Demetrius Covil v. Commonwealth ( 2003 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Elder, Clements and Felton
Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia
DEMETRIUS COVIL
MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
v. Record No. 2860-02-1 JUDGE WALTER S. FELTON, JR.
DECEMBER 9, 2003
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PORTSMOUTH
James A. Cales, Jr., Judge
Felipita Athanas (Public Defender Commission, on briefs), for
appellant.
Eugene Murphy, Assistant Attorney General (Jerry W. Kilgore,
Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Demetrius Covil was convicted in a bench trial of grand larceny of a motor vehicle, a
violation of Code § 18.2-95. On appeal, Covil contends that the evidence was insufficient to
support his conviction. In particular, Covil contends that because the evidence established that
he was not the original thief and that he did not know the car was stolen at the time of his
possession, his conviction must be reversed. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment
of the trial court.
I. BACKGROUND
On April 8, 2002, Tanya Bray rented a red Oldsmobile Alero from Enterprise Rent-A-Car
in Virginia Beach. On April 14, 2002, at approximately 7:30 a.m., as Bray was getting off work
in Portsmouth, a man approached her and took her car at gunpoint. She was unable to provide a
*
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
detailed description of the man, and later at trial, she testified that Covil “doesn’t look like the
man who stole her car.”
On April 16, 2002, at approximately 6:10 p.m., Detective T. McAndrew was on routine
patrol in Portsmouth when he observed Covil alone driving a red Oldsmobile Alero. Aware that
Covil’s driver’s license had been suspended, Detective McAndrew decided to follow Covil.
Shortly thereafter, Covil voluntarily pulled the Alero over to the curb. Detective McAndrew
received information that the vehicle’s tags were those from a vehicle that was reported stolen.
The red Alero in Covil’s possession was in fact the Alero stolen from Bray on April 14, 2002.1
On September 9, 2002, Covil was convicted in a bench trial of grand larceny of a motor
vehicle. Testifying on his own behalf, Covil, a convicted felon, explained that he had rented the
car from an unknown man for fifty dollars. He testified that a friend of his mother’s directed him
to the man who rented the car to him. Covil testified that he didn’t know the man, nor had he
seen the man before. He testified that he did not get the man’s name. Covil testified that the
detective who stopped him found an I.D. badge in the trunk of the car. He testified that he told
the detective that the picture on the I.D. was of the person who “lent” him the car. He further
testified that he had rented the car from the man to visit King’s Dominion amusement park with
friends.
The trial court found Covil’s testimony concerning his possession of the stolen car
incredible, stating, “I just don’t believe his story. I think it’s got too many holes in it.” The trial
court found him guilty of grand larceny and sentenced him to one year and seven months
incarceration.
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At the time Detective McAndrew recovered the Alero, the car was in good condition,
and had not been damaged in any way that might indicate it had been stolen. As Bray handed the
Alero over to the carjacker with the keys in the ignition, there is no reason to expect the car to
bear any such telltale damage.
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II. ANALYSIS
Covil contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove grand larceny. Specifically, he
argues that Bray could not identify him as the thief who stole her car at gunpoint, and his
explanation as to how he came into possession of the car demonstrates that he did not know the
car was stolen. Covil contends that his own testimony, as well as that of Bray, demonstrates that
he was not guilty of larceny. We disagree.
“Where the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged after conviction, it is our duty to
consider it in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and give it all reasonable inferences
fairly deducible therefrom.” Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d
534, 537 (1975). “The judgment of a trial court sitting without a jury is entitled to the same
weight as a jury verdict and will not be set aside unless it appears from the evidence that the
judgment is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Martin v. Commonwealth, 4
Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987).
“Larceny is the wrongful taking of the goods of another without the owner’s consent and
with the intention to permanently deprive the owner of possession of the goods.” Bright v.
Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 248, 251, 356 S.E.2d 443, 444 (1987) (citing Dunlavey v.
Commonwealth, 184 Va. 521, 524, 35 S.E.2d 763, 764 (1945)). Under Code § 18.2-95, grand
larceny includes “larceny not from the person of another of goods and chattels of the value of
$200 or more.” It is well settled that a defendant’s unexplained exclusive possession of recently
stolen property permits an inference of larceny by the possessor. Winston v. Commonwealth, 26
Va. App. 746, 757, 497 S.E.2d 141, 147 (1998) (citing Best v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 387,
389, 282 S.E.2d 16, 17 (1981)). “[P]ossession of goods recently stolen is prima facie evidence
of guilt of the crime of larceny, and throws upon the accused the burden of accounting for that
possession.” Hope v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 381, 385, 392 S.E.2d 830, 833 (1990) (en
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banc) (quoting Fout v. Commonwealth, 199 Va. 184, 190, 98 S.E.2d 817, 821 (1957)). Thus, the
evidence of a defendant’s recent possession of the stolen property, coupled with an unreasonable
explanation of his obtaining of the property, supports a finding of guilt. Bright, 4 Va. App. at
251, 356 S.E.2d at 444.
“The credibility of the witnesses and the weight accorded the evidence are matters solely
for the [trial court] who has the opportunity to see and hear that evidence as it is presented.”
Sandoval v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 133, 138, 455 S.E.2d 730, 732 (1995). “In its role of
judging witness credibility, the [trial court] is entitled to disbelieve the self-serving testimony of
the accused and to conclude that the accused is lying to conceal his guilt.” Snow v.
Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 766, 774, 537 S.E.2d 6, 10 (2000) (citing Marable v.
Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 505, 509-10, 500 S.E.2d 233, 235 (1998) (citations omitted)).
The evidence established Covil’s “recent exclusive possession” of the stolen car. The
police stopped Covil as he was driving the stolen car two days after the theft. The trial court
specifically found Covil’s explanation of his possession of the stolen car to be incredible. “[T]he
[court] was ‘not obliged to accept’ what it obviously found was an unreasonable explanation.”
Roberts v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 264, 272, 337 S.E.2d 255, 260 (1985) (quoting Westcott v.
Commonwealth, 216 Va. 123, 127, 216 S.E.2d 60, 64 (1975)). Moreover, because the trial court
disbelieved Covil, it was entitled to conclude from his testimony that he lied to conceal his guilt.
See Snow, 33 Va. App. at 774, 537 S.E.2d at 10.
It does not matter whether Covil was the original thief who took Bray’s car at gunpoint.
Larceny is a continuing offense. Dunlavey, 184 Va. at 525, 35 S.E.2d at 765. Covil’s “recent
exclusive possession of a stolen item provides circumstantial evidence of [his] guilty knowledge
that [the car] was stolen.” Montague v. Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 430, 437, 579 S.E.2d 667,
670 (2003) (citing Reaves v. Commonwealth, 192 Va. 443, 451, 65 S.E.2d 559, 564 (1951)).
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Absent a reasonable explanation, the trial court was free to infer from Covil’s possession
of the stolen car that he was guilty of larceny. The evidence was sufficient to support his
conviction. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Affirmed.
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