Herman Lee Jones, Jr. v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2002 )


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  •                         COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Willis, Bray and Humphreys
    Argued by teleconference
    HERMAN LEE JONES, JR.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.   Record No. 1586-01-2                   JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY
    JUNE 18, 2002
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND
    Learned D. Barry, Judge
    Gregory W. Franklin, Assistant Public
    Defender, for appellant.
    Marla Graff Decker, Assistant Attorney
    General (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General,
    on brief), for appellee.
    Herman Lee Jones, Jr. (defendant) was convicted in a bench
    trial for possession of heroin in violation of Code § 18.2-250.
    On appeal, he complains the trial court erroneously denied his
    motion to suppress the offending drugs.    We disagree and affirm
    the conviction.
    The parties are fully conversant with the record, and this
    memorandum opinion recites only those facts necessary to a
    disposition of the appeal.
    * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    I.
    In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a suppression motion,
    we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    prevailing party below, the Commonwealth in this instance,
    granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible
    therefrom.    Commonwealth v. Grimstead, 
    12 Va. App. 1066
    , 1067, 
    407 S.E.2d 47
    , 48 (1991).
    "Ultimate questions of reasonable suspicion
    and probable cause to make a warrantless
    search" involve questions of both law and
    fact and are reviewed de novo on appeal. In
    performing such analysis, we are bound by
    the trial court's findings of historical
    fact unless "plainly wrong" or without
    evidence to support them and we give due
    weight to the inferences drawn from those
    facts by resident judges and local law
    enforcement officers.
    McGee v. Commonwealth, 
    25 Va. App. 193
    , 197-98, 
    487 S.E.2d 259
    ,
    261 (1997) (en banc) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 
    517 U.S. 690
    , 691, 699 (1996)).    "On appeal, it is the defendant's burden
    to show 'that the denial of [the] motion to suppress constitute[d]
    reversible error.'"    Moss v. Commonwealth, 
    30 Va. App. 219
    , 223,
    
    516 S.E.2d 246
    , 248 (1999) (citation omitted).   "Our review of the
    record includes evidence adduced at both the trial and the
    suppression hearing."    Greene v. Commonwealth, 
    17 Va. App. 606
    ,
    608, 
    440 S.E.2d 138
    , 139 (1994).
    Viewed accordingly, the instant record discloses that, on
    January 8, 2001, Richmond Police Officer Thomas L. Gilbert, while
    on routine patrol in a "high drug area" at approximately
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    9:00 a.m., observed defendant walking "down the middle of [a]
    street" lined with "sidewalks on both sides." 1   As defendant
    "pas[sed] [the] police vehicle," Gilbert noticed "a silver foil
    package" "in his left hand," which was "loosely cupped so . . .
    [Gilbert] could see the object inside of it."     Based on his
    "training and experience," including "over a hundred" drug-related
    arrests, "probably twenty-five arrests right there in a four block
    radius," Gilbert "believed" the "foil package" contained heroin
    because "heroin is normally packaged in aluminum foil" "in that
    area."
    Investigating, Gilbert "asked [defendant] if [he] could speak
    to him" and, as defendant "turned around and faced" him, inquired,
    "what is in [your] hand?"   Defendant responded, "what?" and became
    "very evasive," "clinch[ing] his fist" and "tr[ying] to take what
    was in his left hand and put it in his right hand."    When
    defendant "got [his hands] up around his chest," Gilbert "grabbed
    [defendant's] arm, and another officer, Wayne Stewart, grabbed the
    other arm," explaining that "if it's heroin, and that's all it is,
    we'll deal with it.   If it's not, everything is going to be all
    right."   Gilbert then "retrieved the foil package" and arrested
    defendant for the instant offense.     Subsequent investigation and
    analysis of the package contents revealed .068 grams of heroin.
    1
    Gilbert testified he "could have written [defendant] a
    summons for unauthorized use of the highway by a pedestrian,"
    but decided instead to approach him and "engage[] in a
    conversation."
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    Prior to trial, defendant moved the court to suppress the
    offending drug, complaining of a warrantless, unlawful search and
    seizure.   The trial court denied the motion and convicted
    defendant, resulting in the subject appeal.
    II.
    Defendant contends Gilbert "grabbed his arm" and searched
    the "foil package" with neither reasonable or articulable
    suspicion that he was engaged in criminal activity nor probable
    cause to arrest.   We disagree, finding Gilbert had probable
    cause to arrest defendant and undertake a related search of the
    package.
    "As a general rule of constitutional law, an officer
    properly may make a warrantless arrest if he has probable cause
    to believe the arrestee has committed a crime, and the officer
    may search the individual incident to that lawful arrest."
    Lovelace v. Commonwealth, 
    27 Va. App. 575
    , 582, 
    500 S.E.2d 267
    ,
    271 (1998) (internal citations omitted).   "To establish probable
    cause, the Commonwealth must show 'a probability or substantial
    chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing' that a crime
    was committed."    Ford v. City of Newport News, 
    23 Va. App. 137
    ,
    143-44, 
    474 S.E.2d 848
    , 851 (1996) (citation omitted).
    "In determining whether probable cause exists courts will
    test what the totality of the circumstances meant to police
    officers trained in analyzing the observed conduct for purposes
    of crime control."    Powell v. Commonwealth, 
    27 Va. App. 173
    ,
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    177, 
    497 S.E.2d 899
    , 900 (1998) (citation omitted).    "'So long
    as probable cause to arrest exists at the time of the search,
    . . . it is unimportant that the search preceded the formal
    arrest if the arrest followed quickly on the heels of the
    challenged search.'"   Ross v. Commonwealth, 
    35 Va. App. 103
    ,
    107, 
    542 S.E.2d 819
    , 821 (2001) (quoting Carter v. Commonwealth,
    
    9 Va. App. 310
    , 312, 
    387 S.E.2d 505
    , 506-07 (1990)).
    Here, when first observed by Gilbert, defendant was
    "walking" "down the middle of [a] street" lined with sidewalks
    in a "high drug area," notorious for harboring drug dealers.
    Defendant was carrying "a silver foil package" in his "loosely
    cupped" hand.   Based on police "training and experience,"
    including "over one hundred" drug arrests and "probably
    twenty-five arrests right there in a four block radius," Gilbert
    believed the "foil package" contained heroin because, "[i]n that
    area," "heroin is normally packaged in aluminum foil."
    Approaching defendant, Gilbert noted he became "very evasive,"
    "clinch[ing] his fist" and attempting to conceal the "foil
    package" by transferring it from "his left hand" to "his right
    hand," conduct that suggested the "package" contained
    contraband.
    The totality of such circumstances, viewed objectively, was
    clearly sufficient to provide probable cause to believe
    defendant possessed heroin, justifying an immediate warrantless
    arrest and related search.   Accordingly, the trial court
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    correctly denied the motion to suppress, and we affirm the
    conviction.
    Affirmed.
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