Hyters Coal Co, Inc v. Oral R Bragg ( 2002 )


Menu:
  •                      COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present:    Judges Elder, Bray and Senior Judge Overton
    HYTERS COAL CO., INC. AND
    OLD REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY
    MEMORANDUM OPINION*
    v.   Record No. 0763-02-3                         PER CURIAM
    AUGUST 27, 2002
    ORAL R. BRAGG
    FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
    (S. T. Mullins; Street Law Firm, L.L.P., on
    brief), for appellants.
    (Clarence E. Phillips; Clarence E. Phillips,
    P.C., on brief), for appellee.
    Hyters Coal Co., Inc. and its insurer (hereinafter referred
    to as "employer") contend the Workers' Compensation Commission
    erred in finding that (1) Oral R. Bragg's (claimant) claim for
    permanent total disability ("PTD") benefits related to his right
    foot condition was not barred by the two-year statute of
    limitations contained in Code § 65.2-601; (2) claimant's right
    foot condition was causally related to his compensable February
    6, 1991 left foot injury; and (3) claimant proved he was unable
    to use his legs to any substantial degree in gainful employment,
    entitling him to an award of PTD benefits.     Upon reviewing the
    record and the parties' briefs, we conclude that this appeal is
    * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    without merit.   Accordingly, we summarily affirm the
    commission's decision.   Rule 5A:27.
    I.   Statute of Limitations
    On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable
    to the prevailing party below.   R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v.
    Mullins, 
    10 Va. App. 211
    , 212, 
    390 S.E.2d 788
    , 788 (1990).
    Factual findings made by the commission will be upheld on appeal
    if supported by credible evidence.     See James v. Capitol Steel
    Constr. Co., 
    8 Va. App. 512
    , 515, 
    382 S.E.2d 487
    , 488 (1989).
    In ruling that claimant's claim for PTD benefits related to
    his right foot was not barred by the two-year statute of
    limitations contained in Code § 65.2-601, the commission found
    as follows:
    We do not agree with the deputy
    commissioner that Dr. [Calvin] Johnson's
    March 28, 2001 report established that the
    claimant injured his right foot in February
    1991. The better history taken by Johnson
    was in November 2000, when he examined the
    claimant. In those notes, Dr. Johnson did
    not record a right-foot injury. Moreover,
    [Dr. Johnson] appeared to be troubled with
    opining that the 1991 accident injured
    [claimant's] right foot because there was no
    mention of right foot problems at the time
    of the accident. When [Dr. Johnson]
    reexamined his own notes and completed the
    March 28, 2001, report, he erroneously
    concluded that the claimant injured his
    right foot in the accident.
    The claimant has never claimed that he
    injured his right foot in the 1991 accident.
    Rather, his Claim was that, as a result of
    the left-leg injury, he has developed
    right-foot problems. The medical evidence
    - 2 -
    is replete with physicians' histories of the
    1991 accident, and no history, including
    Dr. Johnson's November 2000 history, records
    a right foot injury. Only in Dr. Johnson's
    interpretation of his history does he report
    a right-foot injury in 1991. We believe
    this was mistaken, and find that the
    evidence cannot reasonably be interpreted to
    show a right-foot injury in 1991.
    The deputy commissioner denied the
    claim because the claimant failed to file a
    claim for his right foot injury within two
    years of February 6, 1991. The employer did
    not argue that "a compensable consequence
    would be barred by the statute [of
    limitations]," but argued that the claimant
    had a "new injury" to his right ankle that
    was barred by the statute of limitations.
    As set forth above, we do not believe that
    the claimant injured his right foot in the
    February 1991 accident. Moreover, there was
    no evidence of any other "new and separate
    injury" to the claimant's right foot. Thus,
    we believe that the claimant's Claim was
    based on his right-foot problems being a
    compensable consequence of the left-leg
    injury, and not based on "new and separate
    injury." Accordingly, the Claim was not
    barred by Code § 65.2-601 but timely under
    Code § 65.2-708.
    (Citation omitted.)
    In light of the lack of any history of claimant injuring
    his right foot in the 1991 accident, the commission, as fact
    finder, was entitled to weigh Dr. Johnson's medical reports, and
    to conclude that in his March 28, 2001 report, he erroneously
    concluded that the claimant injured his right foot in the
    accident.   Claimant's testimony and the numerous physicians'
    histories of the 1991 accident that did not include a right foot
    injury, provided credible evidence from which the commission
    - 3 -
    could reasonably infer that claimant did not sustain a right
    foot injury in the 1991 accident, but rather that his claim was
    based on his right foot problems being a compensable consequence
    of the left leg injury.   Accordingly, the commission did not err
    in concluding that the claim was not barred by Code § 65.2-601,
    but rather was timely under Code § 65.2-708.
    II.    Causation
    "The actual determination of causation is a factual finding
    that will not be disturbed on appeal if there is credible
    evidence to support the finding."       Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Musick,
    
    7 Va. App. 684
    , 688, 
    376 S.E.2d 814
    , 817 (1989).
    In ruling that claimant proved that his right foot problem
    was a direct and natural result of his 1991 left leg injury, the
    commission found as follows:
    [T]he claimant suffered from a pre-existing
    right-ankle condition. Dr. [William]
    McIlwain described this condition as a
    "tarsal coalition." There was no evidence,
    however, of any treatment or problems with
    the right ankle before the 1991 accident.
    After the accident, which resulted in the
    eventual loss of the claimant's left leg,
    the claimant developed right-leg problems.
    He was told in 1992 by Dr. [Judson] McGowan
    that he had arthritis. In 1997, Dr. [N.C.]
    Ratliffe told him that he had "weakness" in
    the right ankle.
    Dr. Ratliffe opined on October 27,
    2000, that the claimant's right-ankle
    condition was "caused by his using the right
    ankle more, to compensate for the loss of
    his left leg." Similarly, Dr. McIlwain
    stated that the claimant's right-ankle
    problem "is aggravated by his having to
    - 4 -
    shift to the right foot because of pain on
    the left. Dr. Johnson's opinion as to
    causation is not very helpful because he was
    under the mistaken belief that the claimant
    injured his right ankle in the February 1991
    accident.
    . . . The claimant testified about his
    difficulty using his prosthesis and gait
    restrictions caused by his left leg. On
    several occasions, the claimant's treating
    physicians noted gait problems arising from
    the loss of the left leg. Most importantly,
    however, the medical evidence, consisting of
    Dr. Ratliffe's and Dr. McIlwain's opinions,
    was uncontradicted that the claimant's right
    ankle problems were the result of the
    left-leg amputation. Although Dr. McIlwain
    believed that the claimant was essentially
    predisposed to right-ankle problems because
    of his tarsal coalition, he also stated that
    the left-leg amputation "aggravated" his
    right ankle condition.
    Claimant's testimony, coupled with the opinions of
    Drs. Ratliffe and McIlwain, provide ample credible evidence to
    support the commission's findings.    As fact finder, the
    commission was entitled to weigh the medical evidence, to accept
    the opinions of Drs. Ratliffe and McIlwain, and to reject
    Dr. Johnson's opinion.   "Questions raised by conflicting medical
    opinions must be decided by the commission."    Penley v. Island
    Creek Coal Co., 
    8 Va. App. 310
    , 318, 
    381 S.E.2d 231
    , 236 (1989).
    Because credible evidence supports the commission's finding
    that claimant proved a direct causal connection between the 1991
    accident and his right ankle problems, we will not disturb that
    finding on appeal.
    - 5 -
    III.   PTD Benefits
    As the Supreme Court reiterated in
    Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Dancy, 
    255 Va. 248
    ,
    
    497 S.E.2d 133
    (1998), "'[t]he phrases
    "total and permanent loss" or "loss of use"
    of a leg do not mean that the leg is
    immovable or that it cannot be used in
    walking around the house, or even around the
    block. They do mean that the injured
    employee is unable to use it in any
    substantial degree in any gainful
    employment.'"
    Gunst Corp. v. Childress, 
    29 Va. App. 701
    , 708-09, 
    514 S.E.2d 383
    , 387 (1999) (citations omitted).
    In awarding claimant PTD benefits pursuant to Code
    § 65.2-503(C)(1), and in ruling that he proved he was unable to
    use his legs to any substantial degree in gainful employment,
    the commission found as follows:
    Dr. Ratliffe opined that the claimant would
    "never be able to return to work for his
    left stump." Dr. Johnson believed that the
    claimant was unable to "do activities where
    he is required to stand, walk, or climb for
    prolonged period of time, nor can he use the
    extremities to manipulate levers or foot
    pedals." He also stated that he could not
    work on uneven ground or "do stair climbing
    or ladder climbing." Dr. McIlwain opined
    that "were it not for that pre-existing
    tarsal condition and arthritis, he could use
    the right lower extremity to a substantial
    degree in gainful employment despite the
    amputation on the opposite side." Thus,
    Dr. McIlwain's opinion essentially was that
    the claimant was unable to engage to a
    substantial degree in gainful employment.
    The claimant testified that he had an
    eighth-grade education, having dropped out
    of school after two weeks in the ninth grade
    because of the death of both of his parents
    - 6 -
    at that time. He has not worked since the
    accident and has not received any additional
    schooling or training. He worked as an
    equipment operator at the time of the
    accident. As early as January 1992,
    Dr. [Lowell] Gill, the first specialist to
    recommend amputation, advised the claimant
    to "retire from his present form of work to
    try to be re-educated through vocational
    rehab or some other agency for consideration
    of a more sedentary type of employment."
    The claimant, however, has not had any
    additional schooling or retraining and faces
    a vocational future with limited education,
    complete loss of one leg and a 25% loss of
    use of the other, and severe restrictions on
    his physical activities.
    . . . Admittedly, there was evidence
    that the claimant had some residual use of
    his legs. On balance, however, we find that
    the evidence established that, more likely
    than not, the combination of the claimant's
    right and left leg injuries, together with
    his inability to work, have rendered him
    permanently and totally disabled.
    The commission's factual findings are amply supported by
    credible evidence, including claimant's testimony and the
    medical records and opinions of Drs. Ratliffe, McIlwain, and
    Gill.    That credible evidence supported the commission's
    conclusion that "the combination of the claimant's right and
    left leg injuries, together with his inability to work, have
    rendered him permanently and totally disabled."
    "We do not retry the facts before the
    Commission nor do we review the weight,
    preponderance of the evidence, or the
    credibility of the witnesses. If there is
    evidence or reasonable inference that can be
    drawn from the evidence to support the
    Commission's findings, they will not be
    disturbed by this Court on appeal, even
    - 7 -
    though there is evidence in the record to
    support contrary findings of fact."
    
    Id. at 709, 514
    S.E.2d at 387 (citation omitted).
    For these reasons, we affirm the commission's decision.
    Affirmed.
    - 8 -