Dominion Virginia Power and Dominion Resources, Inc. v. Betty J. Pulley ( 2011 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Elder, Petty and Alston
Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia
DOMINION VIRGINIA POWER AND
DOMINION RESOURCES, INC.
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 0866-10-1 JUDGE ROSSIE D. ALSTON, JR.
JUNE 7, 2011
BETTY J. PULLEY
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION
Arthur T. Aylward (Angela F. Gibbs; Midkiff, Muncie & Ross,
P.C., on briefs), for appellants.
John H. Klein (Montagna, Klein, Camden, LLP, on brief), for
appellee.
Dominion Virginia Power and Dominion Resources, Inc. (employer) appeal a decision of
the Workers’ Compensation Commission (the commission) awarding benefits to Betty J. Pulley
(claimant). Employer alleges the commission erred in finding that claimant’s injuries arose out
of a risk peculiar to her employment, rather than a risk common to the neighborhood. For the
reasons that follow, we find that the commission erred in failing to apply the “actual risk” test
and remand the case to the commission for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
*
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
I. BACKGROUND 1
On appeal from the commission, “we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
party prevailing below[,]” in this case, claimant. Tomes v. James City Fire, 39 Va. App. 424,
429, 573 S.E.2d 312, 315 (2002).
So viewed, the evidence indicated that on November 2, 2007, claimant was employed by
employer as an instructor, teaching customer service center communications and technical skills.
During her afternoon break, claimant went to the Dominion Credit Union, located in a building
attached to her place of work. As she returned from the credit union and entered her place of
work, claimant tripped over a raised door threshold, ripping her shoe. Claimant fell forward, hit
her head, and lost consciousness.
As a result of this incident, claimant filed a claim for benefits for injuries to her knees,
right hip, right shoulder, back, head, and face. At a hearing before the deputy commissioner,
Colin Forehand, employer’s supervisor of facilities, testified that six new doors had been
installed in the building in June 2007 to replace old, worn-out doors. Forehand testified that the
new doors were “stock” doors with no modifications and that they had a threshold with a raised
lip of about one-half inch. Furthermore, Richard Hudson, who installed the new doors, testified
that the doors were standard commercial doors that he had previously installed in other types of
facilities, such as schools, libraries, and government buildings. Hudson testified that the
threshold on the new doors was five-eighths of an inch high. Finally, Forehand and Olivia
Banks, who oversaw health and safety for employer, also testified that cautionary signs were
placed near the newly-installed doors to warn people of the new raised threshold.
1
As the parties are fully conversant with the record in this case and because this
memorandum opinion carries no precedential value, this opinion recites only those facts and
incidents of the proceedings as are necessary to the parties’ understanding of the disposition of
this appeal.
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At the hearing before the deputy commissioner, employer denied the claim, alleging that
claimant’s accident did not arise out of her employment, claimant’s medical treatment and
disability were not causally related to the accident in question, and claimant had pre-existing
conditions. The deputy commissioner denied claimant’s claim for benefits, holding that her
injury did not arise out of her employment because there was no evidence of a defect in the
threshold or other unusual condition associated with the workplace. The deputy commissioner
found that there was no evidence that the height of the threshold “constituted some unusual
hazard associated with the employment” and denied claimant’s claim.
Claimant appealed to the full commission. Upon review, the full commission held that
claimant’s injury arose out of her employment. The commission found that claimant tripped
over the threshold when her right foot hit the threshold, causing her to tear the tip of her shoe,
fall forward to the floor, and sustain injuries. The commission also found that the threshold was
five-eighths of an inch in height from the ground. In reaching its holding, the commission relied
on its opinions in Turner v. S. Va. Mental Health Inst, 75 O.W.C. 199 (1996), and Yousef v. Atl.
Coast Airlines, VWC File No. 211-81-31 (Va. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n July 11, 2003), where
the commission had found injuries resulting from trips over thresholds compensable. The
commission found that claimant’s injury arose out of her employment in the instant case because
claimant tripped over a threshold that was five-eighths inch in height, higher than the threshold
involved in Turner. As a result, the commission remanded the case to the deputy commissioner
for an award of benefits.
On remand, the deputy commissioner found that claimant suffered injuries to her head,
shoulder, back, hip, and knees as a result of the workplace incident and that claimant was totally
disabled from November 2, 2007, to March 31, 2008. The deputy commissioner awarded
claimant temporary total disability benefits of $810.84 per week for this time period.
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Furthermore, the deputy commissioner found that claimant was partially disabled from April 7,
2008, to June 17, 2008, and awarded claimant temporary partial disability benefits for this time
period. The deputy commissioner also awarded claimant medical benefits, attorney’s fees, and
credits for sick leave and vacation pay taken during her periods of disability.
Employer appealed to the commission, which affirmed the deputy commissioner’s
decision. The commission declined to revisit its determination that claimant’s injuries arose out
of her employment, stating that the issue was properly decided in its previous opinion for the
reasons stated therein. This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
The fundamental purpose of the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Act (the Act) is to give
compensation for accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of employment without
regard to fault. Lawrence J. Pascal, Virginia Workers’ Compensation: Law and Practice 1-3 (3d
ed. 2000). Although workers’ compensation should not require that every claim asserted be
allowed, the provisions of the Act “‘should be liberally construed’” in favor of the worker “‘to
carry out [its] humane and beneficial purposes.’” Dinwiddie Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Cole, 258 Va.
430, 436, 520 S.E.2d 650, 653 (1999) (quoting Baggett Transp. Co. v. Dillon, 219 Va. 633, 637,
248 S.E.2d 819, 822 (1978)).
To recover benefits under the Act, an injured employee must prove an “‘injury by
accident arising out of and in the course of the employment.’” Marketing Profiles v. Hill, 17
Va. App. 431, 433, 437 S.E.2d 727, 729 (1993) (quoting Code § 65.2-101).
The phrases arising “out of” and arising “in the course of” are
separate and distinct. . . . The phrase arising “in the course of”
refers to the time, place, and circumstances under which the
accident occurred. The phrase arising “out of” refers to the origin
or cause of the injury.
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Cnty. of Chesterfield v. Johnson, 237 Va. 180, 183, 376 S.E.2d 73, 74 (1989). In this case,
employer does not dispute that claimant’s injury arose in the course of her employment. Rather,
employer contends only that the commission erred in holding that claimant’s injury arose out of
her employment.
Whether a claimant’s injury arose out of her employment “involves a mixed question of
law and fact, which we review de novo on appeal.” Blaustein v. Mitre Corp., 36 Va. App. 344,
348, 550 S.E.2d 336, 338 (2001). “On appellate review, the factual findings of the commission
are binding if they are supported by credible evidence.” Wagner Enters., Inc. v. Brooks, 12
Va. App. 890, 894, 407 S.E.2d 32, 35 (1991). “Accordingly, although we are bound by the
commission’s underlying factual findings if those findings are supported by credible evidence,
we review de novo the commission’s ultimate determination as to whether the injury arose out of
the claimant’s employment.” Stillwell v. Lewis Tree Serv., 47 Va. App. 471, 477, 624 S.E.2d
681, 683 (2006) (internal citations omitted). “This Court is not bound by the legal
determinations made by the commission. ‘We must inquire to determine if the correct legal
conclusion has been reached.’” Atlas Plumbing & Mech., Inc. v. Lang, 38 Va. App. 509, 513,
566 S.E.2d 871, 873 (2002) (quoting Cibula v. Allied Fibers & Plastics, 14 Va. App. 319, 324,
416 S.E.2d 708, 711 (1992)).
To determine whether a claimant’s injury arose out of her employment, “we apply an
‘actual risk test,’ meaning that the employment must expose the employee to the particular
danger causing the injury, notwithstanding the public’s exposure generally to similar risks.”
Combs v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 259 Va. 503, 510, 525 S.E.2d 278, 282 (2000). Application of
the actual risk test supports a finding that an injury arises out of the claimant’s employment
“only if there is a causal connection between the employee’s injury and the conditions under
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which the employer requires the work to be done.” Hilton v. Martin, 275 Va. 176, 180, 654
S.E.2d 572, 574 (2008).
Under this test, if the injury can be seen to have followed as a
natural incident of the work and to have been contemplated by a
reasonable person familiar with the whole situation as a result of
the exposure occasioned by the nature of the employment, then it
arises “out of” the employment. But [the actual risk test] excludes
an injury which cannot fairly be traced to the employment as a
contributing proximate cause and which comes from a hazard to
which the workmen would have been equally exposed apart from
the employment. The causative danger must be peculiar to the
work and not common to the neighborhood. It must be incidental
to the character of the business and not independent of the relation
of master and servant. It need not have been foreseen or expected,
but after the event it must appear to have had its origin in a risk
connected with the employment, and to have flowed from that
source as a rational consequence.
Bradshaw v. Aronovitch, 170 Va. 329, 335, 196 S.E. 684, 686 (1938), quoted in Simms v. Ruby
Tuesday, Inc., 281 Va. 114, 122-23, 704 S.E.2d 359, 363 (2011). Thus, an injury does not arise
out of the employment “merely because it occurred during the performance of some employment
duty if the act performed by the employee is not a causative hazard of the employment. Simple
acts of walking, bending, or turning, without any other contributing environmental factors, are
not risks of employment.” Southside Va. Training Ctr. v. Ellis, 33 Va. App. 824, 829, 537
S.E.2d 35, 37 (2000).
From the record before us, it appears the commission failed to apply the actual risk test to
determine whether claimant’s injury arose out of her employment. Instead, the commission
relied upon its previous decisions in Turner, 75 O.W.C. 199, and Yousef, VWC File No.
211-81-31, to find that claimant’s injury arose out of her employment. In Turner, the
commission found that a claimant’s injury arose out of her employment when she tripped over
either a metal doorsill approximately one-half inch in height or an immediately adjacent rubber
mat. In the instant case, the commission reasoned that, because the threshold was five-eighths of
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an inch in height, or one-eighth of an inch higher than the doorsill in Turner, claimant necessary
suffered an injury arising out of her employment. In addition, the commission reasoned that
because it had held in Yousef that a claimant’s injuries arose out of his employment when he
tripped over a rubber strip that formed an edge between marble flooring and carpeting, despite a
lack of any defect in the strip or floor, claimant in the instant case had similarly suffered an
injury by accident. This analysis misses a critical and necessary step in the pertinent inquiry.
Here, the commission made no findings of fact regarding whether claimant’s risk of
injury was “peculiar to [her] job and not one to which the general public [was] equally exposed.”
For example, the commission made no findings of fact regarding whether claimant had a
heightened exposure to the risk of the threshold compared to that of the general public “by
reason of her job responsibilities” requiring her to take a certain route. Nurses 4 You, Inc. v.
Ferris, 49 Va. App. 332, 343, 641 S.E.2d 129, 134 (2007) (holding that a claimant was “more
exposed to the risk of [a wheelchair] ramp than ordinary members of the public and more
exposed to the risk than she would be apart from her employment” because her employment
required her to park near the ramp to transport a patient confined to a wheelchair, thus making
the ramp the most direct route to her car). Moreover, the commission made no findings of fact
regarding whether the threshold was defective, requiring “an increased degree of attentiveness to
negotiate” it. Id. at 341, 641 S.E.2d at 133 (citing Grayson Sch. Bd. v. Cornett, 39 Va. App. 279,
287, 572 S.E.2d 505, 509 (2002)). 2
2
The dissent argues that the commission, in relying upon Turner and Yousef and
distinguishing Harlow v. Cnty. of Louisa, VWC File No. 222-60-44 (Va. Workers’ Comp.
Comm’n Dec. 12, 2005), implicitly applied the actual risk test in the instant case. However, the
commission’s discussion of these cases does not make clear that the commission applied the
actual risk test or made the necessary factual findings required by the actual risk test in the
instant case.
The dissent correctly notes that the commission applied the actual risk test in Yousef and
Harlow. However, the commission’s mere statement that the instant case is more analogous to
Yousef than Harlow is not sufficient to show that the commission considered and applied the
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Because the commission failed to properly apply the actual risk test in this case, we
reverse the commission’s ruling and remand for further fact finding consistent with this opinion.
In so doing, we express no opinion on the merits of claimant’s claim or whether credible
evidence would support a finding that claimant’s injury arose out of her employment, when the
actual risk test is appropriately applied.
In cases where, as here, the commission’s express ruling on a
dispositive point is too “unclear” for us to fairly infer an implied
holding, we prefer to restate the governing legal principles and to
permit the commission on remand to address the case anew. That
is particularly true when we conclude the commission applied “an
incorrect legal standard” and “truncated the factfinding task
necessary under the correct legal standard.”
Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Martin-Elberhi, 55 Va. App. 543, 548, 687 S.E.2d 91, 93 (2010)
(internal citation omitted) (quoting Dowden v. Hercules, Inc., 51 Va. App. 185, 197, 655 S.E.2d
755, 761 (2008) (en banc) (plurality opinion)). For these reasons, we reverse the commission’s
decision and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
actual risk test in this case. As noted, the commission made no explicit finding that claimant was
exposed to a heightened risk because of her employment or that the threshold was defective,
which is necessary to satisfy the actual risk test.
In addition, while Turner purported to apply the actual risk test in determining “whether
the claimant’s stumble on her employer’s premises [over a doorsill or adjacent mat] was caused
by a risk of her employment,” the commission in that case summarily concluded that “[t]he risk
of tripping over the doorsill or the mat is a risk of the employment,” without any analysis of
whether there was a causal connection between the claimant’s injury and the conditions under
which the employer required the work to be performed. Thus, the commission’s reliance on
Turner in the instant case does little to demonstrate analytically that it implicitly considered
whether claimant’s employment “expose[d her] to the particular danger causing the injury,
notwithstanding the public’s exposure generally to similar risks.” Combs, 259 Va. at 510, 525
S.E.2d at 282. Moreover, the commission’s statement that the threshold here was “one-eighth
inch higher than the one the claimant tripped over in Turner” seems to suggest a per se rule that
thresholds of a certain height are necessarily “peculiar to the work and not common to the
neighborhood” so as to satisfy the actual risk test, rather than examining on a case-by-case basis
whether a risk is truly unique or causally connected to a claimant’s employment.
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Elder, J., dissenting.
The majority holds that the commission erred in failing to apply the “actual risk” test and
“made no findings of fact regarding whether claimant’s risk of injury was ‘peculiar to [her] job
and not one to which the general public [was] equally exposed.’” Supra at 7 (quoting Nurses 4
You, Inc. v. Ferris, 49 Va. App. 332, 343, 641 S.E.2d 129, 134 (2007) (alteration in original)).
The majority therefore remands the case to the commission “to address the case anew” in
accordance with the majority’s recitation of the “actual risk” test. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd. v.
Martin-Elberhi, 55 Va. App. 543, 548, 687 S.E.2d 91, 93 (2010). I disagree with the majority’s
resolution of the case because I believe the commission implicitly applied the “actual risk” test
by citing to prior commission decisions that adequately state the pertinent legal principles.
Further, I believe the commission correctly determined that claimant was entitled to temporary
disability benefits because the raised lip of the threshold presented a peculiar risk that was
associated with claimant’s employment. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Under the Workers’ Compensation Act, an injured employee “must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the injury arose ‘out of and in the course of the
employment.’” Lucas v. Fed. Express Corp., 41 Va. App. 130, 133, 583 S.E.2d 56, 58 (2003)
(quoting Code § 65.2-101). Although the commission may “consider all factual evidence, from
whatever source, in its decision whether or not a condition of the workplace caused the injury,”
VFP, Inc. v. Shepherd, 39 Va. App. 289, 293, 572 S.E.2d 510, 512 (2002), “the commission’s
decision that an accident arises out of the employment involves a mixed question of law and fact
and is thus reviewable on appeal,” Southside Va. Training Ctr. v. Shell, 20 Va. App. 199, 202,
455 S.E.2d 761, 763 (1995). “[W]e must affirm the commission’s judgment awarding [disability
benefits] if those findings are supported by credible evidence in the record, regardless of whether
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contrary evidence exists or contrary inferences may be drawn.” Rusty’s Welding Serv., Inc. v.
Gibson, 29 Va. App. 119, 131, 510 S.E.2d 255, 261 (1999).
With this standard of review in mind, I believe the majority recites some of the facts in
too summary a fashion. As the majority accurately states, Colin Forehand testified that he
supervised the replacement of the six doors in June 2007 and the new doors had not been
modified. However, Forehand also stated that cautionary signs were present in the area of the
newly installed doors at the time claimant fell because the door was new and the threshold
contained a raised lip. The purpose of the raised lip was to keep dust, debris, and small animals
from entering underneath the door. In addition, Octavia Banks, who oversaw health and safety
for employer, testified that she had placed the cautionary signs on the inside and outside of the
particular door to warn those entering and exiting the building that the threshold was raised. The
previous door threshold had not contained a raised lip; thus, cautionary signs were needed.
Employer argues the door threshold “is common to the neighborhood and not a risk of the
employment.” Specifically, employer contends claimant offered no clear testimony as to what
aspect of the threshold caused her fall or how she fell. Employer further asserts the threshold
was not an abnormal condition because the rise was a gradual incline and not an abrupt obstacle
jutting out of the ground. Employer points out that similar thresholds are used in other office
buildings, making them “common to the neighborhood,” thereby defeating claimant’s claim.
An accident arises out of the employment if there is a causal connection between the
claimant’s injury and the conditions under which the employer requires the work to be
performed. R.T. Investments, Ltd. v. Johns, 228 Va. 249, 252, 321 S.E.2d 287, 289 (1984).
“The causative danger must be peculiar to the work and not common to the neighborhood.” Id.
at 253, 321 S.E.2d at 289. For example, “the act of merely bending over is a risk to which the
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general public is equally exposed.” 3 Vint v. Alleghany Reg’l Hosp., 32 Va. App. 60, 65-66, 526
S.E.2d 295, 298 (2000).
In the context of slipping on stairs, a condition similar to tripping over a doorway
threshold, “there must either be a defect in the stairs or claimant must have fallen as a result of a
condition of the employment.” Cnty. of Buchanan Sch. Bd. v. Horton, 35 Va. App. 26, 29, 542
S.E.2d 783, 784-85 (2001). “[T]he condition . . . that caused the injury need not have been
overly dangerous (i.e., unduly slippery, in disrepair, poorly lit, or structurally deficient) to
constitute a ‘defect.’” Ferris, 49 Va. App. at 341, 641 S.E.2d at 133 (emphases added).
However, a mere falling down the stairs is insufficient. See Shell, 20 Va. App. at 203, 455
S.E.2d at 763. The claimant must present evidence that the “injury [was] sustained as a result of
a step of abnormal height or condition.” Grayson Sch. Bd. v. Cornett, 39 Va. App. 279, 287, 572
S.E.2d 505, 509 (2002). Indeed, “it is enough that the stairs were of such a nature that they
required an increased degree of attentiveness to negotiate them.” 4 Ferris, 49 Va. App. at 341,
641 S.E.2d at 133.
3
The commission’s citation to Yousef v. Atlantic Coast Airlines, Inc., VWC File No.
211-81-31 (Va. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n July 11, 2003), shows that the commission
appreciated the significance of the threshold’s raised lip in conjunction with the cautionary signs.
In Yousef, the commission held that the “evidence showed that the accident was caused by the
unusual features of the joining of the carpeting and the marble flooring.” Relying on County of
Buchanan School Board v. Horton, 35 Va. App. 26, 542 S.E.2d 424 (1993), the commission held
that the “unusual physical feature where the claimant worked formed a sufficient nexus between
the claimant’s work and the accident.” The commission, by linking the facts in this case to
Yousef, made clear it similarly found the caution signs and recent installation of the new
threshold constituted an “unusual feature” that formed a sufficient nexus between claimant’s
work and the accident.
4
Also illustrating the commission’s implicit reliance on these principles of the “actual
risk” test is its discussion of two additional cases, Turner v. Southern Virginia Mental Health
Institute, 75 O.W.C. 199 (1996), and Harlow v. County of Louisa, VWC File No. 222-60-44,
2005 VA Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 1172 (Dec. 12, 2005). In Harlow, the commission denied the
claimant’s request for benefits because she “offered no evidence that the stoop [she slipped on,]
other than being one and a half inches high, was defective.” 2005 VA Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 1172,
at *5. Significantly, the claimant “had used this particular door on many occasions without
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In Cornett, the claimant was disembarking from the school bus she had been driving as
part of her employment when she slipped, fell, and landed outside the bus. 39 Va. App. at 282,
572 S.E.2d at 506. This Court held that her resulting injuries were compensable because the
evidence established that “the difference in the configuration of the steps in the bus [claimant]
was driving on the date of her injury and her usual bus was the cause of her accident.” Id. at 287,
572 S.E.2d at 509. Because the “steps were angled, different in height, and different from
normal bus steps,” “the record provide[d] sufficient evidence for the full commission to infer that
the oddity of the step construction made the stairs a condition of the workplace that contributed
to her fall.” Id. at 287-88, 572 S.E.2d 509-10.
Here, the evidence establishes that employer had recently installed the new doorway and
raised threshold to replace the previous, malfunctioning doorway. This new threshold contained
a raised lip that was approximately one-half-inch high. Employer believed the threshold posed a
safety concern and attached cautionary signs near the entrance to warn employees of the raised
threshold. Thus, the record establishes that the threshold was a new condition of the workplace
to which the employees were not accustomed, as demonstrated by the employer’s belief in the
need for the cautionary signs. Indeed, claimant testified she was unfamiliar with the raised lip of
the threshold. Notably, prior case decisions have focused on the claimant’s familiarity with the
alleged workplace hazard in affirming an award of benefits. See, e.g., id. But see Shell, 20
Va. App. at 202, 455 S.E.2d at 762-63 (reversing an award of benefits despite the fact the
incident.” Id. The commission implicitly contrasted the situation in Harlow with the case at
hand by noting that the threshold, which had been installed only recently, had a raised lip not
present on the previous threshold and that cautionary signs had been posted as a result. Thus, the
commission demonstrated its awareness that “‘simple acts of walking, bending, or turning,
without any other contributing environmental factors, are not risks of employment.’” Id. at *3
(quoting Southside Va. Training Center v. Ellis, 33 Va. App. 824, 829, 537 S.E.2d 35, 37 (2000)
(emphasis added)). Although the commission did not affirmatively state it was applying the
“actual risk” test, its reliance on these cases makes clear that the commission knew and applied
this test’s requirements.
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claimant had tripped over steps in a building in which the stairs “were different from those to
which she was accustomed” in her usual work building). By installing a threshold that had a
previously unknown physical feature, employer created a condition “of such a nature that [it]
required an increased degree of attentiveness to negotiate [it],” Ferris, 49 Va. App. at 341, 641
S.E.2d at 133, rendering the resulting injury compensable.
Significantly, Hudson testified that the threshold was of a type not typically used in
residences, but rather only for office buildings. The purpose of the raised threshold was to
prevent debris and small animals from entering the building. This evidence supports a finding
that employer installed the threshold to meet this specific business concern, a concern not
normally associated with residences—presumably because residences do not experience the
same high volume of traffic entering and exiting the building. Employer thus subjected claimant
to a heightened risk of tripping in order to accommodate those concerns. Compare Reserve Life
Ins. Co. v. Hosey, 208 Va. 568, 159 S.E.2d 633 (1968) (holding a higher-than-normal stair is an
abnormal condition), Ferris, 49 Va. App. at 342-43, 641 S.E.2d at 134 (finding a defect where
the wheelchair ramp appeared to be level from the vantage point of claimant when she fell and
injured herself), and Shepherd, 39 Va. App. at 293, 572 S.E.2d at 512 (holding scaffolding is an
abnormal condition because the height presented a greater risk than ordinary stairs), with Horton,
35 Va. App. at 30, 542 S.E.2d at 785 (reversing an award of benefits because the claimant could
not prove the set of steps from which she fell presented a particular risk).
The decision makes clear that the commission knew of the “actual risk” test’s
requirements and applied them to the case at hand. Further, credible evidence supports the
commission’s finding that claimant’s trip over the threshold arose out of her employment. The
raised lip of the threshold, its recent installation, the employer’s placement of cautionary signs
near the threshold, and specific purpose of which the threshold was installed all constitute
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credible evidence supporting the commission’s award of benefits. Accordingly, I would affirm
the commission’s award of temporary disability benefits, and I respectfully dissent.
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