Sharon Kay Dalton v. Dept of ABC/Commonwealth of VA ( 2002 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Elder, Bray and Senior Judge Overton
SHARON KAY DALTON
MEMORANDUM OPINION*
v. Record No. 2866-01-2 PER CURIAM
MARCH 5, 2002
DEPARTMENT OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL/
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
(Sharon K. Dalton, pro se, on brief).
(Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General; Judith
Williams Jagdmann, Deputy Attorney General;
Edward M. Macon, Senior Assistant Attorney
General; Scott John Fitzgerald, Assistant
Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Sharon K. Dalton (claimant) contends the Workers'
Compensation Commission erred in finding that she failed to
prove either the doctrine of equitable estoppel or the doctrine
of imposition applied to toll the two-year statute of
limitations contained in Code § 65.2-708(A) applicable to her
May 1, 2000 change-in-condition application. Upon reviewing the
record and the parties' briefs, we conclude that this appeal is
without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the
commission's decision. Rule 5A:27.
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
Equitable Estoppel
To prove estoppel, a claimant must show by
"clear, precise and unequivocal evidence"
that he relied to his detriment upon an act
or statement of an employer or its agent to
refrain from filing a claim within the
statutory period. Estoppel does not require
"proof that the representation [was] false
or that the employer intend[ed] to induce
reliance. The employee's case is made if
the 'representation . . . did in fact induce
the [employee] to refrain from filing [a
claim].'" However, an employer has no
affirmative duty under the Act to inform an
injured employee of the need to file a claim
with the commission within the statutory
period . . . .
Jenkins v. Ford Motor Co., 27 Va. App. 281, 288, 498 S.E.2d 445,
449 (1998) (citations omitted). Furthermore, an "employer is
not estopped from asserting the statute of limitations defense
merely because it voluntarily paid (1) medical bills, (2) wages,
or (3) benefits." Strong v. Old Dominion Power Co., 35 Va. App.
119, 125, 543 S.E.2d 598, 600 (2001) (citations omitted).
In ruling that equitable estoppel did not apply in this
case, the commission found as follows:
[C]laimant testified that she believed that
every document that she forwarded to the
employer was a claim. She also testified
that she spoke to [David] Wingold[, her
supervisor,] about being compensated for her
lost time from work. The claimant, Wingold,
and [Gerald] Powell testified that it was
important to follow the employer's internal
"chain of command." . . .
Wingold acknowledged that the claimant
asked about recovering her lost wages and
that he told her that workers' compensation
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would pay for those wages. However, this is
not the equivalent of a representation that
the employer would file a claim on her
behalf to recover her lost wages. Wingold
did not prevent the claimant from filing, or
persuade her not to file, a claim with the
Commission. There is no evidence that the
employer discouraged her from filing a
claim. In fact, the claimant testified that
Wingold and Ford told her in May 1999 that
workers' compensation would pay for her lost
wages. A claim filed within six months of
this information would have been timely.
Significantly, the record reflects that
the Commission forwarded information to the
claimant before she filed her initial Claim
for Benefits in 1998. Her 1998 claim
included a request for compensation
benefits. The claimant had a Hearing and
was awarded compensation and medical
benefits. She apparently went beyond the
"chain of command" to file the initial
claim. . . .
As the claimant noted, the employer
processed all of her medical bills.
However, the employer was merely abiding by
the outstanding medical award. The
employer's proper action does not absolve
the claimant of the statutory requirement to
file a claim for addition [sic] benefits
within two years from the last day for which
compensation was paid. We recognize that
she worked for an agency of the Commonwealth
of Virginia and that the Commission is also
an agency of the Commonwealth of Virginia,
which may have led to some confusion.
However, this does not alleviate the
claimant's responsibility to timely file a
claim with the Commission.
The commission's factual findings are supported by credible
evidence. Based upon these findings, the commission, as fact
finder, could conclude that "the claimant has not proven with
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clear and unequivocal evidence that the employer told her that
she did not need to file a claim for wage loss." The commission
could also conclude, based upon this record, it was "not
persuaded that after a contested Hearing, the employer misled
the claimant or misrepresented to her that everything would be
paid without further action on her part." As fact finder, the
commission weighed the testimony of claimant and the testimony
of employer's witnesses, and concluded claimant failed to prove
that employer made any representation, upon which she relied,
and which caused her not to file another claim.
Because credible evidence supports the commission's
findings, we cannot find as a matter of law that claimant's
evidence sustained her burden of proving equitable estoppel.
Imposition
The doctrine of imposition also does not apply to toll the
statute of limitations in this case. Imposition is based on the
principle that "the commission has 'jurisdiction to do full and
complete justice in each case,' . . . even though no fraud,
mistake or concealment has been shown." Avon Prods., Inc. v.
Ross, 14 Va. App. 1, 7, 415 S.E.2d 225, 228 (1992) (quoting
Harris v. Diamond Constr. Co., 184 Va. 711, 720, 36 S.E.2d 573,
577 (1946)).
"The doctrine focuses on an employer's or the commission's
use of superior knowledge of or experience with the Workers'
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Compensation Act or use of economic leverage, which results in
an unjust deprivation to the employee of benefits warranted
under the Act." Butler v. City of Va. Beach, 22 Va. App. 601,
605, 471 S.E.2d 830, 832 (1996). The doctrine does not apply
where the employer's acts are consistent with an endeavor to
comply with the Act. See Cheski v. Arlington County Pub. Schs.,
16 Va. App. 936, 940, 434 S.E.2d 353, 356 (1993).
Nothing in this record establishes that employer used
economic leverage or superior knowledge of the Act to effect an
unjust deprivation of benefits, and nothing indicates employer
did not endeavor to comply with the Act. To the contrary,
employer's conduct showed an intent to comply with the Act.
Employer filed a First Report of Accident and paid claimant
compensation and medical bills pursuant to the commission's May
18, 1998 decision. Thus, we cannot find as a matter of law that
claimant's evidence proved that the doctrine of imposition
applied to toll the statute of limitations in this case.
For these reasons, we affirm the commission's decision.
Affirmed.
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