Virginia Employment Commission v. Herbert Davenport ( 1999 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Willis and Bumgardner
Argued at Salem, Virginia
VIRGINIA EMPLOYMENT COMMISSION
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 1181-98-3 JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR.
JANUARY 19, 1999
HERBERT R. DAVENPORT
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY
Charles H. Smith, Jr., Judge
James W. Osborne, Assistant Attorney General
(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on
briefs), for appellant.
David L. Scyphers (Scyphers & Austin, P.C.,
on brief), for appellee.
The Virginia Employment Commission (the Commission) contends
that the trial court erred in awarding unemployment benefits to
Herbert R. Davenport. We agree and reverse the judgment of the
trial court.
I. BACKGROUND
Learning that the plant at which he worked was scheduled to
close, Davenport filed for unemployment benefits, effective
September 17, 1995. Pursuant to Code § 60.2-614, he listed as
his thirty-day employer Westinghouse Corporation, for which he
had worked from May 1, 1985 to September 15, 1995. During this
term of employment, Davenport's work week consisted of five seven
and one-half hour days. The Commission approved this claim and
awarded Davenport unemployment benefits for a benefit year that
ended September 14, 1996. That claim and award are not at issue
in this appeal.
After the filing of his 1995 claim, Davenport was retained
by Westinghouse as a temporary employee. His work week consisted
of four nine and one-half hour days. From September 17, 1995, to
the final closing of the plant on October 26, 1995, Davenport
worked twenty-four such days.
After the plant finally closed, Davenport filed for
unemployment benefits for a benefit year commencing September 15,
1996. He listed Westinghouse as his thirty-day employer and
listed his employment term as April 12, 1991 to October 26, 1995.
The employment term relevant to this claim's qualification under
Code § 60.2-614 is the period from September 17, 1995 to October
26, 1995.
II. THE THIRTY-DAY REQUIREMENT
Code § 60.2-614, as in effect at the time of Davenport's
claim, stated:
No individual may receive benefits in a
benefit year unless, subsequent to the
beginning of the immediately preceding
benefit year during which he received
benefits, he performed service for an
employer as defined in [Code] § 60.2-210 for
remuneration during thirty days, whether or
not such days were consecutive, and
subsequently became totally or partially
separated from such employment. 1
(Emphasis added). The Commission denied Davenport's claim,
1
Code § 60.2-614 has since been amended to require working
(i) during thirty days, whether or not such days were
consecutive, or (ii) for 240 hours. That amendment does not
affect this appeal.
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ruling that he failed to satisfy the thirty-day work requirement.
It held that the term "during thirty days" denoted not a period
of time but a number of days. The trial court reversed the
ruling of the Commission, holding
[Davenport] did perform services for which he
received remuneration while thirty days was
going on, or over the course of thirty days,
or throughout the duration of thirty
days. . . . [T]hat is all the Code requires.
III. ANALYSIS
Davenport contends that the term "during thirty days"
denotes a time period, not a number of days. He argues that the
Commission's interpretation of this term could produce
unreasonable results. He notes that an employee who worked but a
brief time on each of thirty days would thereby satisfy the
Commission's interpretation. He notes further that a shift that
began at 11:00 p.m. and ended 7:00 a.m. the following day would
encompass two days under the Commission's interpretation. We
note that under Davenport's interpretation, a brief period of
work on the first and last days of any month except February
would satisfy the statute. We perceive no need to indulge such
speculations. Our task is to apply the statute as it is written,
gleaning from its terms the legislative intent. If the
application of the statute produces questionable results in
particular cases, that is a matter of legislative, not judicial,
concern.
"A primary rule of statutory construction is that courts
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must look first to the language of the statute. If a statute is
clear and unambiguous, a court will give the statute its plain
meaning." Loudoun County Department of Social Services v.
Etzold, 245 Va. 80, 84, 425 S.E.2d 800, 802 (1993). The
Commission properly interpreted the statute by following its
plain meaning. To be eligible for benefits, a claimant must have
performed services for an employer for a minimum of thirty days
during the relevant time period. That the legislature intended
the term "during thirty days" to define a number of days, not a
period of time, is verified by the legislative inclusion of the
clause "whether or not such days were consecutive." Davenport
worked only twenty-four days. Thus, he did not satisfy the
statutory requirement.
The Commission has consistently interpreted Code § 60.2-614
to require thirty days of service. The Commission has given the
same interpretation to Code § 60.2-618, which also contains the
thirty-day requirement. "It is well settled that where the
construction of a statute has been uniform for many years in
administrative practice, and has been acquiesced in by the
General Assembly, such construction is entitled to great weight
with the courts." Virginia Employment Commission v. Nunery, 24
Va. App. 617, 626, 484 S.E.2d 609, 614 (1997).
Noting that during his term of regular employment, he worked
seven and one-half hour days, Davenport argues that the
twenty-four nine and one-half hour days that he worked more than
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equaled the commitment of time that would have been involved had
he worked thirty seven and one-half hour days. We find this
argument unpersuasive. The statute, as it applies to Davenport's
claim, employs days, not hours, as units of computation.
Furthermore, when the legislature chose, in the 1997 amendment,
to employ an hourly criterion, it set the threshold at 240 hours.
Even were that amended standard applied to this case, the 228
hours worked by Davenport would be insufficient.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the
decision of the Commission is reinstated.
Reversed.
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