Deborah A. Williams v. Wiley D. Williams ( 1998 )


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  •                      COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Baker, Bray and Overton
    Argued at Norfolk, Virginia
    DEBORAH A. WILLIAMS
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.          Record No. 2443-97-1          JUDGE JOSEPH E. BAKER
    JUNE 30, 1998
    WILEY D. WILLIAMS
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH
    John K. Moore, Judge
    Carl W. Isbrandtsen (Carl W. Isbrandtsen, P.C.,
    on briefs), for appellant.
    Moody E. Stallings, Jr. (Kevin E. Martingayle;
    Stallings & Richardson, P.C., on brief), for
    appellee.
    In this appeal from a decree of divorce entered by the
    Circuit Court of the City of Virginia Beach (trial court),
    Deborah A. Williams (wife) contends the trial court
    (1) erroneously classified common stock of B. R. Williams & Son,
    Inc. (the company), registered in the name of Wiley D. Williams
    (husband), as separate property, or, in the alternative,
    (2) erroneously classified as separate property real estate known
    as Lot 72, Section 6, Corova (Lot 72), and (3) erroneously valued
    husband's interest in real property known as Mandan Road.
    Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    As the parties are familiar with the record, we state only
    those facts necessary to an understanding of this opinion.      In
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    doing so, we separately discuss the applicable facts relating to
    the issues raised and view the evidence in the light most
    favorable to the prevailing party below.    The evidence was heard
    by a commissioner in chancery, to whom the matter was referred by
    the trial court.
    Pursuant to Code § 20-107.3, the trial court is authorized
    to make monetary awards.   See Day v. Day, 
    8 Va. App. 346
    , 349,
    
    381 S.E.2d 364
    , 366 (1989).   The trial court's findings are
    presumed correct on appeal and are given "great weight" by this
    Court.   See Rowe v. Rowe, 
    24 Va. App. 123
    , 140, 
    480 S.E.2d 760
    ,
    768 (1997) (quoting Panlock v. Gallop, 
    207 Va. 989
    , 994, 
    154 S.E.2d 153
    , 157 (1967)).   The party who asserts the trial court
    erred in making such findings "is required to overcome the
    presumption by record proof."     Broom v. Broom, 
    15 Va. App. 497
    ,
    504, 
    425 S.E.2d 90
    , 94 (1992).    Therefore, in reviewing the
    record and wife's claims, we must accord great deference to the
    trial court's findings, and its judgment will not be disturbed
    unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.     See,
    e.g., Keyser v. Keyser, 
    7 Va. App. 405
    , 409, 
    374 S.E.2d 698
    , 701
    (1988) (citing Code § 8.01-680).
    Stock of B. R. Williams & Son, Inc.
    Husband and his parents formed the company in 1972, prior to
    husband's marriage to wife.   Husband, his father, and his mother
    each received one-third of the outstanding shares of the
    company's stock.   Upon his father's death in 1982, husband
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    inherited his father's one-third share in the company.
    Subsequently, husband's mother loaned the company a total of
    $85,000, which has never been repaid.
    In 1986, husband and wife borrowed and advanced $4,500 to
    the company, which, with $16,500 of the company's money, was used
    to purchase two real estate lots in Currituck, North Carolina,
    identified as Lot 72, Section 6 (Lot 72), and Lot 6, Section 4
    (Lot 6).   Husband's original intent was to title each lot in the
    company's name; however, "during closing," at which wife was not
    present, husband directed Lot 6 be titled jointly to him and wife
    and Lot 72 be titled in the company's name only.   Wife testified
    she was unaware Lot 72 had not also been titled jointly in the
    parties' names.
    The commissioner accepted husband's testimony that Lot 72
    was intended to be corporate property and recommended it be
    declared separate property owned solely by the company and valued
    at $41,282.   Wife claimed Lot 72, titled to the company, was an
    asset she contributed to the company which transmuted husband's
    stock to marital property.   However, the trial court rejected
    that claim, and we cannot say its decision was clearly wrong.
    In addition, the commissioner reported the evidence
    disclosed that the company stock had no fair market value other
    than the value of the lot, and the record confirms that the
    company had no assets other than Lot 72.   The trial court
    accepted the commissioner's appraisal.   Because no evidence
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    supports a contrary view and the debt to husband's mother was
    twice the amount of the sole corporate asset, we cannot say the
    trial court's decision was clearly wrong or without evidence to
    support it.
    The North Carolina Property
    The commissioner reported Lot 6 was marital property, and
    the trial court agreed.   The parties do not contest that
    decision.   The commissioner noted, and in fact the record shows,
    there was considerable dispute over whether the parties intended
    Lot 72 to be owned by the corporation or by the parties jointly.
    While the evidence is conflicting, the trial court accepted
    husband's evidence when it declared Lot 72 and the company stock
    owned by husband to be separate properties.      The commissioner
    noted the property was titled in the corporate name and accepted
    the testimony presented by husband that only corporate assets
    were used to purchase Lot 72 and that it was always the parties'
    intent to title it in that manner.       He implicitly rejected wife's
    assertion that the corporate monies paid for the lots were salary
    to husband rather than funds for purchase of an asset (Lot 72)
    for the company.   He also rejected wife's claims of resulting
    trust, fraud, and transmutation.
    Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to husband
    as the prevailing party below, we cannot say the trial court
    erred in making that decision.
    Mandan Road
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    Wife contends the trial court made an erroneous monetary
    award in favor of husband when it approved the commissioner's
    proposed division of the equity in the Mandan Road property.       The
    commissioner's report, approved by the trial court, contained the
    following analysis:
    Mandan Road, Virginia Beach, Virginia. The
    marital home is legally titled in the [wife].
    It has a fair market value of $89,000.00 and
    secures a debt of approximately $53,000.00,
    leaving an equity of $36,000.00. It is
    marital property. Considering sale expenses,
    the equity would be reduced by at least
    $7,000.00, for an equity of $29,000.00, or
    Defendant's share of $14,500.00.
    Wife does not dispute the classification of the property as
    marital, although it was titled in her name only.    Rather, she
    contends husband's share had no value.
    In this appeal, the burden is upon wife to show by the
    record that the trial court's finding constituted reversible
    error.    We hold wife failed to show by this record that the trial
    court erroneously valued husband's marital interest in Mandan
    Road.
    The parties do not dispute that, when they resided together
    in the Mandan Road house, the property was titled in wife's name
    only.    Originally, the property secured two loans made to the
    parties jointly.    A first mortgage favored Life Savings Bank.
    The balance owed was $23,351.12.    The second lien secured a loan
    made to the parties by Seaboard Savings Bank with a $28,754.29
    balance owed.    Seaboard demanded payment of the balance due it,
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    causing the parties to refinance the debts.   For reasons
    disputed, the new lender would not accept husband as a borrower,
    and wife became sole owner of the property and solely responsible
    for the amount borrowed.   An exhibit discloses this loan was in
    the amount of $55,000; $23,351.12 of the loan paid Life Savings
    and $28,754.29 of the loan paid Seaboard.   Wife concedes the loan
    from Life Savings was for the mutual benefit of the parties.
    However, she asserts the $28,754.29 paid to Seaboard was for
    monies borrowed solely for the benefit of the company.   Wife's
    exception to the commissioner's valuation was as follows:
    The Commissioner failed to account for
    $28,000.00 in debt of B.R. Williams & Son,
    Inc. (a corporation solely owned by the
    defendant and his mother). The plaintiff
    will have to pay back this debt by repayment
    of the Note secured by the property, although
    the benefit of same accrued to the
    corporation.
    Wife was equally liable with husband on the Seaboard loan.
    The evidence concerning use of the Seaboard loan proceeds is
    tenuous, at best.   Viewed in the light most favorable to husband,
    wife did not know for what purpose the Seaboard loan monies were
    used, and husband testified some of the money was "for use in my
    business," some was "to pay house payments" when the parties were
    living in LagoMar, and at least $1,000 went toward the purchase
    of the Corova lots.   Wife excepted to the commissioner's
    recommendation, but the trial court overruled her exception.
    Because wife failed to file a transcript of the proceedings held
    in the trial court on those exceptions, we cannot determine
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    whether the trial court erroneously valued the parties'
    respective interests in Mandan Road. 1   Wife has not met her
    burden of proving the trial court committed reversible error when
    it approved the commissioner's recommended division of the equity
    in Mandan Road.   Therefore, we cannot say the trial court erred
    in holding wife solely responsible for the balance from the
    Seaboard loan.
    For the reasons stated, the judgment of the trial court is
    affirmed.
    Affirmed.
    1
    Code § 20-107.3 mandates that the court determine the
    ownership and value of all real and personal property of the
    parties. The determination must go beyond mere guesswork. See,
    e.g., Artis v. Artis, 
    4 Va. App. 132
    , 136, 
    354 S.E.2d 812
    , 814
    (1987); Hodges v. Hodges, 
    2 Va. App. 508
    , 516, 
    347 S.E.2d 134
    ,
    139 (1986).
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