Jacqueline L Palmer v. Support Services of Va, etal ( 2003 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Elder, Felton and Senior Judge Willis
JACQUELINE L. PALMER
MEMORANDUM OPINION*
v. Record No. 0060-03-1 PER CURIAM
MAY 6, 2003
SUPPORT SERVICES OF VIRGINIA, INC. AND
TWIN CITY FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
(Jacqueline L. Palmer, pro se, on brief).
(Adam S. Rafal; Vandeventer Black L.L.P., on
brief), for appellees.
Jacqueline L. Palmer (claimant) contends the Workers'
Compensation Commission erred in finding that the doctrine of
collateral estoppel barred her January 15, 2002
change-in-condition application because the issue of whether she
was entitled to a change in treating physicians had been
previously litigated. 1 Upon reviewing the record and the
parties' briefs, we conclude that this appeal is without merit.
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
1
Although claimant raises fourteen separate Questions
Presented in her opening brief, we find that this issue was the
sole issue before the commission when it rendered its December
10, 2002 decision from which claimant has appealed to this
Court. Thus, this issue is dispositive of this appeal, and is
the sole issue we will address on appeal.
Accordingly, we summarily affirm the commission's decision.
Rule 5A:27.
In ruling that claimant's application was barred by
collateral estoppel, the commission found as follows:
The claimant has not seen Dr. [Colin]
Hamilton since May 6, 1998. There is no
evidence Dr. Hamilton would refuse to treat
the claimant. Since the claimant submitted
no new evidence to support her application
for a change in treating physicians, this
case has therefore already been litigated,
and is barred by collateral estoppel.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies "in a
subsequent action based upon a collateral and different cause of
action." Bates v. Devers, 214 Va. 667, 671, 202 S.E.2d 917, 921
(1974). "Under the principle of collateral estoppel, 'the
parties to the first action and their privies are precluded from
litigating [in a subsequent action] any issue of fact actually
litigated and essential to a valid and final personal judgment
in the first action.'" Slagle v. Slagle, 11 Va. App. 341, 344,
398 S.E.2d 346, 348 (1990) (quoting Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Bailey
Lumber Co., 221 Va. 638, 640, 272 S.E.2d 217, 218 (1980)).
"'[A]n appropriate test for determining the identity of issues
involved in former and subsequent actions is "whether the same
evidence will support both actions."'" Allegheny Airlines, Inc.
v. Merillat, 14 Va. App. 341, 343, 416 S.E.2d 467, 469 (1992)
(citations omitted).
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The issue of whether claimant was entitled to a change in
treating physicians from Dr. Hamilton was actually litigated and
decided in the deputy commissioners' April 16, 1998 and March 3,
1999 opinions. Claimant did not appeal either decision.
Claimant presented no new evidence to support her January 15,
2002 change-in-condition application. Accordingly, the
commission did not err in holding that the doctrine of
collateral estoppel barred it from considering claimant's
January 15, 2002 application.
For these reasons, we affirm the commission's decision.
Affirmed.
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