Major Lance Hillman v. Commonwealth of Virginia , 68 Va. App. 585 ( 2018 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Alston, Chafin and Malveaux
PUBLISHED
Argued at Salem, Virginia
MAJOR LANCE HILLMAN
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 0287-17-3 JUDGE MARY BENNETT MALVEAUX
APRIL 3, 2018
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CAMPBELL COUNTY
John T. Cook, Judge
Matthew L. Pack (M. Pack Law, PLLC, on brief), for appellant.
Eugene P. Murphy, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Mark R.
Herring, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Major Lance Hillman (“appellant”) was found guilty of use of a computer to solicit a minor,
in violation of Code § 18.2-374.3, and taking indecent liberties with a child, in violation of Code
§ 18.2-370. On appeal, appellant argues the trial court (1) erred in finding that the evidence was
sufficient to prove that his actions constituted an exposure; (2) erred in finding that the evidence was
sufficient to prove that he knew or had reason to believe that the victim was younger than 15 years
of age; and (3) abused its discretion by allowing photographs to be admitted that had not been
properly authenticated. Finding no error, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
The Offenses
Appellant was employed as the youth pastor at A.F.’s church. Between August and
December of 2015, A.F. sought out appellant for counseling because of prior sexual abuse. At
that time, A.F. was fourteen years old and in the eighth grade. Appellant was twenty-two years
old. To participate in the church’s youth group, A.F. had to sign a medical release form which
listed both her age and date of birth. This form was given to the church. A.F. never told
appellant that she was older than fourteen, but did not specifically remember telling him her age.
A.F. and appellant began to communicate via text message and later through Snapchat.1
Several dated and time-stamped text messages recovered from appellant’s iPad show that on the
evening of October 27, 2015, appellant asked A.F. if she used Snapchat, and asked her to “add”
him to hers. Appellant then gave A.F. his Snapchat user name, and ten minutes later asked her if
she “g[o]t that.” A.F. replied “yes” about twenty seconds later. During a two-hour period that
night, appellant and A.F. exchanged text messages stating that they had sent Snapchat messages
and asking if the other person had received them.
Via Snapchat, A.F. sent appellant a nude picture of her upper body, and in return,
appellant sent her a nude picture of himself. Appellant also sent A.F. a picture of his erect penis.
They also sent each other videos in which appellant was nude and A.F.’s upper body was nude.
Evidence at Trial
Jason Sloan, an investigator with the Campbell County Sheriff’s Office at the time of the
offenses, testified that in addition to the text messages, he found photographs on appellant’s iPad
of a male subject with visible genitalia.2 The Commonwealth attempted to introduce these
photographs through Sloan. Counsel for appellant objected on the ground that they were not
properly authenticated. The court sustained the objection. The Commonwealth recalled A.F.
1
“Snapchat is an image messaging mobile phone application in which a user can send a
photograph or text message with a set time to expire. The receiving user can only view the text
message or photograph for one to ten seconds before the image or text message expires and is
automatically deleted from the mobile phone.” State v. Bariteau, 884 N.W.2d 169, 172 n.1 (S.D.
2016). While Snapchat has changed its core features since the period in time in which A.F. and
appellant were exchanging messages on the platform, A.F.’s testimony indicates that any
messages sent between the two were automatically deleted after viewing.
2
Sloan discovered during his investigation of appellant’s electronic devices that
appellant’s iPhone had been “remotely wiped,” and therefore he could not recover any data from
the phone.
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and asked her if she had received the photographs from appellant via Snapchat, to which A.F.
responded in the affirmative. However, A.F. also acknowledged on cross-examination that
during the period of time in which she and appellant were exchanging Snapchat messages, the
application deleted photographs shortly after they were sent and they could not be saved. A.F.
then testified that because the pictures were sent with Snapchat, the photographs she saw in court
were not actually the pictures that were sent, but were just “similar.” Also on cross-examination,
A.F. was asked whether the pictures were a fair and accurate representation of the pictures sent
to her by appellant, and she replied “yes.” Counsel for appellant again objected to the
introduction of the photographs, arguing that they still were not properly authenticated as the
actual photographs sent to A.F. The trial court overruled the objection and admitted the
photographs, specifically noting that A.F. had affirmed that the pictures were a fair and accurate
representation of the photographs sent to her by appellant.
Investigator Dudley of the Campbell County Sheriff’s Office testified that he interviewed
appellant as a part of his investigation. Dudley testified that “[appellant’s] story was just about
the same as [A.F.’s].” Dudley testified that during the recorded interview, appellant admitted
sending A.F. naked photographs and videos, and also admitted to asking A.F. for naked
photographs and videos, a request with which she complied. Appellant told Dudley that
exchanging the photographs was a counseling technique he used to help A.F. deal with prior
sexual abuse that she had revealed to him. When asked during the interview how old A.F. was,
appellant responded “fifteen I believe . . . fourteen, fifteen.”
Appellant was convicted, after a jury trial, of use of a computer to solicit a minor, in
violation of Code § 18.2-374.3, and taking indecent liberties with a child, in violation of Code
§ 18.2-370.
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II. ANALYSIS
A. “Exposure” under Code § 18.2-370
On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred in finding the evidence sufficient to
prove that he committed an act of exposure necessary for a conviction of taking indecent liberties
under Code § 18.2-370.3
“We review the sufficiency of the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, and only reverse the judgment of the circuit court when its decision is plainly
wrong or without evidence to support it.” Farhoumand v. Commonwealth, 288 Va. 338, 351,
764 S.E.2d 95, 102 (2014). “Nevertheless, when an appeal presents the question whether the
facts proved, and the legitimate inferences drawn from them, fall within the language of a statute,
we must construe statutory language to answer the question. That function presents a pure
question of law which we consider de novo on appeal.” Smith v. Commonwealth, 282 Va. 449,
453-54, 718 S.E.2d 452, 454 (2011). “To the extent our analysis of the sufficiency of the
evidence requires us to examine the statutory language, we review issues of statutory
construction de novo on appeal.” Miller v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 527, 537, 769 S.E.2d
706, 710 (2015).
3
Appellant also argues that the trial court erred in finding the evidence sufficient to prove
that appellant exposed himself under the use of a computer to solicit a minor statute, Code
§ 18.2-374.3. However, in his motion to strike before the trial court, appellant only argued that
the Commonwealth had failed to prove exposure under Code § 18.2-370. Therefore, we do not
address his argument regarding exposure under Code § 18.2-374.3 on appeal. See Rule 5A:18;
Edwards v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 752, 760, 589 S.E.2d 444, 448 (2003) (en banc)
(“Making one specific argument on an issue does not preserve a separate legal point on the same
issue for review.”). Further, appellant’s argument that he preserved this issue in his closing
argument is incorrect. “[I]n a jury trial, the closing argument is addressed to the jury, not the
trial judge, and does not require the trial judge to rule on the evidence as a matter of law. Only a
motion to strike the evidence accomplishes that objective in a jury trial.” Campbell v.
Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 476, 481, 405 S.E.2d 1, 3 (1991) (en banc).
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Code § 18.2-370(A)(1) provides, in relevant part, that:
Any person 18 years of age or over, who, with lascivious intent,
knowingly and intentionally . . . [e]xpose[s] his or her sexual or
genital parts to any child [under the age of 15 years] to whom such
person is not legally married or propose[s] that any such child
expose his or her sexual or genital parts to such person [is guilty of
a Class 5 felony].
The appellate courts of Virginia have had numerous opportunities to examine the
definition of “expose” under Code § 18.2-370. We begin, as many of these cases do, with an
examination of the plain meaning of the word “expose.” We do so because “the general rule of
statutory construction is to infer the legislature’s intent from the plain meaning of the language
used.” Meeks v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 798, 802, 651 S.E.2d 637, 639 (2007) (quoting
Hubbard v. Henrico Ltd. P’ship, 255 Va. 335, 340, 497 S.E.2d 335, 338 (1998)). “Thus, ‘[a]n
undefined term must be given its ordinary meaning, given the context in which it is used.’” Id.
(quoting Sansom v. Bd. of Supervisors, 257 Va. 589, 594-95, 514 S.E.2d 345, 349 (1999)).
In Farhoumand, 288 Va. 338, 764 S.E.2d 95, our Supreme Court reviewed several
dictionary definitions of the word “expose” in an effort to discern whether the term “expose” as
used in Code § 18.2-370 is limited to visual exposure, or included tactile exposure as well:
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 802 (1993) defines
expose as “to lay open to view” or “lay bare.” It also offers the
definitions to “make known” or “set forth,” with the qualifying
example: “[E]ach had started exposing his views.” The Webster’s
New College Dictionary 252 (3rd ed. 2008), defines “expose” as
“to lay bare or uncover.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate
Dictionary 441 (11th ed. 2003), defines “expose” as “caus[ing] to
be visible or open to view.” In The American Heritage Dictionary
of the English Language 625 (5th ed. 2011), “expose” is defined
simply as “to make visible.”
Id. at 343, 764 S.E.2d at 98. The Court concluded that each definition supported its holding that
under Code § 18.2-370, “‘expose’ unambiguously means revealing one’s genitalia to sight,” thus
a touching of genitals was not exposure under the statute. Id.
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In this case, we find that the ordinary definitions of “expose” cited in Farhoumand
support a finding that appellant’s behavior constituted exposure under Code § 18.2-370. Here,
appellant sent photographs of his genitals to A.F. via Snapchat. We find nothing in any of the
dictionary definitions that indicates that he did not “expose” himself by doing so. Rather,
appellant’s Snapchat messages laid “open to view,” “ma[d]e known,” and “cause[d] to be
visible” his genitals to A.F. The plain meaning of “expose” therefore supports the conclusion
that the messages sent by appellant via Snapchat satisfy the “expose” element of Code
§ 18.2-370.
However, appellant argues that his conduct failed to constitute exposure because prior
case law has established that exposure under this statute must occur (1) in the physical presence
of the victim, and (2) contemporaneous with this physical presence. Appellant contends these
requirements derive from two cases from this Court, Holley v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 158,
562 S.E.2d 351 (2002), and Brooker v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 609, 587 S.E.2d 732
(2003). We address each argument in turn.
Physical Presence
In Holley, defendant lived next door to a woman who operated a daycare center in her
home. Holley, 38 Va. App. at 160, 562 S.E.2d at 352. On several occasions, the daycare
provider saw defendant standing naked at the glass doors at the back of his home. Id. Two
parents dropping their children off at daycare also observed defendant standing naked behind his
glass doors. Id. at 161, 562 S.E.2d at 352. After the daycare provider reported defendant to the
police, a police officer conducting surveillance observed defendant naked at the glass doors,
masturbating. Id. at 161, 562 S.E.2d at 352-53. On appeal, defendant argued that the evidence
was insufficient for a conviction under Code § 18.2-370 because he did not display his genitals
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“in the ‘presence’ of the children.” Id. at 163, 562 S.E.2d at 354. This Court affirmed
defendant’s conviction, utilizing two cases in our analysis. Id. at 163-64, 562 S.E.2d at 354.
In the first case, Siquina v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 694, 697, 508 S.E.2d 350, 352 (1998),
we considered whether a victim must actually see the genital parts in order for one to have
exposed them. We concluded that this is not necessary, holding that Code § 18.2-370
“proscribes the intentional display by an adult, with lascivious intent, of his or her genitals in the
presence of a child where a reasonable probability exists that they might be seen by that child,
regardless of the child’s actual perception of such a display.” Id. at 699, 508 S.E.2d at 353
(emphasis added). In the second case, Noblett v. Commonwealth, 194 Va. 241, 244, 72 S.E.2d
241, 243 (1952), our Supreme Court relied on common law principles to support a conviction of
indecent exposure. The Court in Holley cited Noblett for the proposition that “[a]n indecent
exposure must be either in the actual presence and sight of others, or in such a place or under
such circumstances that the exhibition is liable to be seen by others.” Holley, 38 Va. App. at
164, 562 S.E.2d at 354 (quoting Noblett, 194 Va. at 245, 72 S.E.2d at 243-44). Examining the
facts of the case in Holley—defendant’s exposure behind glass doors near a home used as a
daycare center—the Court found that “[t]he instant case falls squarely within the rationale of
Siquina and Noblett.” Id. The evidence proved that appellant’s exposure “was in the ‘presence
of the children’ because a ‘reasonable probability exist[ed] that [defendant] might be seen by [the
children].’” Id. at 165, 562 S.E.2d at 354 (quoting Siquina, 28 Va. App. at 699, 508 S.E.2d at
353).
Appellant argues that Holley compels us to conclude that he did not “expose” himself
under Code § 18.2-370 because he was not in the physical presence of A.F. during the exposure.
However, we do not find such a limitation in Holley. The determinative question in Holley, after
a discussion of the relevant principles from Siquina and Noblett, was whether a “reasonable
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probability exist[ed] that [defendant] might be seen by [the children].” Id. (quoting Siquina, 28
Va. App. at 699, 508 S.E.2d at 353). Further, while Siquina’s holding includes the language “in
the presence of a child,” that specific language does not reference a definition of “expose” under
Code § 18.2-370; rather, that language concerns what type of behavior is “proscribe[d]” under
Code § 18.2-370. In both cases, the issue was whether the exposures were sufficient despite the
victims not having actually seen the genital parts. As such, we find nothing in the language of
either Holley or Siquina that places a limitation on the term “expose” by requiring that, to satisfy
Code § 18.2-370, the exposure must occur in the physical presence of the victim.
This conclusion is further compelled by the other case cited in support by appellant,
Brooker, 41 Va. App. 609, 587 S.E.2d 732. In Brooker, a police detective posed as a
twelve-year-old girl named “Kim” while conducting computer online investigations. Id. at 611,
587 S.E.2d at 733. The detective, as “Kim,” had three separate text message conversations with
defendant via an instant message internet chat room. Id. at 612, 587 S.E.2d at 733. During the
first “chat,” defendant sent “Kim” two photographs of himself in which his genitals were
exposed. Id. at 612, 587 S.E.2d at 734. During the second “chat,” defendant removed his pants
and, by means of a web camera, transmitted live pictures of himself exposing his genitals. Id.
The detective testified that defendant’s web camera allowed him to “see what [defendant] was
doing” at that time. Id. During defendant and “Kim’s” third exchange, defendant removed his
pants and masturbated in front of the web camera. Id. at 613, 587 S.E.2d at 734. Defendant
argued that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he attempted to expose himself to a minor
in violation of Code § 18.2-370, because the parties were located in separate cities at the time of
the incident and because he exposed his genitals by means of the internet and not in a public
location. Id. at 615-16, 587 S.E.2d at 735.
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Our Court rejected these arguments, and in doing so relied upon the following principles:
Expose has been defined as “‘to put on show or display,’” “‘to lay
open to view,’” “‘to display,’” “‘to offer to the public view.’”
Siquina v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 694, 698, 508 S.E.2d 350,
352 (1998) (citations omitted). “‘Exposure of [a] person becomes
indecent when it occurs at such time and place where [a]
reasonable person knows or should know his act will be open to
observation of others.’” Id. (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 768
(6th ed. 1990)). “‘An indecent exposure must be either in the
actual presence and sight of others, or in such a place or under such
circumstances that the exhibition is liable to be seen by others.’”
Holley v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 158, 164, 562 S.E.2d 351,
354 (2002) [(quoting Noblett v. Commonwealth, 194 Va. 241, 245,
72 S.E.2d 241, 243-44 (1952))].
Id. at 616, 587 S.E.2d at 735-36. Applying these principles, our Court found that the evidence
demonstrated that defendant’s behavior constituted exposure under the statute. Id. at 617, 587
S.E.2d at 736. We noted that defendant “twice transmitted to someone, whom he believed was a
minor, live images of his genital parts by means of a computer and a web camera so that the
minor could see [defendant’s] genital parts at the time of the exposure.” Id. at 616, 587 S.E.2d at
736. Thus, it was reasonable to conclude from this evidence that appellant “knowingly and
intentionally exposed his genitals to a person whom he believed to be a minor.” Id. Further,
screenshots of the detective’s computer screen, showing appellant’s genitals and dated the same
as the instant message chat conversations between “Kim” and defendant, provided evidence from
which the trial judge could conclude that “appellant knew that the exposure of his genitals in
front of his activated web camera was ‘liable to be seen’ by the minor at the time of the
exhibition because ‘Kim’ was engaged in an instant message internet conversation with appellant
at the time of the displays.” Id. at 616-17, 587 S.E.2d at 736.
A review of Brooker clearly demonstrates that appellant is incorrect in his assertion that
exposure must occur in the physical presence of the victim; in Brooker, “Kim” and the defendant
were in different cities at the time of the exposure. Rather, we hold that the central principle
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concerning “presence” and exposure derives from the common law principle found in Noblett
and quoted in both Holley and Brooker—“expose” under Code § 18.2-370 requires exposure
(1) “in the actual presence and sight of others,” or (2) “in such a place or under such
circumstances that the exhibition is liable to be seen by others.” Noblett, 194 Va. at 245, 72
S.E.2d at 243-44.
In the instant case, we find that appellant did expose himself as required under Code
§ 18.2-370, as he exposed himself under such circumstances that his exposure was “liable to be
seen by others.” Id. at 245, 72 S.E.2d at 244. A.F. testified that she and appellant exchanged
nude photos and videos of themselves. Appellant also admitted in a police interview to sending
naked pictures of himself to A.F., and receiving naked pictures of A.F. from the waist up. In
addition, the evidence specifically demonstrated that on the evening of October 27, 2015,
appellant asked A.F. if she used Snapchat, and asked her to “add” him to hers. In a text message,
appellant gave A.F. his user name on Snapchat, and then asked her if she had received a
Snapchat from him. This exchange shows that appellant exposed himself “in such a place or
under such circumstances that the exhibition [was] liable to be seen by others.” Id. By ensuring
that A.F. had his correct user name, and then confirming that she had received a Snapchat from
him, appellant was clearly exposing himself to A.F. in a manner “liable to be seen” by her.
Therefore, appellant’s behavior satisfied the “physical presence” or “liable to be seen”
requirement under Code § 18.2-370.
Contemporaneous Exposure
Appellant, relying on Brooker, further argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove that
he exposed himself under Code § 18.2-370 because his exposure was not “contemporaneous”
with A.F.’s presence. He argues that the Court in Brooker reasoned that defendant’s behavior
constituted exposure under Code § 18.2-370 because the explicit images were transmitted “live
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and in real time,” thus providing a requirement that exposure under the statute be
contemporaneous with the victim viewing the explicit parts.
Contrary to appellant’s contention, the facts in this case fall squarely within the reasoning
of Brooker. Here, while the images were not shared “live,” we find that as in Brooker they were
shared “at the time of the exposure.” As noted above, text messages entered into evidence show
that during a two-hour period on October 27, 2015, appellant and A.F. discussed sending
Snapchat messages to each other. The record of the text messages reflects that their conversation
via text message occurred at the same time as their exchange of explicit Snapchat messages. At
one point during their text messages, appellant asked A.F. if she had received his Snapchat
message, and she responded in the affirmative within twenty seconds. We find that this evidence
supports the conclusion that A.F. viewed appellant’s genitals “at time of the exposure.” Brooker,
41 Va. App. at 616, 587 S.E.2d at 736.
B. Knowledge of the Age of the Victim Under Code § 18.2-374.3
On appeal, appellant also challenges his use of a computer to solicit a minor conviction
under Code § 18.2-374.3(C). He argues that the trial court erred in finding the evidence
sufficient for the five-year mandatory minimum sentence to apply because the Commonwealth
failed to prove that appellant knew or had reason to believe that A.F. was younger than fifteen
years of age.
“A verdict of the jury, upon which the trial court enters judgment, settles all conflicts of
testimony in favor of the prevailing party and entitles that party to all just inferences deducible
therefrom.” Hix v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 335, 341, 619 S.E.2d 80, 83 (2005). “We view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as the prevailing party, and will not
set aside the verdict unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Id.
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In order to convict a defendant of violating Code § 18.2-374.3(C), the trial court must
find, inter alia, that the individual was communicating with “any person he knows or has reason
to believe is a child younger than 15 years of age.”4 In addition, Code § 18.2-374.3(C) provides
in its sentencing language that an individual convicted under that subsection shall receive at least
a five-year sentence if he “is at least seven years older than the child he knows or has reason to
believe is less than 15 years of age.”
Contrary to appellant’s argument, there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the
finding that appellant knew or had reason to believe A.F. was less than fifteen years of age. A.F.
was fourteen and in eighth grade during the period in which the solicitation occurred. To
participate in the church’s youth group, she completed a medical release form setting forth her
age and birthday and provided that form to the church. Appellant was the youth pastor at the
church and A.F.’s counselor there. A.F. testified that she never told appellant that she was older
than fourteen. Based upon this evidence, the jury could reasonably infer that appellant, as the
youth pastor at the church, would have seen A.F.’s medical release form and therefore have had
reason to believe that she was fourteen years old.
Additionally, in his interview with Investigator Dudley, appellant himself stated that
appellant was “fifteen I believe . . . fourteen, fifteen.” The recording of this interview was
4
The relevant portion of Code § 18.2-374.3(C) reads as follows:
It is unlawful for any person 18 years of age or older to use
a communications system, including but not limited to computers
or computer networks or bulletin boards, or any other electronic
means, for the purposes of soliciting, with lascivious intent, any
person he knows or has reason to believe is a child younger than
15 years of age to knowingly and intentionally:
1. Expose his sexual or genital parts to any child to whom
he is not legally married or propose that any such child expose his
sexual or genital parts to such person . . . .
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played for the jury, who, as the trier of fact, had the ability to determine what tone or emphasis
appellant placed on each age. Here, the jury, sitting as finder of fact, was not plainly wrong or
without evidence in its finding that appellant knew or had reason to believe that A.F. was
fourteen.
C. Admission of Photographs
Finally, appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing photographs
found on appellant’s iPad to be admitted without proper authentication. Appellant contends the
Commonwealth failed to offer an adequate foundation for the admission of the photographs
because A.F. testified that the photographs were only similar to those she received via Snapchat,
and also that the Snapchat application deleted photographs after they were sent. Assuming
without deciding that the trial court erred in admitting the photographs, we conclude any error
was harmless.
We “will not reverse a trial court for evidentiary errors that were harmless to the ultimate
result.” Shifflett v. Commonwealth, 289 Va. 10, 12, 766 S.E.2d 906, 908 (2015). Code
§ 8.01-678 requires harmless error review before any judgment is reversed. The test for
non-constitutional harmless error under Code § 8.01-678, as adopted by the Supreme Court of
Virginia, is as follows:
If, when all is said and done, the conviction is sure that the error
did not influence the jury, or had but slight effect, the verdict and
the judgment should stand . . . . But if one cannot say, with fair
assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the
erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not
substantially swayed by the error, it is impossible to conclude that
substantial rights were not affected. . . . If so, or if one is left in
grave doubt, the conviction cannot stand.
Clay v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 253, 260, 546 S.E.2d 728, 731-32 (2001) (quoting Kotteakos v.
United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65 (1946)). An error is harmless “[i]f other evidence of guilt is
so overwhelming and the error insignificant, by comparison, supporting a conclusion that the
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error did not have a substantial effect on the verdict.” Angel v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 248,
268, 704 S.E.2d 386, 398 (2011).
In the instant case, appellant admitted, on an audio recording entered into evidence, that
he sent nude photographs and videos of himself to A.F. via Snapchat. A.F. testified that she
received these nude photographs and videos. Text messages introduced into evidence showed
appellant and A.F. communicating about sending photographs via Snapchat to each other. As
there was abundant evidence in the record demonstrating that appellant did in fact send
photographs of his genitals to A.F., we can say that the erroneous admission of the nude
photographs allegedly of appellant found on his iPad “did not influence the jury, or had but slight
effect,” thus rendering the error harmless. Clay, 262 Va. at 260, 546 S.E.2d at 731.
III. CONCLUSION
We hold that the trial court did not err in finding sufficient evidence that appellant
exposed himself under Code § 18.2-370 and in finding sufficient evidence that appellant knew or
should have known A.F. was less than fifteen years old under Code § 18.2-374.3(C). In addition,
if the trial court erred in the admission of photographs, any such error was harmless.
Consequently, we affirm appellant’s convictions.
Affirmed.
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