Tyrone Jerrod Pettiford v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 1998 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Benton, Elder and Bray
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
TYRONE JERROD PETTIFORD
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 2770-97-2 JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY
NOVEMBER 24, 1998
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND
James B. Wilkinson, Judge
Susan D. Hansen, Deputy Public Defender
(David J. Johnson, Public Defender, on
brief), for appellant.
Eugene Murphy, Assistant Attorney General
(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief),
for appellee.
On April 16, 1997, Tyrone Jerrod Pettiford (defendant) was
convicted of carrying a concealed weapon and sentenced to five
years imprisonment, all suspended subject to supervised probation
with attendant terms and conditions. Upon the Commonwealth's
motion, the trial court subsequently ordered defendant "to show
cause why the suspended sentence . . . should not be revoked" as
a result of alleged violations of probation, including
defendant's failure to "obey all . . . laws and ordinances." At
a related hearing, the court found that defendant had violated
"conditions of . . . supervision," and revoked a portion of the
suspended sentence. Defendant appeals, complaining that the
court acted without proper evidence to support the order.
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
Finding no error, we affirm the order.
The parties are fully conversant with the record, and this
memorandum opinion recites only those facts necessary to
disposition of the appeal.
During the show cause hearing, the attorney for the
Commonwealth represented to the court that defendant had been
"convicted of trespassing, obstruction of justice, assault and
battery, and . . . [had] absconded from probation," since the
imposition of the suspended sentence. In response, defendant's
counsel conceded that defendant had been convicted of trespass
and assault and battery and explained that the offenses arose
from disputes related to visitation with his son. Counsel
acknowledged that, "once [defendant] had those convictions, . . .
he wasn't seeing [his] probation officer . . . [for fear] of
being violated."
It is well established that "probation revocation hearings
are not a stage of criminal prosecution and therefore . . .
'formal procedures and rules of evidence are not employed'
. . . . [T]he process of revocation hearings 'should be flexible
enough to consider evidence . . . that would not be admissible in
an adversary criminal trial.'" Davis v. Commonwealth, 12 Va.
App. 81, 84, 402 S.E.2d 684, 686 (1991) (citations omitted).
"[W]hether to revoke the suspension of a sentence lies within the
sound discretion of the trial court." Singleton v. Commonwealth,
11 Va. App. 575, 580, 400 S.E.2d 205, 208 (1991); see Code
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§ 19.2-306. "However, the trial judge may only revoke the
suspension of a sentence for reasonable cause." Preston v.
Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 731, 733, 419 S.E.2d 288, 290 (1992)
(citation omitted).
Here, the Commonwealth, without objection, advised the court
of those misdemeanor convictions which had prompted the instant
revocation proceedings. Immediately thereafter, defense counsel
admitted to the alleged trespass and assault and battery offenses
and explained the underlying circumstances to mitigate the
misconduct. Thus, violations of law contrary to express
conditions of probation were uncontroverted and clearly before
the court. Manifestly, "[a] [c]onviction for a misdemeanor that
occurred during the probationary period, . . . is reasonable
cause to revoke . . . a suspended sentence." Hess v.
Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 738, 741, 441 S.E.2d 29, 31 (1994).
Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial
court and affirm the disputed order.
Affirmed.
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