities between the parties.
In Dukelow v. Dukelow, 2 Va. App. 21, 341 S.E.2d 208 (1986),
this Court explained the statutory scheme of Code § 20-107.1 as
follows:
The determination of spousal support is a
two-step process: first, the court must
determine whether either of the parties is
barred from receiving support due to the
existence of a marital fault amounting to a
statutory ground for divorce; and, second, if
no fault ground exists, then the court must
weigh the relative needs and abilities of the
parties in accordance with the statutory
factors enumerated in Code § 20-107.1.
Id. at 26, 341 S.E.2d at 210. Thus, once the trial court has
determined that a spousal support award is appropriate, the only
factors the trial court may consider in determining the amount of
the award are the "relative needs and abilities of the parties in
accordance with the statutory factors enumerated in Code
§ 20-107.1." Id.
Wife alleges that the trial court gave improper
consideration to marital fault (her uncorroborated desertion)
11
under paragraph nine (9) in Code § 20-107.1, which resulted in an
award to her of only $1,500 monthly. Husband argued at trial,
and the court agreed, that evidence of marital fault and the
circumstances contributing to the dissolution of the marriage
were proper considerations under paragraph nine (9) of Code
§ 20-107.1.
We find that marital fault is not a factor to be considered
under paragraph nine (9) of Code § 20-107.1. If the General
Assembly intended for a court to consider circumstances and
factors contributing to the dissolution of the marriage in
determining the amount of the award, it would have stated so
expressly in the enumerated factors. In Code § 20-107.3 the
General Assembly intended for a court to consider the
circumstances contributing to the dissolution of the marriage in
determining the division of the marital property. The statute
expressly includes in the enumerated factors the court must
consider, "[t]he circumstances and factors which contributed to
the dissolution of the marriage . . . ." Code § 20-107.3(E)(5)
(emphasis added). It chose not to do so with respect to the
amount of spousal support.
Without attempting to envision all of the factors that might
be included in paragraph nine (9), we conclude that paragraph (9)
refers to economic and financial factors and not to factors that
contributed to the dissolution of the marriage. As stated in
Dukelow, upon the determination that a wife is entitled to
12
spousal support, "the only question was the extent of her need
for support when balanced against her husband's ability to pay."
Dukelow, 2 Va. App. at 26, 341 S.E.2d at 211. The trial court
erred in considering marital fault as a factor under paragraph
nine (9).
Wife claims that the trial court improperly relied upon
evidence of the value of husband's assets based on auction prices
he observed in Pennsylvania. Husband testified that he "attended
an auction for forty million dollars worth of property, similar
to my own property. At the auction sale the properties did not
bring half of the county appraised value . . . ." As a result of
this sale, husband reduced the value of his real estate to
seventy percent of its assessed value. He inserted this reduced
value in a financial statement and the statement was introduced
in evidence. Husband's testimony and the financial statement
showing the seventy percent reduction in value of the assets were
introduced in evidence without objection.
The trial court in its August 16, 1995 letter opinion stated
"[t]he Court has also considered . . . all of the stipulated
exhibits regarding [husband's] financial resources and
obligations, and the testimony and exhibit concerning his opinion
as to the value of his current assets based upon 70% of appraised
value due to an auction he recently attended in Pennsylvania."
We do not address the admissibility and weight to be
attached to this evidence. It was introduced without objection.
13
No ruling of the trial court will be considered as a basis for
reversal unless the objection was stated together with the
grounds therefor at the time of the ruling, except for good cause
shown or to enable this Court to attain the ends of justice.
Rule 5A:18. This rule applies to law and equity cases, including
divorce. See Lee v. Lee, 12 Va. App. 512, 514, 404 S.E.2d 736,
737 (1991) (en banc). A claimed error must be brought to the
trial court's attention so that the court may consider the issue
and take corrective action to avoid unnecessary appeals,
reversals and mistrials. A matter not in dispute before the
trial court will not be considered for the first time on appeal.
Connelly v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 888, 891, 420 S.E.2d 244,
246 (1992). While this Court will take notice of error when
necessary to satisfy the "ends of justice" exception to the rule,
our review of the record in this case does not disclose any
miscarriage of justice. Id.
Wife asserts that the trial court erred in allowing the
testimony of Frank Kessler over her objection. Wife never
objected to the entire testimony of Frank Kessler. She did
object at trial to specific questions propounded to Kessler, but
in her brief she has not identified or alluded to specific
questions and answers which she considers to be objectionable.
She states that Kessler "testified as to the loss [husband]
would suffer if he were forced to sell his real estate holdings
in a quick liquidation sale," citing the appendix pages 254-260.
14
Within these pages the trial judge twice sustained objections to
this type of testimony, once based upon lack of a proper
foundation and once upon relevance. Wife has not referred to
specific objectionable testimony within these seven pages. No
argument and no authorities have been given in accord with Rule
5A:20. Wife alleges that Kessler's testimony was in the nature
of expert testimony, yet he was never qualified as an expert and
his area of expertise was never identified, citing appendix
251-263. She did not point out in her brief the specific
testimony to which she was referring and has given no argument or
authority to support the same.
Wife further alleges that the trial court refused to permit
her counsel to cross-examine Kessler with respect to husband's
success in the real estate business, citing appendix pages
267-268. We have reviewed these pages and do not find that the
trial judge refused to permit wife's counsel to cross-examine
Kessler. We find the following:
Q. And, Charlie Hurt has done very well here since
you have known him, hasn't he?
Mr. Tweel: Objection, Your Honor. No
foundation.
A. I don't know how Charlie Hurt has done. I
know what I have done.
Court: calls for hearsay unless it's
something [husband] has told you. Sustain
it. Let's go to the next question.
From this record, we find no merit to the wife's assertions
concerning the testimony of Kessler. "Statements unsupported by
15
argument, authority, or citations to the record do not merit
appellate consideration. We will not search the record for
errors in order to interpret [a party's] contention and correct
deficiencies in a brief." Buchanan v. Buchanan, 14 Va. App. 53,
56, 415 S.E.2d 237, 239 (1992).
Several of the wife's remaining contentions will be
considered together. She contends that the trial court failed to
determine and accord meaningful, substantive consideration to
husband's earning capacity, to her earning capacity, to her
standard of living established during the marriage, and to her
financial needs in determining the amount of the spousal support
award.
In awarding spousal support, the trial
judge has broad discretion. . . . The trial
judge must consider all the factors
enumerated in Code § 20-107.1. Consideration
entails more than a recitation in the record
or decree that all factors have been
considered. We believe that the
legislature's inclusion in 1982 of specific
factors in the statute envisioned meaningful
substantive consideration in the decision-
making process. When the court does not
quantify or elaborate on what weight or
consideration it has given each factor, we
must examine the record to determine if the
award is supported by evidence relevant to
those factors.
Gibson v. Gibson, 5 Va. App. 426, 434-35, 364 S.E.2d 518, 523
(1988).
The transcript of the evidence and the exhibits are replete
with substantial evidence relating to all of the factors
enumerated in Code § 20-107.1. The trial judge outlined in
16
detail much of the evidence in support of his opinion and stated
that he considered all of the factors enumerated in Code
§ 20-107.1.
The statute requires that the trial judge consider "[t]he
earning capacity, obligations, needs and financial resources of
the parties." Husband argued before the trial court and this
Court that the trial judge could consider only income and
earnings in determining spousal support. The argument is not
sound. The word "resources" encompasses money, property, wealth
and assets of all kinds. Therefore, it was proper for the trial
court to consider the husband's net worth as shown in the
financial statements in evidence, which ranged from a low of
approximately six million dollars to a high of twenty million
dollars.
The trial court imputed to wife an annual income of $53,460,
after reviewing in its letter opinion her prior earnings, her
equitable distribution and real estate holdings. Although the
trial judge did not specifically state the exact amount of
husband's earning capacity, the record contains ample evidence of
earning capacity to support his award of spousal support.
In its letter opinion, the trial court reviewed the evidence
concerning the standard of living of the parties during the
marriage, and wife's financial needs as shown in the record. The
judge discussed these factors in his letter opinion and obviously
considered them in reaching his decision.
17
We conclude that there is meaningful substantive evidence in
the record to support each factor set forth in Code § 20-107.1
and that the trial court did consider all of the factors and
accorded them proper weight within the bounds of his discretion.
Lastly, wife contends that the trial court erred when it
failed to order a lump sum spousal support award. Code
§ 20-107.1 provides that "[t]he Court, in its discretion, may
decree that maintenance and support of a spouse be made in
periodic payments, or in a lump sum award, or both." Although
the statute grants the trial judge discretion in deciding whether
to order periodic or lump sum payments, periodic payments are
generally the preferred form. See Blank v. Blank, 10 Va. App. 1,
5, 389 S.E.2d 723, 725 (1990). As we stated in Blank, "when
courts do make lump sum spousal support awards they do so because
of special circumstances or compelling reasons." Id. See also
Mosley v. Mosley, 19 Va. App. 192, 197, 450 S.E.2d 161, 164
(1994). We find no abuse of discretion in the award of periodic
spousal support.
In summary, whether spousal support should be paid is
largely a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court,
but it is a discretion to be exercised with reference to Code
§ 20-107.1 and established guidelines. The record in this case
discloses that the trial court considered all of the factors
enumerated in the statute, except it should not have included the
wife's marital fault as a consideration under paragraph nine (9).
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We remand this case to the trial court with instructions that it
reconsider the $1,500 per month award of spousal support and
modify the award to the extent that the wife's "uncorroborated
desertion" may have affected the amount of the award. In all
other respects, the decision of the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed in part,
reversed and remanded
in part.
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