Norman Joseph Taylor v. Commonwealth ( 2003 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Frank, Humphreys and Senior Judge Overton
Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia
NORMAN JOSEPH TAYLOR
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 2367-02-1 JUDGE ROBERT P. FRANK
JUNE 24, 2003
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ACCOMACK COUNTY
Glen A. Tyler, Judge
A. Theresa Bliss for appellant.
Richard B. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney
General (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General,
on brief), for appellee.
Norman Joseph Taylor (appellant) was convicted in a bench
trial of grand larceny, in violation of Code § 18.2-95. On
appeal, he contends the trial court erred in finding the evidence
was sufficient. Specifically, he maintains the evidence only
proved he was physically present during the larceny. For the
reasons stated herein, we affirm the conviction.
BACKGROUND
Gerald Alms and George Tripp went fishing under the Cockle
Creek Bridge. They parked Alms's Suburban near the bridge, took
their gear, and proceeded to the water. After some time, Alms
heard another vehicle on the bridge. He then heard what he
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
recognized as his car door shutting, so he went to the top of the
bridge to "check it out."
"When [Alms] got to the top and looked over the guard rail,
[he] could see a man in the back of [his] pickup grabbing stuff."
A second vehicle was parked five feet from his Suburban. Alms
walked towards the back of his truck.
The man who had been rummaging in Alms's vehicle, identified
at trial as Robert Cherrix, got into the other car's front
passenger seat and locked the door. Another man, Sammy Cherrix,
was passed out in the backseat. Appellant was driving the car.
Alms approached the other car and saw his toolbox, jigsaw and
hydraulic ram inside. His toolbox and hydraulic unit "[were] in
between the driver and the passenger." "The jigsaw was on the
passenger's side front on the floor board and the cord was hanging
out the door."
Alms told the two men that he "wanted [his] tools back
. . . ." In response, "[t]hey just kind of snickered and smiled
at each other. They wouldn't look at [Alms]. They just kept
looking forward out the windshield."
To prevent the vehicle from leaving, Alms "popped" two tires
with his knife. The men in the car continued "snickering." Alms
yelled at them and smashed the car's windshield with the back of
his knife. At this point, Cherrix "rolled down the window about
six inches and handed back the hydraulic sleeve and the green
toolbox." Alms told them they had to open the door so he could
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get the jigsaw, as its cord was stuck. When Cherrix did so, Alms
"stuck the knife in there." Cherrix "put his arms up and [Alms]
got [his] saw back and [Cherrix] gets cut." Appellant then drove
off toward Queens Creek Bridge.
Chincoteague Police Officer Gary Fox was called to the Queens
Sound Bridge, where he found appellant and Cherrix with an
ambulance crew. Cherrix had a cut on his right arm. He told Fox
that "he fell on the shells on Queens Sound Bridge." 1 When
Officer Fox asked appellant what had happened, appellant "said
that they had stopped there at Cockle Creek to help somebody and
the man went ballistic and cut both tires and knocked the
windshield out and cut Bobby." Both Cherrix and appellant were
intoxicated. Appellant said nothing to Officer Fox about a theft.
At trial, Cherrix admitted he took a circular saw and either
a grinder or sander from Alms's Suburban, yet he denied taking the
toolbox. Other than this inconsistency, Cherrix confirmed Alms's
version of the events. According to Cherrix, he and appellant did
not discuss stealing the property. He claimed not to know why he
did it, other than that he was drunk.
Appellant, a convicted felon, denied any prior knowledge of
the larceny. He testified he did see Cherrix take some items
from the Suburban. He claimed he "hollered, 'Put it back.'" He
1
Cherrix, a convicted felon, denied making this statement
to the officer.
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then saw Alms "come around." Appellant testified Cherrix handed
the items to Alms before returning to the car. He also claimed
Cherrix asked him to stop the car on the bridge to see if anyone
in the truck needed help.
On cross-examination, appellant reiterated, "I never got of
the car. Had no idea what was going on." However, he admitted
turning off the motor "as soon as I got out." Appellant also
claimed he "never laugh[ed] at nobody. Mr. Alms is not telling
the truth if he says I laughed or snickered." He also claimed
Alms lied when he said his property was in appellant's car, next
to appellant.
At the conclusion of the Commonwealth's case-in-chief,
appellant moved to strike the evidence, maintaining no evidence
indicated appellant participated in the theft. The trial court
denied the motion. Upon the conclusion of appellant's case,
appellant renewed his motion to strike. Again, the trial court
denied the motion.
ANALYSIS
Appellant contends the evidence only reveals he was present
during Cherrix's theft of Alms's property, not that he
participated in the theft. He argues no evidence indicated that
he had prior knowledge of Cherrix's larcenous intent or that he
had any intent to take Alms's property.
Under familiar principles of appellate
review, we examine the evidence in the light
most favorable to the Commonwealth. See
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Martin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 438, 443,
358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987). The credibility
of a witness and the inferences to be drawn
from proven facts are matters solely for the
fact finder's determination. See Long v.
Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 194, 199, 379
S.E.2d 473, 476 (1989). In its role of
judging witness credibility, the fact finder
is entitled to disbelieve the self-serving
testimony of the accused and to conclude
that the accused is lying to conceal his
guilt. See Speight v. Commonwealth, 4
Va. App. 83, 88, 354 S.E.2d 95, 98 (1987)
(en banc).
"Circumstantial evidence is as competent and
is entitled to as much weight as direct
evidence, provided it is sufficiently
convincing to exclude every reasonable
hypothesis except that of guilt." Coleman
v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31, 53, 307 S.E.2d
864, 876 (1983). "[T]he Commonwealth need
only exclude reasonable hypotheses of
innocence that flow from the evidence, not
those that spring from the imagination of
the defendant." Hamilton v. Commonwealth,
16 Va. App. 751, 755, 433 S.E.2d 27, 29
(1993). Whether a hypothesis of innocence
is reasonable is a question of fact. See
Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 269,
290, 373 S.E.2d 328, 339 (1988).
Marable v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 505, 509-10, 500 S.E.2d
233, 235 (1998).
A principal in the second degree is one who
is not only present at a crime's commission,
but one who also commits some overt act,
such as inciting, encouraging, advising, or
assisting in the commission of the crime or
shares the perpetrator's criminal intent.
Murray v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 282, 170
S.E.2d 3 (1969); Triplett v. Commonwealth,
141 Va. 577, 127 S.E. 486 (1925); W. LaFave
& A. Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law 497
(1972). Mere presence during the commission
of a crime and subsequent flight do not
constitute sufficient evidence to convict a
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person as a principal in the second degree.
Grant v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 166, 217
S.E.2d 806 (1975); Whitbeck v. Commonwealth,
210 Va. 324, 170 S.E.2d 776 (1969).
Moehring v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 564, 567, 290 S.E.2d 891, 892
(1982).
"Every person who is present at the
commission of a [crime], encouraging or
inciting the same by words, gestures, looks,
or signs, or who in any way, or by any
means, countenances or approves the same is,
in law, assumed to be an aider and abettor,
and is liable as principal."
Foster v. Commonwealth, 179 Va. 96, 99, 18 S.E.2d 314, 315-16
(1942) (citing James v. Commonwealth, 178 Va. 28, 33, 16 S.E.2d
296, 298 (1941)).
The rule has been generally adopted:
"Notwithstanding these rules as to the
nonliability of a passive spectator, it is
certain that proof that a person is present
at the commission of a crime without
disapproving or opposing it, is evidence
from which, in connection with other
circumstances, it is competent for the jury
to infer that he assented thereto, lent to
it his countenance and approval, and was
thereby aiding and abetting the same." 1
R.C.L. 141. Cases cited from other States.
Id. at 100, 18 S.E.2d at 316.
The issue here is whether appellant aided Cherrix in the
theft or intended to deprive Alms of his property. The evidence
revealed that appellant was more than a "passive bystander."
Appellant snickered and smiled at Cherrix while ignoring Alms's
demands for his property. This behavior could allow the fact
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finder to conclude that appellant countenanced and encouraged
Cherrix's theft.
Additionally, the stolen property was seen in appellant's
car with appellant immediately following the theft. Alms
testified he saw his tools in appellant's car. A presumption of
theft arises from the recent, unexplained, exclusive possession
of recently-stolen property, though such possession may be
joint. Castle v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 222, 226-27, 83 S.E.2d
360, 363 (1954). Although appellant claimed he was never in
possession of the items, the fact finder could have concluded he
did possess them. First, appellant lied to the officers and at
trial to conceal his involvement. See Dunbar v. Commonwealth,
29 Va. App. 387, 394, 512 S.E.2d 823, 827 (1999). Second, at
least one of the items was on the seat beside appellant, within
his reach and in plain view, placed in his car after he saw
Cherrix steal it from the truck. See Albert v. Commonwealth, 2
Va. App. 734, 741-42, 347 S.E.2d 534, 538-39 (1986) (finding a
defendant consciously exercised dominion and control over drugs
found in a briefcase near his bed that contained his
identification). The trial court was not obligated to accept
appellant's testimony that he was not in exclusive possession
with Cherrix of the recently-stolen goods. The fact finder
could apply the presumption of theft in this case to conclude
appellant was a principal in the second degree.
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The evidence supports the trial court's finding that
appellant was a principal in the second degree. We affirm his
conviction.
Affirmed.
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