Ronald James Uzenoff v. Linda Anne Terrell ( 2000 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Willis, Bumgardner and Frank
Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
RONALD JAMES UZENOFF
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 2047-99-4 JUDGE RUDOLPH BUMGARDNER, III
APRIL 11, 2000
LINDA ANNE TERRELL
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY
M. Langhorne Keith, Judge
Donald E. Coulter for appellant.
John D. Steffan (Steffan & Associates, P.C.,
on brief), for appellee.
The trial court found Ronald James Uzenoff $11,247 in
arrears in child support payments. He alleges the trial court
erred in finding that a 1991 consent order extended his
obligation to pay child support past the age of eighteen.
Finding no error, we affirm.
The parties married in 1977, separated in 1986, and
divorced September 28, 1990. They had two children: Kimberly
Nicole born March 22, 1979 and Jennifer Marie born January 28,
1983. The trial court entered a child support order on July 31,
1991 that ordered the husband to pay child support to each
child. Child support continued "until [she] finished school
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
and/or college, dies, marries, or is otherwise emancipated."
The husband's counsel endorsed this order as "seen agreed."
Neither party appealed that order.
In 1999, the wife filed to enforce the support order, and
the husband defended that he had overpaid child support for his
oldest daughter because she was eighteen years old and past the
age of majority. The husband concedes that she attends college.
The trial court ordered the husband to continue paying child
support while his daughter was in college and entered judgment
for the payments in arrears. The husband argues that the trial
court (1) lacked jurisdiction to order child support past the
age of majority, and (2) erred in finding that his obligation to
pay child support did not end upon the child turning eighteen
years old and completing high school.
A divorce court has jurisdiction to provide for support and
maintenance of minor children. See Code §§ 20-103 through
-109.1. Children attain their majority at the age of eighteen
years. See Code § 1.13-42(a)(1). Accord Code § 20-103(v).
Jurisdiction to provide support for minors terminates when a
child turns eighteen years old. 1 See Hosier v. Hosier, 221 Va.
1Code § 20-124.2(C) provides:
The court may order that support be
paid for any child of the parties. The
court shall also order that support will
continue to be paid for any child over the
age of eighteen who is (i) a full-time high
school student, (ii) not self-supporting,
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827, 831, 273 S.E.2d 564, 566 (1981); Cutshaw v. Cutshaw, 220
Va. 638, 641, 261 S.E.2d 52, 54 (1979); Eaton v. Eaton, 215 Va.
824, 826, 213 S.E.2d 789, 791 (1975).
However, parties may agree to support their children beyond
reaching the age of majority. If they do, the courts may
enforce the agreement. See Hosier, 221 Va. at 831, 273 S.E.2d
at 566 (court's jurisdiction terminates when child reaches
eighteen "unless otherwise provided by agreement incorporated
into the divorce decree"); Cutshaw, 220 Va. at 641, 261 S.E.2d
at 54; Paul v. Paul, 214 Va. 651, 654, 203 S.E.2d 123, 126
(1974) (it is clear that the parties intended to support
children past majority). It is undisputed that the parties'
daughter turned eighteen years old and is no longer a minor.
and (iii) living in the home of the party
seeking or receiving child support until
such child reaches the age of nineteen or
graduates from high school, whichever first
occurs. The court may also order the
continuation of support for any child over
the age of eighteen who is (i) severely and
permanently mentally or physically disabled,
(ii) unable to live independently and
support himself, and (iii) resides in the
home of the parent seeking or receiving
child support. In addition, the court may
confirm a stipulation or agreement of the
parties which extends a support obligation
beyond when it would otherwise terminate as
provided by law. The court shall have no
authority to decree support of children
payable by the estate of a deceased party.
The court may make such further decree as it
shall deem expedient concerning support of
the minor children, including an order that
any party provide health care coverage.
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Unless otherwise provided by agreement between the parties, the
trial court lacked jurisdiction to order the husband to support
her beyond her eighteenth birthday.
The 1991 order provided that the father would support each
child "until said child has finished high school and/or college,
dies, marries, or is otherwise emancipated." The phrase "or is
otherwise emancipated" would only apply if the child was under
eighteen and still a minor. The child must have the status of
"minor" in order to be emancipated. The phrase "or is otherwise
emancipated" could only encompass an event that would free the
minor from that status before the status terminated by the
inexorable passage of time. By reaching the age of majority,
the child could no longer be emancipated because she was no
longer a minor. 2 The phrase "or is otherwise emancipated" as
used in the child support order cannot limit the determination
of whether the order obligated the parties to pay support after
a child reached eighteen.
Both parties appeared before the trial court and testified
at the hearing on child and spousal support held July 26, 1991.
The trial court found that the parties agreed that the husband
would continue to pay child support after the children turned
eighteen years old. The order memorialized their agreement that
2
Code § 16.1-333 provides that a court may declare a minor
emancipated if she is validly married, in the armed forces, or
willingly living separate and apart from her parents.
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support continue until their daughters "finished high school
and/or college." Both parties endorsed the order as seen and
agreed, and neither party appealed its entry. The language was
clear that the parties intended support to continue past the age
of majority if the child was enrolled in high school or college
and had not been emancipated while a minor.
The husband's interpretation of the 1991 order renders the
words "finished high school and/or college" meaningless and of
no effect. The order should be interpreted in the same manner
as statutes and contracts. "No word or clause in the contract
will be treated as meaningless if a reasonable meaning can be
given to it, and there is a presumption that the parties have
not used words needlessly." D.C. McClain, Inc. v. Arlington
County, 249 Va. 131, 135-36, 452 S.E.2d 659, 662 (1995)
(citations omitted).
We conclude that the trial court correctly interpreted its
1991 order. The consent order memorialized the parties'
agreement that the husband would support his children past the
age of majority if they attended high school or college.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
Affirmed.
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