Marco Lance Martin c Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2002 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Willis, Bray and Humphreys
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
MARCO LANCE MARTIN
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 1405-01-2 JUDGE ROBERT J. HUMPHREYS
JUNE 25, 2002
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY
Catherine Currin Hammond, Judge
Michael Morchower; Christopher C. Booberg
(Morchower, Luxton and Whaley; Thorsen &
Scher, L.L.P., on briefs), for appellant.
Richard B. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney
General (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General,
on brief), for appellee.
Marco Lance Martin appeals his conviction, after a jury
trial, for second degree murder of his infant daughter. Martin
contends the trial court erred in refusing his proposed
instruction on the theory of accident, and in finding the evidence
sufficient as a matter of law to prove the element of malice. We
disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
On appeal, Martin first contends that the trial court erred
in refusing his instruction pertaining to the theory of accident.
During Martin's trial, at the conclusion of the evidence, the
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication. Further, because this memorandum
opinion has no precedential value, we recite only those facts
necessary to our holding.
trial court gave the jury finding instructions on capital murder,
second degree murder and involuntary manslaughter. Martin had
also proffered the following instruction on the theory of
accident:
Where the defense is that the killing was an
accident, the defendant is not required to
prove this fact. The burden is on the
Commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the killing was not accidental.
If after considering all the evidence you
have a reasonable doubt whether the killing
was accidental or intentional, then you
should find the defendant not guilty.
Martin argued that although his conduct in shaking his infant
child was not accidental, the infant's resulting death was
accidental. The trial court denied the instruction finding that
the facts of the case did not support the instruction. The judge
stated "[t]here's just not enough testimony to create a reasonable
hypothesis that there was an accident."
"A reviewing court's responsibility in reviewing jury
instructions is 'to see that the law has been clearly stated and
that the instructions cover all issues which the evidence fairly
raises.'" 1 "However, [a] defendant is entitled to have the jury
instructed only on those theories of the case that are supported
2
by evidence."
1
Darnell v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 485, 488, 370 S.E.2d
717, 719 (1988) (quoting Swisher v. Swisher, 223 Va. 499, 503,
290 S.E.2d 856, 858 (1982)).
2
Frye v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 370, 388, 345 S.E.2d 267,
280 (1986) (citing LeVasseur v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 564,
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"[F]or purposes of resolving the issue of the trial court's
jury instruction, we are concerned with [Martin's] version of the
events surrounding the crime[] and not a determination of [their]
truthfulness." 3 Nevertheless, "[t]he evidence to support an
instruction 'must be more than a scintilla,'" 4 and "[a] jury
instruction, even though correctly stating the law, should not be
given if it is not applicable to the facts in evidence." 5
"The rule in Virginia is that every homicide is presumed in
law to be murder in the second degree, and the burden is upon the
accused to reduce it to manslaughter, voluntary or involuntary, or
to show that the killing was justifiable or excusable, in the
latter case — for example, an unavoidable accident." 6 The Supreme
Court of Virginia has recognized that "[e]xcusable homicide per
infortunium, or by misadventure or accident, is where a person
unfortunately kills another in the doing of a lawful act, without
any intent to hurt, and without criminal negligence. If a man
kills another in doing a lawful act in a lawful manner, that is,
590-91, 304 S.E.2d 644, 658-59 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1063 (1984)) (other citations omitted).
3
Sam v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 312, 322, 411 S.E.2d 832,
837 (1991).
4
Frye, 231 Va. at 388, 345 S.E.2d at 280 (quoting
LeVasseur, 225 Va. at 590, 304 S.E.2d at 658).
5
Bolyard v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 274, 277, 397 S.E.2d
894, 896 (1990).
6
Mundy v. Commonwealth, 144 Va. 609, 614-15, 131 S.E. 242,
244 (1926).
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without negligence, the homicide is excusable, 'for the act is
lawful, and the effect is merely accidental." 7 For instance:
When men, while drunk or sober, drive
automobiles along highways and through
crowded streets recklessly, the killing of
human beings is a natural and probable
result to be anticipated. When a homicide
follows as a consequence of such conduct, a
criminal intent is imputed to the offender
and he may be punished for his crime. The
precise grade of such a homicide, whether
murder or manslaughter, depends upon the
facts of the particular case. One, however,
who accidentally kills another, even though
he may be chargeable with some actionable
negligence, is not guilty of a crime, unless
his negligence is so gross and culpable as
to indicate a callous disregard of human
life and of the probable consequences of his
act. The crime is imputed because of the
recklessness, and where there is no
recklessness there is no crime. 8
Thus, although an accused is entitled to an instruction
presenting his theory of accidental killing as a defense – this is
true only when the evidence warrants the instruction. 9 Here,
there is no evidence that the infant's death was the result of
misadventure. Instead, the evidence, even as stated by Martin,
demonstrated that the death was the natural and probable result of
reckless and/or culpably negligent conduct on the part of Martin.
7
Valentine v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 946, 954, 48 S.E.2d
264, 268 (1948).
8
Goodman v. Commonwealth, 153 Va. 943, 952, 151 S.E. 168,
171 (1930).
9
Mart. v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 4, 6, 235 S.E.2d 304, 305
(1977).
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Accordingly, upon the evidence in this case, the jury would not
have been justified in taking the view that the infant's death was
caused by accident. Therefore, we hold that the trial court did
not err in refusing the instruction.
Martin next contends that the trial court erred in finding
the evidence sufficient as a matter of law to establish the
necessary element of malice, beyond a reasonable doubt. Once
again, we disagree.
"When considering the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal
of a criminal conviction, we must view all the evidence in the
light most favorable to the Commonwealth and accord to the
evidence all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom." 10
"The jury serves as the final arbiter of the facts, 'charged with
weighing the evidence, judging the credibility of the witnesses,
and reaching a verdict' in the case."11 Further, a jury's factual
findings will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or
unsupported by the evidence. 12
To establish the crime of second-degree
murder, "the defendant must be shown to have
wilfully [sic] or purposefully, rather than
negligently, embarked upon a course of
wrongful conduct likely to cause death or
10
Traverso v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 172, 176, 366 S.E.2d
719, 721 (1988).
11
Will. v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 577, 582, 484
S.E.2d 153, 155 (1997) (quoting Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete
Co., 500 U.S. 614, 625 (1991)).
12
Id.
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great bodily harm." Malice is the element
that distinguishes murder from manslaughter.
The trier of fact may infer malice from the
deliberate use of a deadly weapon unless the
evidence raises a reasonable doubt whether
malice existed. Killing with malice but
without premeditation and deliberation is
murder in the second degree. 13
"Malice inheres in the doing of a wrongful act intentionally, or
without just cause or excuse, or as a result of ill will. It
may be directly evidenced by words, or inferred from acts and
conduct which necessarily result in injury. Its existence is a
question of fact to be determined by a jury under proper
instructions." 14
On this record, there is ample evidence upon which the jury
could have based its finding that Martin acted with malice in his
actions with regard to the infant. Martin himself conceded that
he shook the infant "hard, three times." Moreover, the medical
evidence, without conflict, demonstrated that the infant's death
was caused by nothing other than "shaken baby syndrome." The
medical evidence further established that the injury sustained by
the infant was very severe, and would have necessarily been caused
by a tremendous amount of force. 15 Thus, on this evidence, we
13
Elliot v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 430, 436, 517 S.E.2d
271, 274 (1999) (quoting Essex v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 273,
280-81, 322 S.E.2d 216, 220 (1984)).
14
Dawkins v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 55, 61, 41 S.E.2d 500,
503 (1947).
15
Dr. Marcella Fierro, the Chief Medical Examiner for the
Commonwealth of Virginia, whose office performed the autopsy on
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cannot hold that the jury's finding of malice, beyond a reasonable
doubt, was plainly wrong. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of
the trial court.
Affirmed.
the infant, testified that "to have received an accidental
injury with . . . these catastrophic findings of subdural
hemorrhage, subarachnoid hemorrhages, tremendous brain swelling,
optic nerve hemorrhage, retinal nerve hemorrhage, the, the class
of the accident that would have had to have occurred to cause
this would be something like motor vehicle violence, the child
who is thrown against the windshield or fell from two stories
. . . . This is a major, major injury."
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