George Haywood Bell v. Commonwealth ( 1996 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Baker, Bray and Overton
Argued at Norfolk, Virginia
GEORGE HAYWOOD BELL
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 0799-95-1 JUDGE NELSON T. OVERTON
JUNE 11, 1996
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK
Thomas R. McNamara, Judge
B. Cullen Gibson for appellant.
Richard H. Rizk, Assistant Attorney General
(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee.
George Bell appealed his conviction of burglary on the
ground that his preliminary hearing was held in the general
district court instead of the juvenile and domestic relations
court. We granted the appeal and affirmed the judgment below
without reaching a decision on whether Code § 16.1-241(J) applies
to Bell. The Supreme Court of Virginia, on April 10, 1996,
remanded the case to this Court for reconsideration. Upon
rehearing, we affirm Bell's conviction on the basis that Bell's
status does not entitle him to a preliminary hearing before the
juvenile and domestic relations court.
Bell burglarized the house of the widow of his father. He
was brought before general district court for a preliminary
hearing, indicted, and tried in the circuit court. Bell pled
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
guilty at a bench trial. The facts of the burglary as well as
the fact that he was the illegitimate son of the victim's
deceased husband were stipulated. In accordance with the plea
agreement, the judge sentenced Bell to 10 years, with 5
suspended.
The juvenile and domestic relations courts have exclusive,
original jurisdiction in certain cases:
J. All offenses in which one family or household
member is charged with an offense in which another
family or household member is the victim and all
offenses under § 18.2-49.1.
In prosecution for felonies over which the court
has jurisdiction, jurisdiction shall be limited to
determining whether or not there is probable cause.
. . . For purposes of this subsection, "family or
household member," as defined in § 16.1-228, shall also
be construed to include parent and child, stepparent
and stepchild, brothers and sisters, and grandparent
and grandchild, regardless of whether such persons
reside in the same home.
Code § 16.1-241(J). Bell contends that he is a stepchild of the
victim. We disagree.
By common usage and ordinary dictionary definition, a
stepchild is a "child of one's wife or husband by a former
marriage." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2237
(1993) (emphasis added); see American Heritage Dictionary 1194
(2d ed. 1985). Without a former marriage no stepchild is
possible. Other jurisdictions have adopted the requirement of a
previous marriage before one can be considered a stepchild or
stepparent. See In re Workers' Compensation Death Benefits of
Gathier, 797 P.2d 208 (Mont. 1990); State v. Buckles, 508 N.E.2d
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54 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987); Strickland v. Deaconess Hosp., 735 P.2d
74 (Wash App.), review denied, 108 Wash. 2d. 1028 (1987);
Zaragoza v. Capriola, 492 A.2d 698 (N.J. Super. 1985); B-B v.
Califano, 476 F. Supp. 970 (M.D. Ga. 1979), aff'd, B. on behalf
of B. v. Schweiker, 643 F.2d 1069 (5th Cir. 1981); Flanagan v.
Railroad Retirement Bd., 332 F.2d 301 (3d Cir. 1964); Dangerfield
v. Indemnity Ins., 24 So. 2d 375 (La. 1945). Bell stipulated
that he was the illegitimate child of the victim's deceased
husband, conceding that he was not born of a previous marriage.
Bell falls neither in the technical definition of a step-
child nor in the statutory intent to protect and preserve family
harmony. Consequently, the general district court was the proper
forum for the defendant's criminal prosecution to begin.
Affirmed.
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