Mark Anthony Powell v. Commonwealth ( 2003 )


Menu:
  •                       COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Benton, Bumgardner and Retired Judge Brown ∗
    Argued at Salem, Virginia
    MARK ANTHONY POWELL
    MEMORANDUM OPINION ∗∗ BY
    v.   Record No. 1490-02-1             JUDGE RUDOLPH BUMGARDNER, III
    AUGUST 5, 2003
    COMMNWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PORTSMOUTH
    Johnny E. Morrison, Judge
    Joseph R. Winston, Special Appellate Counsel
    (Public Defender Commission, on briefs), for
    appellant.
    Steven A. Witmer, Assistant Attorney General
    (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General, on
    brief), for appellee.
    The trial court convicted Mark Anthony Powell of robbery,
    two counts of abduction, and three counts of use of a firearm in
    the commission of a felony.   He argues the evidence was
    insufficient to prove he had a firearm, Code § 18.2-53.1. 1    We
    conclude the trial court did not err and affirm the convictions.
    ∗
    Retired Judge J. Howe Brown, Jr., took part in the
    consideration of this case by designation pursuant to Code
    § 17.1-400.
    ∗∗
    Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    1
    "It shall be unlawful for any person to use or attempt to
    use any . . . firearm or display such weapon in a threatening
    manner while committing or attempting to commit . . . robbery."
    Code § 18.2-53.1.
    We view the evidence and the reasonable inferences fairly
    deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the
    Commonwealth.     Dowden v. Commonwealth, 
    260 Va. 459
    , 467, 
    536 S.E.2d 437
    , 441 (2000).    The defendant walked to the register of
    a clothing store and inquired, "Where is your help today?"       The
    cashier responded that she and the sales associate were alone.
    As he demanded money from the register, the defendant said he
    had a gun and "Don't move and won't nobody get hurt."      He had
    his hand in the pocket of his loose fitting jeans the entire
    time.    The employees believed the defendant had a firearm,
    though neither of them saw one.    The defendant was "fidgety" and
    moved his hand in his pocket left to right.    As the cashier
    opened the register, the defendant told her to move slowly so no
    one would get hurt.    She gave him more than $100 cash.   The
    defendant ordered the employees into the storeroom, told them to
    lie on the floor, and closed the door as he left.    The employees
    watched the defendant leave the premises, saw him get into a
    taxi, and called the police.
    Officer Nathan Clark received a robbery alert, reported to
    the store, and learned the defendant had left in a taxi.     Clark
    spotted the taxi and pursued it.    He did not see anything thrown
    from the window.    When he stopped the taxi, the defendant told
    its driver to "keep going."    The taxi driver did not notice the
    defendant roll the window down, did not see or hear anything
    being thrown out the window, and did not see a firearm.     The
    - 2 -
    police recovered $196 cash under the back seat of the cab near
    where the defendant sat, but no firearm.
    In a statement to police, the defendant conceded, "I told
    the girl that I had a gun and to give me the money."    However,
    he denied he had a gun.
    The defendant maintains that his statements that he had a
    gun were uncorroborated assertions and constituted the only
    evidence that he possessed a gun.
    Elmore v. Commonwealth, 
    22 Va. App. 424
    , 430, 
    470 S.E.2d 588
    , 590 (1996), controls this case.   The defendant gave a bank
    teller "a note stating that he had a 'gun,' pointed to his
    pocket and said that he did not want to hurt anyone."   At trial,
    he denied he possessed a firearm.    This Court affirmed his
    conviction under Code § 18.2-53.1.
    In this case, the evidence is more than an uncorroborated
    assertion by the defendant that he had a gun.   The defendant had
    his hand in his pocket, told the employees he had a gun, and
    threatened to use it.   He was fidgety, moved his hand in his
    pocket back and forth, and ordered them to move slowly so no one
    would get hurt.   When he ordered them to the storeroom, his hand
    remained in his pocket.   The defendant accomplished the robbery
    and abductions by placing the employees in fear that he would
    use the gun to hurt them.   His statements, his assertive
    conduct, and the circumstances surrounding them were an "implied
    assertion" that he had a firearm. See Redd v. Commonwealth, 29
    - 3 -
    Va. App. 256, 258-59, 
    511 S.E.2d 436
    , 437-38 (1999) (Code
    § 18.2-308.2).
    Credible evidence supports the convictions.   Accordingly,
    we affirm.
    Affirmed.
    - 4 -
    Benton, J., dissenting.
    In Yarborough v. Commonwealth, 
    247 Va. 215
    , 
    441 S.E.2d 342
    (1994), the Supreme Court decided several principles that are
    again at issue in this case.
    The Attorney General contends that "the
    law does not require that a firearm actually
    be seen or even used in order to sustain a
    conviction under [Code] § 18.2-53.1" and
    that the evidence is sufficient to support a
    conviction "if the victim is made to feel
    that an assailant has a firearm, and reacts
    in response to that perception." Consistent
    with that contention, the Court of Appeals
    stated that "actual sighting of the weapon
    is unnecessary for a conviction under Code
    § 18.2-53.1." Yarborough [v. Commonwealth],
    15 Va. App. [638,] 642, 426 S.E.2d [131,]
    133-34 [(1993)]. Continuing, the Court of
    Appeals noted that, although Konchal saw no
    gun, she saw what she believed was a gun and
    that Yarborough "may have had a gun in his
    right pocket at the time of the offense."
    Id., 426 S.E.2d at 134.
    We have decided two cases dealing with
    the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
    conviction under Code § 18.2-53.1. In Cox
    v. Commonwealth, 
    218 Va. 689
    , 690-91, 
    240 S.E.2d 524
    , 525 (1978), we held that a
    pistol, which was capable of firing live
    ammunition but which was loaded with wooden
    bullets, was "a weapon whose use was
    specifically proscribed by [Code
    § 18.2-53.1]." In Holloman v. Commonwealth,
    
    221 Va. 196
    , 197, 
    269 S.E.2d 356
    , 357
    (1980), the sole issue was whether the
    instrument in the defendant's possession was
    a "firearm" within the meaning of Code
    § 18.2-53.1. Although the instrument
    "appear[ed] in size, weight and shape to be
    a .45 caliber automatic pistol," it fired
    BBs "by the force of a spring, not by
    gunpowder." Id. We held that the evidence
    was sufficient to convict the defendant of
    using a firearm in violation of Code
    - 5 -
    § 18.2-53.1, even though the instrument was
    fired by a spring rather than by gunpowder.
    Id. at 199, 
    269 S.E.2d at 358
    .
    These cases do not stand for the
    proposition that the Commonwealth need not
    prove that the defendant actually possessed
    a firearm. Indeed, they stand for the
    contrary proposition, and we reject the
    Attorney General's contention and the
    conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals.
    Code § 18.2-53.1, a penal statute, must
    be strictly construed against the
    Commonwealth and in favor of an accused.
    Martin v. Commonwealth, 
    224 Va. 298
    , 300,
    
    295 S.E.2d 890
    , 892 (1982). When so
    construed, we think that, to convict an
    accused of violating Code § 18.2-53.1, the
    Commonwealth must prove that the accused
    actually had a firearm in his possession and
    that he used or attempted to use the firearm
    or displayed the firearm in a threatening
    manner while committing or attempting to
    commit robbery or one of the other specified
    felonies. In order to convict an accused of
    a crime, the evidence must establish the
    accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
    and exclude every reasonable hypothesis of
    innocence. Cameron v. Commonwealth, 
    211 Va. 108
    , 110, 
    175 S.E.2d 275
    , 276 (1970).
    Conviction of a crime is not justified if
    the evidence creates only a suspicion or
    probability of guilt. 
    Id.
    Id. at 217-18, 
    441 S.E.2d at 343-44
     (footnote omitted).
    The evidence in this case proved that during the robbery
    Powell said he had a gun.   Both salespersons testified, however,
    that they did not see a gun, did not see "the outline of a gun"
    in Powell's pocket, and saw no other indication of a gun.   After
    committing the robbery, Powell entered a taxi and traveled a
    short distance before the police stopped the taxi and arrested
    - 6 -
    Powell.   The evidence proved the police recovered money from the
    back seat of the taxi but no weapon.   The taxi driver testified
    Powell did not throw any items from the taxi.    When questioned
    by the police, Powell denied having a gun or using a gun.     In
    summary, only by conjecture could the trier of fact find that
    the evidence proved Powell actually had a gun.
    It is, of course, a truism of the
    criminal law that evidence is not sufficient
    to support a conviction if it engenders only
    a suspicion or even a probability of guilt.
    Conviction cannot rest upon conjecture. The
    evidence must be such that it excludes every
    reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The
    giving by the accused of an unclear or
    unreasonable or false explanation of his
    conduct or account of his doings are matters
    for the jury to consider, but they do not
    shift from the Commonwealth the ultimate
    burden of proving by the facts or the
    circumstances, or both, that beyond all
    reasonable doubt the defendant committed the
    crime charged against him.
    Smith v. Commonwealth, 
    192 Va. 453
    , 461-62, 
    65 S.E.2d 528
    , 533
    (1951).
    As in Yarborough, I would hold that the evidence failed to
    prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Powell "actually possessed
    a firearm."   247 Va. at 219, 
    441 S.E.2d at 344
    .   See also
    McBride v. Commonwealth, 
    24 Va. App. 603
    , 608-11, 
    484 S.E.2d 165
    , 168-70 (1997) (Benton, J., dissenting).    Therefore, I would
    reverse the firearm convictions.
    - 7 -