Jerome Antonio Woodfork v. Commonwealth of Virginia , 31 Va. App. 154 ( 1999 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Elder, Lemons and Senior Judge Cole
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
JEROME ANTONIO WOODFORK
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 1923-98-2 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER
DECEMBER 7, 1999
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF NEW KENT COUNTY
Thomas B. Hoover, Judge
Charles E. Adkins for appellant.
Michael T. Judge, Assistant Attorney General
(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief),
for appellee.
Jerome Antonio Woodfork (appellant) appeals from his bench
trial convictions for malicious wounding and attempted grand
larceny. On appeal, he contends that his circuit court
convictions are void due to defects in his original transfer
hearing in the juvenile and domestic relations district court.
We find no defect requiring reversal, and we affirm the
convictions, subject to remand to correct a clerical error. 1
1
Appellant was indicted for aggravated malicious wounding
pursuant to Code § 18.2-51.2. The order of conviction entered
May 14, 1998 indicates that the court found appellant guilty of
malicious wounding in violation of Code § 18.2-51.2. However,
Code § 18.2−51.2 proscribes the offense of aggravated malicious
wounding; a different statute, Code § 18.2-51, proscribes
malicious wounding. The sentencing order entered August 11,
1998 also does not make clear the offense for which appellant
was convicted. It repeats the inconsistent offense and
statutory citation contained in the conviction order and imposes
I.
FACTS
On October 1, 1997, appellant appeared in the New Kent
County Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court (district
court) on charges of abduction in violation of Code § 18.2-47
and malicious wounding in violation of Code § 18.2-51 (case
numbers J-2735-01 and J-2735-02) allegedly committed against
Lisa Diane Kinaitis on February 28, 1997. In completing the
felony certification form, the district court checked the box
indicating a "find[ing] that the evidence is insufficient to
establish probable cause to believe that the juvenile committed
the alleged offense(s)" and dismissed the charges. It did not
check the box indicating a "find[ing] that the juvenile was not
fourteen (14) years of age or older at the time of the alleged
offense(s)." Although no transcript of the October 1, 1997
proceedings appears in the record, the parties agree that the
Commonwealth's evidence failed to prove appellant was fourteen
years of age or older at the time of the alleged offenses and
a sentence of twenty years, which would be appropriate for
either offense. However, the trial transcript of April 27, 1998
makes clear that the trial court convicted appellant under Code
§ 18.2-51 rather than § 18.2-51.2, for it granted appellant's
motion to strike the evidence of aggravated malicious wounding,
directed that the case would proceed on the charge of malicious
wounding, and found appellant guilty of that charge. Therefore,
we remand the matter to the trial court for the sole purpose of
correcting the clerical errors in the trial court's conviction
and sentencing orders. See Tatum v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App.
585, 592, 440 S.E.2d 133, 138 (1994).
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that appellant introduced no evidence to prove he was under
fourteen.
Also on October 1, 1997, the sheriff's department issued
petitions charging appellant with aggravated malicious wounding
in violation of Code § 18.2-51.2 and attempted grand larceny in
violation of Code §§ 18.2-95 and 18.2-26 (case numbers J-2735-03
and J-2735-04), also involving Lisa Diane Kinaitis on February
28, 1997.
On October 31, 1997, appellant appeared in district court
for a hearing on those petitions. The Commonwealth introduced
into evidence a copy of appellant's birth certificate showing a
birth date of November 23, 1980, making appellant sixteen years
of age on February 28, 1997, the date of the charged offenses.
The court found "from the evidence presented that [appellant]
was fourteen (14) years of age or older at the time of the
alleged offense and that there is probable cause to believe that
the juvenile committed [aggravated malicious wounding]." It
ordered the charges certified to the grand jury, and on November
17, 1997, the grand jury issued indictments on both charges.
When appellant appeared in circuit court on February 13,
1998 for his scheduled trial, his attorney requested a
continuance to obtain a competency evaluation. During those
proceedings, the trial court inquired of appellant's counsel
whether he had any "objection to the procedure that was followed
by . . . [the Commonwealth or the district court] to transfer
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the case here." Appellant's counsel agreed that the statute had
been complied with and contended only that it was "in
[appellant's] best interest to remain in juvenile court."
When the parties again appeared for trial on April 27,
1998, the court arraigned appellant on the aggravated malicious
wounding and attempted grand larceny charges. Subsequently, the
Commonwealth moved the court to make part of the record the
district court order certifying the case to the circuit court
for trial. The circuit court also received into evidence a copy
of appellant's birth certificate offered by the Commonwealth.
When the circuit court asked appellant's counsel whether he had
any objection to the transfer proceeding, counsel said, "Well,
Judge, I believe this fell under the discretionary transfer by
the Commonwealth, and it wouldn't have been appropriate for me
to object to that." 2
After hearing the parties' evidence, the circuit court
reduced the charge of aggravated malicious wounding to malicious
wounding and convicted appellant of malicious wounding and
attempted grand larceny. Following his convictions but prior to
the court's entry of its sentencing order, appellant moved the
court to declare the convictions void, contending that the
2
In fact, because appellant was charged with aggravated
malicious wounding, the Commonwealth had no discretion. Code
§ 16.1-269.1(B) required that the district court conduct the
preliminary hearing and transfer the case if it found probable
cause.
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Commonwealth's inability to prove appellant's age at the first
transfer hearing required that the Commonwealth proceed against
appellant as a juvenile and that the circuit court never
acquired jurisdiction over him. After hearing argument from
both parties, the trial court denied the motion.
II.
ANALYSIS
Appellant argues on appeal that the district court had
exclusive original jurisdiction over the charges against him and
that defects in the first transfer hearing prevented the circuit
court from obtaining the subject matter jurisdiction necessary
for his convictions. As a result, he contends, the convictions
are void, thereby permitting him to attack them for the first
time on appeal.
We hold that appellant's objections are without substantive
merit under Code § 16.1-269.1. Appellant originally was charged
with malicious wounding in violation of Code § 18.2-51 and
abduction in violation of Code § 18.2-47. Under Code
§ 16.1-269.1(C), the district court was required to conduct the
preliminary hearing on the malicious wounding charge once the
Commonwealth elected to seek to have appellant transferred to
the circuit court for trial as an adult, as long as the
Commonwealth provided the requisite notice and proved that
appellant was fourteen years of age or older at the time of the
alleged offense. Here, the record indicates the district court
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found "the evidence [was] insufficient to establish probable
cause to believe that the juvenile committed the alleged
offense(s)" and it dismissed the case, an act which was within
its discretion at that time.
Appellant contends that the evidence at the first transfer
hearing failed to prove appellant was fourteen or older at the
time of the alleged offense. As a result, he argues, the
district court erred in dismissing the original charges and not
directing that they "proceed as otherwise provided for by law,"
as required by the last paragraph of Code § 16.1-269.1(D).
Appellant contends that the district court should have tried him
as a juvenile on the charges then before it and that the
erroneous dismissal prevented the circuit court from obtaining
jurisdiction over him in the subsequent proceeding.
We hold that appellant misconstrues the language of Code
§ 16.1-269.1(D). Before the court is required under
§ 16.1-269.1(D) to see that "the case shall proceed as otherwise
required by law," it must first "find[] that the juvenile was
not fourteen years of age or older at the time of the alleged
commission of the offense." 3 Code § 16.1-269.1(D) (emphasis
3
Pursuant to the statute, the court also is required to
direct that the case proceed as required by law if it finds
"that the conditions specified in subdivision 1, 2, or 3 of
subsection A have not been met." Because appellant does not
contend on appeal that the conditions specified in subsection
(A) have not been met, we do not consider that portion of the
statute in this appeal.
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added). Here, the record contains no evidence that the district
court made such a finding. Appellant furnished no transcript or
statement of facts detailing the evidence introduced at the
original transfer hearing, and the district court's order
indicates it found only "that the evidence is insufficient to
establish probable cause to believe that the juvenile committed
the alleged offense(s)." See, e.g., McBride v. Commonwealth, 24
Va. App. 30, 35, 480 S.E.2d 126, 128 (1997) (holding that "[a]
court speaks through its orders and those orders are presumed to
accurately reflect what transpired"); see also Stamper v.
Commonwealth, 220 Va. 260, 280-81, 257 S.E.2d 808, 822 (1979)
(noting that presumption ordinarily applies where order
conflicts with transcript of related proceedings). The court
did not find "that the juvenile was not fourteen (14) years of
age or older at the time of the alleged offense(s)."
Appellant next contends that, because the district court
erred in dismissing the charges at issue in the original
transfer hearing, the second transfer hearing could not vest
jurisdiction in the circuit court, regardless of whether the
second hearing otherwise was conducted in compliance with the
transfer statute. He also argues, citing Code § 16.1-269.1(E),
that indictment in the circuit court did not remedy this
jurisdictional problem because such indictment does not "cure[]
any error or defect . . . with respect to the juvenile's age."
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We hold that these claimed errors did not prevent the
circuit court from obtaining jurisdiction over the second set of
charges. First, we already have held that the district court
did not err in dismissing the original charges against appellant
because the court did not find that appellant was not fourteen
years of age or older.
Second, we need not decide whether the district court's
dismissal of the original charges based on the lack of evidence
of appellant's age constitutes an "error or defect" in the
hearing which may not be cured by indictment in the circuit
court. This is so because the charges for which appellant was
convicted do not depend on Code § 16.1-269.1(E) for their
legitimacy. Rather, the Commonwealth initiated the second round
of charges against appellant by preliminary hearing in the
district court, and the district court treated the matter as if
no prior transfer hearing had occurred.
In this second hearing, on October 31, 1997, the district
court received into evidence a copy of appellant's birth
certificate, which supported its finding that appellant was
fourteen years of age or older at the time of the alleged
offense. Further, it found that probable cause existed to
believe appellant committed aggravated malicious wounding, a
finding appellant does not challenge on appeal. As a result, it
certified both charges to the grand jury, which returned
indictments on both offenses. Because the second round of
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charges proceeded to the circuit court for trial only after a
new transfer hearing in which the district court made the
requisite findings regarding age and probable cause, appellant's
challenge to the circuit court's jurisdiction must fail.
For these reasons, we affirm appellant's convictions for
malicious wounding and attempted grand larceny. However, due to
the clerical error in the conviction and sentencing orders
regarding the statute under which appellant was convicted, see
supra note 1, we remand this matter to the trial court for the
sole purpose of amending the conviction and sentencing orders to
reflect that appellant was convicted under Code § 18.2-51 rather
than Code § 18.2-51.2.
Affirmed on the merits
and remanded with instructions.
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