Margarita Mendoza-Garcia v. Cho Yeon Hwi ( 2001 )


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  •                       COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Willis, Bray and Clements
    Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
    MARGARITA MENDOZA-GARCIA
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.   Record No. 1257-00-4              JUDGE JEAN HARRISON CLEMENTS
    MARCH 27, 2001
    CHO YEON HWI/BEST CLEANERS AND
    UNINSURED EMPLOYER'S FUND
    FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
    Manuel R. Geraldo (Robinson & Geraldo, P.C.,
    on brief), for appellant.
    Paul S. Stahl, Assistant Attorney General
    (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General; John J.
    Beall, Jr., Senior Assistant Attorney
    General, on brief), for appellee Uninsured
    Employer's Fund.
    No brief or argument for appellee Cho Yeon
    Hwi/Best Cleaners.
    Margarita Mendoza-Garcia appeals the decision of the Workers'
    Compensation Commission dismissing her claim for lack of
    jurisdiction.   She contends that the full commission, in
    dismissing her claim for benefits based on the decision of the
    Supreme Court in Granados v. Windson Development Corp., 
    257 Va. 103
    , 
    509 S.E.2d 290
    (1999), erred as a matter of law.    We disagree
    and affirm the decision of the commission.
    * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    As the parties are fully conversant with the record in this
    case and because this memorandum opinion carries no precedential
    value, this opinion recites only those facts necessary to a
    disposition of this appeal.
    Mendoza-Garcia was injured while working on January 22, 1999.
    She concedes that she was an undocumented alien at the time who
    was not authorized to legally work in the United States.    She
    argues, however, that Granados does not apply to her because she
    did not misrepresent, and her employer did not inquire about, her
    immigration status.   Furthermore, applying Granados to her claim,
    she contends, violates public policy and denies her equal
    protection under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
    Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Constitution of
    Virginia.   Finally, she asks us to retroactively apply to her
    claim the 2000 amendment to Code § 65.2-101 that added "aliens
    . . . whether lawfully or unlawfully employed" to the definition
    of "employee."
    In Granados, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether
    an undocumented alien was an "employee" as defined in Code
    § 65.2-101.   The Court held that, under the provisions of the
    United States Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, an
    undocumented alien could not lawfully contract for hire and,
    therefore, could not satisfy the definition of "employee" under
    the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act.   
    Granados, 257 Va. at 108-09
    , 509 S.E.2d at 293.
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    Mendoza-Garcia first argues that Granados does not apply to
    her, because she, unlike the claimant in Granados, did not
    misrepresent her status as an illegal alien.   Furthermore, she
    adds, her employer, Cho Yeon Hwi/Best Cleaners, unlike the
    employer in Granados, made no inquiry about her status.   However,
    the decision in Granados turned neither on the employee's
    misrepresentation nor on the employer's inquiry regarding the
    employee's status.   Rather, the Supreme Court held that "Granados
    was not eligible to receive compensation benefits as an 'employee'
    under the [Virginia Workers' Compensation Act] because his
    purported contract of hire was void and unenforceable."   
    Id. Mendoza-Garcia next argues
    that to apply Granados to the
    facts of her case would only serve to encourage employers to
    violate federal and state law.    Therefore, her argument continues,
    she should be eligible for benefits on public policy grounds.     We
    must, however, adhere to the holding of the Supreme Court of
    Virginia in Granados.   See Roane v. Roane, 
    12 Va. App. 989
    , 993,
    
    407 S.E.2d 698
    , 700 (1991) (noting that we are bound by the
    Supreme Court's decisions and are without authority to overrule
    them).   To the extent that Mendoza-Garcia invites us to decide
    this case as a matter of public policy, we decline her invitation,
    recognizing that "public policy . . . considerations belong
    exclusively in the legislative domain."   Infants v. Virginia Hous.
    Dev. Auth., 
    221 Va. 659
    , 671, 
    272 S.E.2d 649
    , 656 (1980).
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    Mendoza-Garcia further argues that applying Granados to this
    case would deny her equal protection under the law.   However, the
    Supreme Court unequivocally rejected this argument in Granados.
    There, the Court found that the denial of workers' compensation
    benefits did not violate the claimant's constitutional right of
    equal protection because "[t]he denial of benefits result[ed] from
    Granados' failure to meet his burden of proving that he was an
    'employee' under the [Virginia Workers' Compensation Act], not
    from his status as an illegal alien."   
    Granados, 257 Va. at 109
    ,
    509 S.E.2d at 293.
    Lastly, Mendoza-Garcia urges us to apply the 2000 amendment
    to Code § 65.2-101 that took effect April 19, 2000,
    retroactively to her claim.   The legislature, she asserts, in
    including "aliens . . . whether lawfully or unlawfully employed"
    within the definition of an "employee," expressed its
    disagreement with the Supreme Court's decision in Granados.
    Therefore, she continues, to achieve the benevolent purpose of
    the Workers' Compensation Act, we should apply the amendment
    retroactively.
    Again, though, we are bound by the decision of the Supreme
    Court in Granados.   The Court interpreted in that case the
    version of Code § 65.2-101 that was applicable to this case.      We
    may not now ignore the Court's interpretation of the applicable
    law merely because of a subsequent change in the statute.     The
    general rule is that a statute will always be construed as
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    operating prospectively, rather than retrospectively, unless the
    legislature makes a contrary intent manifest.   Duffy v.
    Hartstock, 
    187 Va. 406
    , 419, 
    46 S.E.2d 570
    , 576 (1948).    That
    general principle has been given statutory approval in Code
    § 1-16.   Brushy Ridge Coal Co. v. Blevins, 
    6 Va. App. 73
    , 79,
    
    367 S.E.2d 204
    , 207 (1988).   Here, the legislature specifically
    made the amendment adding "aliens" to the definition of
    "employee" in Code § 65.2-101 effective April 19, 2000.    We find
    nothing in the amended statute to indicate that the legislature
    intended that the amendment be applied retroactively.   Hence, we
    will not do so.
    Accordingly, we find no error, and the decision of the
    commission is affirmed.
    Affirmed.
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