Elbert L. Avery, Jr. v. Commonwealth, DSS ( 1996 )


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  •                     COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Benton and Coleman
    Argued at Salem, Virginia
    ELBERT L. AVERY, JR.
    v.   Record No. 0221-95-3                     OPINION BY
    JUDGE JAMES W. BENTON, JR.
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA,                   JULY 16, 1996
    DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES,
    DIVISION OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT,
    ex rel. KIMBERLY R. CLARK
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CAMPBELL COUNTY
    J. Samuel Johnston, Jr., Judge
    James J. Angel for appellant.
    Jack A. Maxwell, Special Counsel (Betsy S.
    Elliott, Senior Special Counsel; James S.
    Gilmore, III, Attorney General; William H.
    Hurd, Deputy Attorney General; Siran S.
    Faulders, Senior Assistant Attorney General;
    Robert B. Cousins, Jr., Senior Assistant
    Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
    Elbert L. Avery, Jr. appeals from the trial judge's refusal
    to hear his appeal from a final order of the juvenile and
    domestic relations court adjudging him guilty of contempt and
    assessing a support arrearage.    Avery alleges that the trial
    judge erred in finding that because Avery failed to file an
    appeal bond the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to consider the
    contempt issue.   We agree and reverse the order.
    The record establishes that in 1990, a judge of the juvenile
    court ordered Avery to pay $100 per month support for his three
    children.   In 1994, Avery was summoned to court from prison for
    failure to pay support.     The judge determined Avery was indigent
    and appointed counsel for him.    Following a hearing, the judge
    found that an arrearage of $9,200 existed and adjudged Avery in
    contempt for violating the support order.   He sentenced Avery to
    365 days in jail unless he paid the arrearage or reached an
    agreement with the Division of Child Support Enforcement.    The
    judge set the appeal bond at $9,200, the amount of the child
    support arrearage.
    Avery appealed to the circuit court.    At a hearing in the
    circuit court, Avery's counsel argued that no bond was required
    to perfect the appeal, that Avery's sentence was criminal in
    nature, and that Avery was entitled to a trial de novo in circuit
    court pursuant to Code §§ 16.1-296(E) and 16.1-136.   The trial
    judge ruled that the conviction and punishment were civil in
    nature, found that an appeal bond had not been filed, and
    dismissed the appeal on the ground that the circuit court lacked
    jurisdiction.   The dismissal order recited that the juvenile
    court judge found that Avery has been jailed on a felony
    conviction "almost since ordered to pay [child] support" and that
    Avery "could not pay because of his felony conviction plus
    violation . . . of parole."
    The statute governing appeals from the juvenile court
    states, in pertinent part, as follows:
    No appeal bond shall be required of a party
    appealing from an order of a juvenile and
    domestic relations district court except for
    that portion of any order or judgment
    establishing a support arrearage or
    suspending payment of support during pendency
    of an appeal. In cases involving support, no
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    appeal shall be allowed unless and until the
    party applying for the same or someone for
    him shall give bond, in an amount and with
    sufficient surety approved by the judge or by
    his clerk if there is one, to abide by such
    judgment as may be rendered on appeal if the
    appeal is perfected or, if not perfected,
    then to satisfy the judgment of the court in
    which it was rendered. An appeal will not be
    perfected unless such appeal bond as may be
    required is filed within thirty days from the
    entry of the final judgment or order.
    Code § 16.1-296(H) (emphasis added).     By its explicit terms, the
    statute removes the requirement for posting a bond except as
    provided in the statute.    The provision specifying that a bond
    shall be required for an appeal of a judgment establishing
    support arrearages implicitly recognizes that an order that sets
    arrearages may have a component that does not establish a support
    arrearage.    In such a case, an appeal bond is required only for
    "that portion of any order . . . establishing a support
    arrearage."     Id.
    The juvenile court's order that Avery sought to appeal
    adjudged Avery guilty of civil contempt and assessed an
    arrearage.    Seeking to appeal without the necessity of posting a
    bond, Avery's counsel argued, in part, to the circuit judge as
    follows:
    I guess the first issue that the Court needs
    to decide is whether or not we properly
    perfected our appeal. It was done within the
    appropriate time, but what the J & D Court is
    saying that this is a civil matter so they
    had the right to set an appeal bond and that
    the case cannot be appealed until the appeal
    bond is posted.
    It didn't sound right to me and I'm not
    - 3 -
    sure whether it is right or not, but I found
    a Court of Appeals decision. It's called
    Kessler vs. Commonwealth [,
    18 Va. App. 14
    ,
    
    441 S.E.2d 223
     (1994)].
    *      *   *    *      *   *   *
    And I submit to the Court that the same
    reasoning would apply that if a person is
    subject to twelve months in jail like my
    client received, it's criminal in nature and,
    therefore, he should be entitled to either a
    jury trial, which we're not asking for, but
    at least an appeal to the Circuit Court,
    which is why we're asking the Court to assume
    jurisdiction, allow us to put on some
    evidence really as to sentencing. We'll
    plead guilty to non support, but I think that
    there is some mitigation evidence that would
    justify a sentence less than the twelve
    months. So I think the first issue is the
    jurisdiction issue.
    *      *   *    *      *   *   *
    And then I think it's--it's almost
    ludicrous to then find someone indigent and
    say that he doesn't have money to hire an
    attorney so that he is entitled to court
    appointed counsel, and then to make him post
    a $10,000.00 cash bond for his sentence to be
    reviewed by another Court. I mean, so, to
    say that, you know, to put a condition that
    --that there is no way that the defendant can
    make, I think practically speaking there is
    no way that he could purge it so he doesn't--
    so he doesn't--to style the order in that way
    would effectively deny his appeal. I don't
    think that's fair.
    In finding a lack of jurisdiction, the trial judge ruled
    that the "statute says that [the juvenile judge was] entitled to
    set a bond in the amount of the arrears."   However, this record
    clearly supports Avery's argument that he sought only to appeal
    the contempt finding.   During the circuit court proceedings,
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    Avery's counsel addressed the nature of the contempt charge and
    the sentencing but never challenged the support arrearage.
    Indeed, Avery's counsel tacitly conceded the arrearage when he
    stated, "[w]e'll plead guilty to non support."    Thus, his
    argument sufficiently "inform[ed] the court that he was pursuing
    an appeal of the contempt order and not appealing the
    determination of the support arrearage."    McCall v. Commonwealth
    Dep't of Soc. Servs., 
    20 Va. App. 348
    , 352-53, 
    457 S.E.2d 389
    ,
    392 (1995).
    We need not address Avery's argument that because he was
    indigent and incarcerated, the contempt "punishment [was] . . .
    determined and unconditional," Kessler v. Commonwealth, 18 Va.
    App. 14, 16, 
    441 S.E.2d 223
    , 224 (1994), and, therefore, was a
    criminal matter requiring no bond.    Code § 16.1-296(H) does not
    require the posting of a bond except as specified.    A finding of
    contempt is not an order "establishing a support arrearage."     See
    McCall, 20 Va. App. at 352-53, 457 S.E.2d at 392.    We hold,
    therefore, that Code § 16.1-296(H) permitted Avery to appeal from
    the juvenile court's contempt order without the necessity of
    posting a bond.
    Accordingly, we reverse the order dismissing the appeal and
    remand to the circuit court for further proceedings.
    Reversed and remanded.
    - 5 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 0221953

Filed Date: 7/16/1996

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014