Jamie Maurice Stokes v. Commonwealth ( 2002 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Willis, Bray and Humphreys
Argued by teleconference
JAMIE MAURICE STOKES
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 2738-01-2 JUDGE ROBERT J. HUMPHREYS
JULY 2, 2002
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY
George F. Tidey, Judge
Christopher J. Collins for appellant.
H. Elizabeth Shaffer, Assistant Attorney
General (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General,
on brief), for appellee.
Jamie Maurice Stokes appeals his convictions, after a bench
trial, for robbery and using a firearm in the commission of a
robbery. Stokes contends the trial court erred in finding the
evidence sufficient as a matter of law to sustain the robbery
conviction. Instead, Stokes argues the evidence was sufficient
to establish nothing more than that he was an
accessory-after-the-fact. We disagree.
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication. Further, because this memorandum
opinion has no precedential value, we recite only those facts
necessary to our holding.
"'The distinctive elements of robbery are (1) the use of violence,
or the threat thereof, against the victim, and (2) the theft of
property from his person or in his presence.'" 1
In order for a person to be a principal in
the second degree to a felony, [such as
robbery,] the individual must "know or have
reason to know of the principal's criminal
intention and must intend to encourage,
incite, or aid the principal's commission of
the crime." McGhee v. Commonwealth, 221 Va.
422, 427, 270 S.E.2d 729, 732 (1980) [].
The person must be "present, aiding and
abetting the act done, or keeping watch or
guard at some convenient distance." 2 Brown
v. Commonwealth, 130 Va. 733, 736, 107 S.E.
809, 810 (1921). "[M]ere presence and
consent will not suffice." Underwood v.
Commonwealth, 218 Va. 1045, 1048, 243 S.E.2d
231, 233 (1978). 3
Further, any element of an offense may be proved by circumstantial
evidence. 4 "Circumstantial evidence is as competent and is
entitled to as much weight as direct evidence, provided it is
1
Quesinberry v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 364, 373, 402 S.E.2d
218, 224 (1991) (quoting Briley v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 532,
543, 273 S.E.2d 48, 55 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1031(1981)).
2
This is opposed to an accessory, which is defined as "one
not present at the commission of the offense, but who is in some
way concerned therein, either before or after, as contriver,
instigator or advisor, or as a receiver or protector of the
perpetrator . . . ." Foster v. Commonwealth, 179 Va. 96, 99, 18
S.E.2d 314, 315 (1942); Hitt v. Commonwealth, 131 Va. 752, 759,
109 S.E. 597, 600 (1921) (emphasis added).
3
Jones v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 384, 387, 424 S.E.2d
563, 565 (1992) (emphases added).
4
See Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31, 53, 307 S.E.2d
864, 876 (1983).
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sufficiently convincing to exclude every reasonable hypothesis
except that of guilt." 5 In fact, intent may, and usually must, be
proven by circumstantial evidence. 6 "[T]he fact finder may infer
that a person intends the immediate, direct, and necessary
consequences of his voluntary acts. [Additionally], when the fact
finder draws such inferences reasonably, not arbitrarily, they
will be upheld." 7
Here, Stokes' own statement to police proved that: 1) he had
spent most of the day with Antoine Smith; 2) he knew Joseph
Phillips, the robber; 3) he drove Smith and Phillips to the scene;
4) he was present when the robbery occurred; 5) he drove himself,
Smith and Phillips away after the robbery; 8 6) he voluntarily
shared in the robbery proceeds; and 7) he drove both Smith and
Phillips to their intended destinations after the incident. Thus,
the direct evidence, as well as the corroborating circumstantial
5
Id.
6
See Servis v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 507, 524, 371
S.E.2d 156, 165 (1988); see also Long v. Commonwealth, 8
Va. App. 194, 198, 379 S.E.2d 473, 476 (1989).
7
Moody v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 702, 706-07, 508 S.E.2d
354, 356 (1998) (citations omitted).
8
We note that the fact finder rejected Stokes' contention
that he drove away under duress, because Phillips had a gun and
he "told us to pull off." See Sheppard v. Commonwealth, 250 Va.
379, 387, 464 S.E.2d 131, 136 (1995) ("[W]hen conducting
appellate review on . . . question[s] of fact, considering the
evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we
must grant the Commonwealth all reasonable inferences from the
facts proven, and the trial court's judgment must be affirmed
unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.")
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evidence, permits the reasonable inference that Stokes shared
Phillips' and Smith's criminal intent, proving beyond a reasonable
doubt that Stokes was a principal in the second degree to the
robbery.
Moreover, as the legal standard defining a principal in the
second degree makes clear, it was not necessary for the
Commonwealth to prove Stokes shared in the criminal intent to
commit the robbery. The standard is defined in the disjunctive.
Thus, if the evidence established that Stokes aided in, or in some
way countenanced, the principal's commission of the crime, he
could be convicted as a principal in the second degree. 9 Here,
Smith himself conceded that he aided in the commission of the
robbery, by driving the men from the scene and sharing in the
robbery proceeds.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is
Affirmed.
9
See Augustine v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 120, 124, 306
S.E.2d 886, 888-89 (1983) ("Mere presence, however, is
insufficient to establish that [an accused] is a principal in
the second degree. To prove [an accused] was an aider and
abettor, the evidence must show that [he] was not only present
but that [he] procured, encouraged, countenanced, or approved
commission of the crime. In other words, [he] must share the
criminal intent of the party who actually committed the [crime]
or be guilty of some overt act in furtherance thereof.")
(emphasis added); see also Rollston v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App.
535, 540, 399 S.E.2d 823, 826 (1991) ("Specific intent is not
required to convict the defendant as a principal in the second
degree.").
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