Craig A Knepp v. Linda E Niece ( 2003 )


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  •                       COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present:   Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Frank and Clements
    CRAIG A. KNEPP
    MEMORANDUM OPINION *
    v.   Record No. 1801-02-2                      PER CURIAM
    JANUARY 28, 2003
    LINDA E. NIECE
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY
    George F. Tidey, Judge
    (John H. Goots; Chenault & Goots, PLC, on
    brief), for appellant.
    (Jennifer E. Crossland; Parcell, Webb &
    Wallerstein, on brief), for appellee.
    Craig A. Knepp (husband) appeals the decision of the circuit
    court awarding Linda E. Niece (wife) a divorce.   On appeal,
    husband contends the trial court erred in awarding wife (1) a
    divorce on the ground of desertion, (2) $25,000 for her interest
    in a business, and (3) spousal support.   Upon reviewing the record
    and the parties' briefs, we conclude that this appeal is without
    merit.   Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial
    court.   See Rule 5A:27.
    On appeal, we view the evidence and all reasonable
    inferences in the light most favorable to appellee as the party
    * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    prevailing below.     See McGuire v. McGuire, 
    10 Va. App. 248
    , 250,
    
    391 S.E.2d 344
    , 346 (1990).
    Background
    The parties married in 1967 and separated on August 21,
    1999.    Wife testified she learned husband had had a sexual
    relationship with his secretary.    She also stated husband told
    her to leave the marital home.
    During their marriage, husband purchased an interest in the
    company Brummell & Associates.    He testified he borrowed money
    from Christopher Goad to finance the purchase.    However, the
    corporate records list appellant as the owner of the stock.
    Husband's expert witness valued husband's stock in the business
    at $82,500.    The court awarded wife $25,000 for her interest in
    the asset.
    Wife testified she worked part-time during the marriage
    performing clerical and secretarial work.    After the parties
    separated, wife returned to full-time work.    Husband is in good
    health and has a graduate degree in business.    Wife's income and
    expense statement indicated a monthly need of $934.    Husband's
    monthly expenses listed over $700 to support his adult daughters
    and also included the $704 he was ordered to pay as pendente
    lite spousal support.    Husband admitted he used his business
    account to pay personal expenses.    The court awarded wife $500
    per month in spousal support.
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    Analysis
    I.
    "'Desertion is a breach of matrimonial duty, and is
    composed first, of the actual breaking off of the marital
    cohabitation, and secondly, an intent to desert in the mind of
    the offender.    Both must combine to make the desertion
    complete.'"     Zinkhan v. Zinkhan, 
    2 Va. App. 200
    , 205, 
    342 S.E.2d 658
    , 660 (1986) (quoting Nash v. Nash, 
    200 Va. 890
    , 893, 
    108 S.E.2d 350
    , 352 (1959)).    "The burden of proving desertion
    should be by a preponderance of the evidence."     Bacon v. Bacon,
    
    3 Va. App. 484
    , 490, 
    351 S.E.2d 37
    , 40-41 (1987).
    Wife testified appellant was having an affair and that he
    ordered her to leave the house.    "The law is settled that
    desertion as a ground for divorce does not depend on which
    spouse actually leaves the family home."     Dexter v. Dexter, 
    7 Va. App. 36
    , 42, 
    371 S.E.2d 816
    , 819 (1988).    The evidence
    established that appellant intended to leave the marriage and
    broke off the marital cohabitation by ordering wife to leave the
    house.
    II.
    The court ordered husband to pay wife $25,000 for her
    interest in the business "Brummell & Associates."    "In reviewing
    an equitable distribution award on appeal, we have recognized
    that the trial court's job is a difficult one, and we rely
    heavily on the discretion of the trial judge in weighing the
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    many considerations and circumstances that are presented in each
    case."     Klein v. Klein, 
    11 Va. App. 155
    , 161, 
    396 S.E.2d 866
    ,
    870 (1990).    "Unless the record shows that the trial judge has
    abused his or her discretion by misapplying the statutory
    factors, the trial judge's determination will not be reversed on
    appeal."     Moran v. Moran, 
    29 Va. App. 408
    , 417, 
    512 S.E.2d 834
    ,
    838 (1999).    Husband unquestionably owned the stock at the time
    the parties separated.    The court properly classified the
    property as marital and did not err by awarding a portion of its
    value to wife.
    III.
    "Whether and how much spousal support will be awarded is a
    matter of discretion for the trial court."     Barker v. Barker, 
    27 Va. App. 519
    , 527, 
    500 S.E.2d 240
    , 244 (1998).
    Appellant argues the trial court failed to consider the
    necessary statutory factors.
    The requirement that the trial court
    consider all of the statutory factors
    necessarily implies substantive
    consideration of the evidence presented as
    it relates to all of these factors. This
    does not mean that the trial court is
    required to quantify or elaborate exactly
    what weight or consideration it has given to
    each of the statutory factors. It does
    mean, however, that the court's findings
    must have some foundation based on the
    evidence presented. Therefore, we hold that
    in a determination involving spousal
    support, if the court's findings do not have
    evidentiary support in the record, then the
    court has abused its discretion.
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    Woolley v. Woolley, 
    3 Va. App. 337
    , 345, 
    349 S.E.2d 422
    , 426
    (1986).    Evidence concerning the income and expenses of the
    parties established a foundation supporting the court's award of
    spousal support.
    Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial
    court.    See Rule 5A:27.
    Affirmed.
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