Diversified Technology, LLC v. Steve Pancoast ( 2002 )


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  •                      COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present:    Judges Annunziata, Agee and Senior Judge Coleman
    DIVERSIFIED TECHNOLOGY, LLC AND
    PRINCETON INSURANCE COMPANY
    MEMORANDUM OPINION*
    v.   Record No. 1860-02-1                         PER CURIAM
    DECEMBER 10, 2002
    STEVE PANCOAST
    FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
    (S. Vernon Priddy III; Mary Louise Kramer;
    Sands Anderson Marks & Miller, on brief), for
    appellants.
    (Ann K. Sullivan; David N. Payne; Crenshaw,
    Ware & Martin, P.L.C., on brief), for
    appellee.
    Diversified Technology, LLC ("Diversified Technology") and
    its insurer contend the Workers' Compensation Commission erred
    in finding that Steve Pancoast (claimant) was its employee at
    the time of his compensable injury by accident on May 1, 2001.
    Upon reviewing the record and the parties' briefs, we conclude
    that this appeal is without merit.     Accordingly, we summarily
    affirm the commission's decision.     Rule 5A:27. 1
    * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    1
    Diversified Technology raises five Questions Presented in
    its brief. However, all of those questions address the sole
    issue of whether claimant was Diversified Technology's employee
    rather than an independent contractor. Accordingly, on appeal,
    we address that sole issue, while taking into account the
    various arguments made by Diversified Technology in its brief.
    "The Workers' Compensation Act covers employees but not
    independent contractors."    County of Spotsylvania v. Walker, 
    25 Va. App. 224
    , 229, 
    487 S.E.2d 274
    , 276 (1997).    This distinction
    must be determined from the facts of each case, with the burden
    upon the person seeking benefits under the Act to prove the
    employer/employee relationship contemplated by the Act.     Id. at
    229-30, 487 S.E.2d at 276; see Code § 65.2-101.    Although the
    commission's factual findings are binding and conclusive on
    appeal, when they are supported by credible evidence, see James
    v. Capitol Steel Constr. Co., 
    8 Va. App. 512
    , 515, 
    382 S.E.2d 487
    , 488 (1989), a "[d]etermination of the [employer/employee]
    relationship involves a mixed question of law and fact which is
    reviewable on appeal."    County of Spotsylvania, 25 Va. App. at
    230, 487 S.E.2d at 276.
    Generally, an individual "'is an employee if he works for
    wages or a salary and the person who hires him reserves the
    power to fire him and the power to exercise control over the
    work to be performed.    The power of control is the most
    significant indicium of the employment relationship.'"
    Behrensen v. Whitaker, 
    10 Va. App. 364
    , 367, 
    392 S.E.2d 508
    ,
    509-10 (1990) (quoting Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Gill, 
    224 Va. 92
    , 98, 
    294 S.E.2d 840
    , 843 (1982)).
    [T]he right of control includes not only the
    power to specify the result to be attained,
    but the power to control "the means and
    methods by which the result is to be
    accomplished." An employer/employee
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    relationship exists if the party for whom
    the work is to be done has the power to
    direct the means and methods by which the
    other does the work. "[I]f the latter is
    free to adopt such means and methods as he
    chooses to accomplish the result, he is not
    an employee but an independent contractor."
    The extent of the reserved right of control
    may be determined by examining the
    performance of the parties in the activity
    under scrutiny.
    Intermodal Servs., Inc. v. Smith, 
    234 Va. 596
    , 601, 
    364 S.E.2d 221
    , 224 (1988) (citations omitted).
    In holding that an employee/employer relationship existed
    between claimant and Diversified Technology, the commission made
    the following findings:
    [T]he record established that Diversified
    Technologies exercised a significant amount
    of control over the claimant to make him an
    employee. The Deputy Commissioner believed
    the claimant's testimony regarding the means
    and methods of the work he performed. This
    testimony established that the claimant
    worked for the employer, side by side with
    [Jon] King at the job sites, and that King
    instructed the claimant on the means and
    methods of the work to be performed. King
    also directed the claimant's work hours.
    The claimant did not supply his own tools,
    although he did have some of his own. The
    evidence showed that King supplied the cable
    and the essential tools for the job on which
    the claimant worked. The evidence also
    showed that King would correct any mistakes
    in the work and solve any problems. All of
    these factors support the Deputy
    Commissioner's conclusion that the claimant
    was an employee of Diversified Technologies.
    Claimant's testimony constitutes credible evidence to
    support the commission's finding that he was Diversified
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    Technology's employee rather than an independent contractor.     As
    fact finder, the commission was entitled to weigh the
    credibility of the witnesses, to accept claimant's testimony,
    and to reject the contrary testimony of employer's witnesses.
    It is well settled that credibility determinations are within
    the fact finder's exclusive purview.     Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
    v. Pierce, 
    5 Va. App. 374
    , 381, 
    363 S.E.2d 433
    , 437 (1987).
    Claimant's testimony established that he had only limited
    experience in the cable industry and that King agreed to provide
    claimant with minimal training.   Claimant's testimony also
    proved that Diversified Technology hired him for an indefinite
    period and not for any specific job.   Claimant's testimony, as
    well as King's testimony, established that Diversified
    Technology agreed to pay claimant wages equal to a certain
    percentage of the profits realized from the work performed.
    Claimant's right to a share of the profits did not necessarily
    make him an independent contractor, rather "[i]t merely
    constituted the manner of payment and the measure of
    compensation for his services . . . ."     Jackson v. Haynie's
    Adm'r, 
    106 Va. 365
    , 368, 
    56 S.E. 148
    , 149 (1907).    Moreover,
    "[p]ayment of wages, alone, is not the determinative factor."
    Purvis v. Porter Cabs, Inc., 
    38 Va. App. 760
    , 773 n.4, 
    568 S.E.2d 424
    , 430 n.4 (2002).
    Claimant's testimony also proved that King obtained the
    work that he and claimant performed; King instructed claimant as
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    to where and when to report for work; King supplied the
    essential tools for the job; King obtained the supplies
    necessary to complete the job; and King reserved the right to
    exercise control over the means and methods by which claimant's
    work was ultimately accomplished.    Lastly, King admitted in his
    deposition testimony that he could have had claimant removed
    from the jobsite by the police if claimant did not perform his
    assigned duties in a manner that was acceptable to King. 2   Thus,
    credible evidence supports the commission's finding that
    Diversified Technology exercised the requisite control over
    claimant to make him its employee.
    Contrary to Diversified Technology's contention, claimant's
    work history before he began working for Diversified Technology
    and/or his relationship to other entities in the past were not
    relevant factors to the commission's determination of claimant's
    relationship with Diversified Technology.    See Intermodal, 234
    Va. at 601, 364 S.E.2d at 224; Behrensen, 10 Va. App. at 367,
    392 S.E.2d at 509-10.   In addition, Diversified Technology's
    assertion that claimant's refusal to sign the "Subcontractor
    Agreement" supported an inference that, by his silence, he
    acquiesced to the terms of the agreement does not logically
    follow.   To the contrary, claimant testified that he never read
    2
    The deputy commissioner admitted the depositions of
    claimant and King into evidence at the October 22, 2001 hearing.
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    the agreement before his injury and that he had no intention of
    signing it.   Furthermore,
    in the worker's compensation context, the
    existence of the master servant
    relationship . . . "does not depend upon how
    the parties designate each other in their
    contract." Rather, the individual's status
    in relation to the alleged employer is to be
    determined from all the facts and
    circumstances adduced by the evidence,
    including the provisions of any written
    agreement.
    Virginia Employment Comm'n v. A.I.M. Corp., 
    225 Va. 338
    , 347,
    
    302 S.E.2d 534
    , 539 (1983) (citations omitted).
    For these reasons, we affirm the commission's decision.
    Affirmed.
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