Sa'ad El-Amin v. Carolyn Adams ( 2002 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Annunziata, Agee and Senior Judge Coleman
SA'AD EL-AMIN
MEMORANDUM OPINION *
v. Record No. 1063-01-2 PER CURIAM
JANUARY 29, 2002
CAROLYN ADAMS
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND
Barnard F. Jennings, Judge Designate
(Sa'ad El-Amin, pro se, on brief).
No brief for appellee.
Sa'ad El-Amin (husband) appeals the decision of the circuit
court finding him in arrears in spousal support, ordering him to
make a good faith effort to pay the amount due to Carolyn Adams
(wife), and finding him in contempt of court. On appeal, husband
contends the trial court erred by (1) including in its order
findings it did not make when the parties were before the court,
(2) deferring a ruling on husband's entitlement to subpoenaed
materials until the hearing date, and (3) denying husband's
request to present arguments on the termination of spousal support
with a reservation to conduct additional matters. Upon reviewing
the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision
of the trial court. See Rule 5A:27.
On appeal, we view the evidence and all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to appellee as the party
prevailing below. See McGuire v. McGuire, 10 Va. App. 248, 250,
391 S.E.2d 344, 346 (1990).
Procedural Background
The parties were divorced in March 1990, and husband was
ordered to pay wife spousal support. Appellant currently is
obligated to pay wife support in the amount of $1,500 per month.
In September 2000, wife filed a motion to reinstate and a petition
for rule to show cause. Wife contended husband was in arrears in
his support payments. Husband argued he was unable to make the
payments and filed a motion to terminate spousal support. Husband
served wife's employer with a subpoena duces tecum requesting
information regarding wife's employment. Wife filed a motion to
quash the subpoena. After hearing arguments on the motion to
quash on December 11, 2000, the trial court deferred ruling and
advised the parties that it would decide the matter when it heard
their case.
The court heard the case on January 11, 2001. At the hearing
the court denied wife's motion to quash and granted husband a
continuance on the motion to terminate support. The court found
husband in contempt, fined him $1,000, found he was in arrears in
the amount of $137,035.21, and transferred the case to the
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juvenile and domestic relations district court. The court entered
the order on March 23, 2001.
Analysis
I.
Husband argues the trial court included in the order factual
findings and rulings that had not been made when the parties were
before the court. He also contends the trial court erred by
entering the order without his endorsement in violation of Rule
1:13.
Rule 1:13 provides, in pertinent part, that "[d]rafts of
orders and decrees shall be endorsed by counsel of record, or
reasonable notice of the time and place of presenting such
drafts together with copies thereof shall be served [on] all
counsel of record who have not endorsed them." However,
"[c]ompliance with this rule . . . may be modified or dispensed
with by the court in its discretion." Rule 1:13. When
dispensing with endorsement or notice pursuant to Rule 1:13,
a better practice would be for a trial court
to include a statement reflecting its
decision to exercise its discretion, [but,]
in the absence of such a statement, we
presume that a trial court exercised its
discretion . . . . Courts are presumed to
act in accordance with the law and orders of
the court are entitled to a presumption of
regularity.
Napert v. Napert, 261 Va. 45, 47, 540 S.E.2d 882, 884 (2001).
Accordingly, on the instant record, we must presume the court
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exercised discretion in dispensing with both the endorsement and
notice requirements that attended the order in issue.
Furthermore, a review of the trial court's transcript
reveals the court's written order included only factual findings
and rulings made at the hearing. The trial court did not err in
entering the order.
II.
At the December 11, 2000 hearing, the trial court declined
to rule on wife's motion to quash. On January 11, 2001, the
court heard argument on the motion, denied it, and granted
husband a continuance in order to review the requested documents
and prepare arguments concerning his motion to terminate spousal
support. Husband has failed to demonstrate any prejudice
resulting from the court's decision to postpone ruling on the
motion. The trial court did not abuse its discretion.
III.
After the court denied wife's motion to quash, husband
asked to proceed with his motion to terminate support with a
reservation of right to conduct additional matters after
reviewing the materials provided by wife's employer. The court
denied husband's request, preferring to hear the entire matter
at once and granted husband a continuance, at his request.
"[T]he order of proof is a matter
within the sound discretion of the trial
court and [an appellate] court will not
reverse the judgment except in very
exceptional cases, and, unless it
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affirmatively appears from the record that
this discretion has been abused, [an
appellate] court will not disturb the trial
court's ruling."
Lebedun v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 697, 715, 501 S.E.2d 427,
436 (1998) (citation omitted). The trial court did not abuse
its discretion by denying husband's request to hear arguments
with reservation to conduct additional matters.
Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial
court. See Rule 5A:27.
Affirmed.
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