Tereence Mack Booth, etc. v. Commonwealth ( 1996 )


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  •                   COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Baker, Willis and Overton
    Argued at Norfolk, Virginia
    TERRENCE MACK BOOTH, S/K/A
    TERRANCE BOOTH
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.        Record No. 0862-95-1     JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR.
    JUNE 11, 1996
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK
    John C. Morrison, Jr., Judge
    Timothy P. Sceviour (Abrons, Fasanaro &
    Sceviour, on brief), for appellant.
    Steven A. Witmer, Assistant Attorney General
    (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on
    brief), for appellee.
    On appeal from his convictions of second degree murder and
    use of a firearm in the commission of murder, Terrence Mack Booth
    contends the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions.
    We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable
    to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable inferences
    fairly deducible therefrom.   Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 
    216 Va. 349
    , 352, 
    218 S.E.2d 534
    , 537 (1975).   The judgment of a
    trial court sitting without a jury will not be set aside unless
    plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.    Martin v.
    Commonwealth, 
    4 Va. App. 438
    , 443, 
    358 S.E.2d 415
    , 418 (1987).
    On August 28, 1994, at approximately 9:30 p.m., Officer
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    Andreano of the Norfolk Police Department responded to a radio
    dispatch that a man had been shot close to the intersection of
    28th Street and Debree Avenue.    Upon his arrival at the scene,
    Officer Andreano found the victim lying dead on the ground with
    blood on his face and surrounding his head.      No other shooting
    occurred in that area on August 28, 1994.
    Sharmeka Spratley testified that on the evening of August
    28, 1994, Booth telephoned her and arranged to spend the night at
    her home.   He told her that "he shot somebody or he might have."
    The next morning, Ms. Spratley and two friends drove Booth home.
    At the intersection of 28th Street and Debree Avenue, the
    driver, Ms. Jerry Morris, asked Booth, "where the gentlemen he
    had killed at."   Booth pointed to the crime scene, which was
    cordoned off with yellow tape, and replied, "right over there."
    Booth contends that the evidence against him is wholly
    circumstantial.   Acknowledging that the evidence is suggestive of
    his guilt, he argues that it nonetheless fails to exclude every
    reasonable hypothesis of innocence and, thus, is insufficient to
    support his conviction. We disagree.
    Direct evidence is evidence which tends to establish a
    fact in issue without the aid of an inference.
    It is
    [E]vidence that directly proves a fact,
    without an inference or presumption, and
    which in itself, if true, conclusively
    establishes that fact.
    *    *    *    *      *   *     *
    Circumstantial evidence, sometimes called indirect
    - 2 -
    evidence, is evidence of facts and circumstances not in
    issue from which facts or circumstances in issue may be
    inferred.
    Friend, The Law of Evidence in Virginia (Fourth Edition, 1993),
    § 12-1.
    Officer Andreano's description of his findings at the crime
    scene is direct evidence.   Likewise, Sharmeka Spratley's report
    of Booth's statements is direct evidence.   However, the inference
    required to link those two elements of proof, renders each of
    those elements circumstantial proof as to the issue of whether
    Booth killed the victim.
    Although this case is based on circumstantial evidence,
    circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a conviction.
    Hughes v. Commonwealth, 
    18 Va. App. 510
    , 518, 
    446 S.E.2d 451
    , 456
    (1994) (en banc) (citation omitted).
    All necessary circumstances proved must be
    consistent with guilt and inconsistent with
    innocence; they must exclude every reasonable
    hypothesis of innocence; the chain of these
    circumstances must be unbroken; and the
    "circumstances of motive, time, place, means,
    and conduct must all concur to form an
    unbroken chain" linking the appellant to the
    crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
    
    Id. at 518-19, 446
    S.E.2d at 457 (citation omitted).   The proof
    must exclude only those reasonable hypotheses of innocence that
    flow from the evidence, and not those that derive from the
    ruminations of defense counsel.   See Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 
    7 Va. App. 269
    , 289, 
    373 S.E.2d 328
    , 338 (1988), cert. denied, 
    496 U.S. 911
    (1990).
    - 3 -
    The evidence supports Booth's convictions.     He confessed to
    Ms. Spratley that "I shot someone."     When passing the crime scene
    the following day, he said "that's where it happened."    No other
    shootings occurred in that area on August 28, 1994.    Booth
    admitted his presence at the crime scene, but stated that he
    thought the victim was drunk.   The trial court found this
    explanation incredible.   When the trial court asked defense
    counsel to offer a reasonable hypothesis of innocence, counsel
    could proffer none.   The evidence unerringly compels the
    conclusion of Booth's guilt.
    The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
    Affirmed.
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Document Info

Docket Number: 0862951

Filed Date: 6/11/1996

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014